From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>,
Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>,
Shanker Donthineni <sdonthineni@nvidia.com>,
Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 21/43] arm64: RME: Runtime faulting of memory
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 10:00:37 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5azfp3274i.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <80e2dc67-9dca-4e90-8a42-21ddea329c53@arm.com>
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> writes:
> On 22/08/2024 04:50, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
>> Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> writes:
>>
>>> At runtime if the realm guest accesses memory which hasn't yet been
>>> mapped then KVM needs to either populate the region or fault the guest.
>>>
>>> For memory in the lower (protected) region of IPA a fresh page is
>>> provided to the RMM which will zero the contents. For memory in the
>>> upper (shared) region of IPA, the memory from the memslot is mapped
>>> into the realm VM non secure.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>> Changes since v2:
>>> * Avoid leaking memory if failing to map it in the realm.
>>> * Correctly mask RTT based on LPA2 flag (see rtt_get_phys()).
>>> * Adapt to changes in previous patches.
>>> ---
>>> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 10 ++
>>> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h | 10 ++
>>> arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 120 +++++++++++++++-
>>> arch/arm64/kvm/rme.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>> 4 files changed, 325 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>>> index 7430c77574e3..0b50572d3719 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>>> @@ -710,6 +710,16 @@ static inline bool kvm_realm_is_created(struct kvm *kvm)
>>> return kvm_is_realm(kvm) && kvm_realm_state(kvm) != REALM_STATE_NONE;
>>> }
>>>
>>> +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(struct kvm *kvm)
>>> +{
>>> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm)) {
>>> + struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
>>> +
>>> + return BIT(realm->ia_bits - 1);
>>> + }
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> static inline bool vcpu_is_rec(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> {
>>> if (static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_rme_is_available))
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h
>>> index 0e44b20cfa48..c50854f44674 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rme.h
>>> @@ -103,6 +103,16 @@ void kvm_realm_unmap_range(struct kvm *kvm,
>>> unsigned long ipa,
>>> u64 size,
>>> bool unmap_private);
>>> +int realm_map_protected(struct realm *realm,
>>> + unsigned long base_ipa,
>>> + struct page *dst_page,
>>> + unsigned long map_size,
>>> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache);
>>> +int realm_map_non_secure(struct realm *realm,
>>> + unsigned long ipa,
>>> + struct page *page,
>>> + unsigned long map_size,
>>> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache);
>>> int realm_set_ipa_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>> unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
>>> unsigned long ripas,
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>>> index 620d26810019..eb8b8d013f3e 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>>> @@ -325,8 +325,13 @@ static void __unmap_stage2_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t start, u64
>>>
>>> lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>>> WARN_ON(size & ~PAGE_MASK);
>>> - WARN_ON(stage2_apply_range(mmu, start, end, kvm_pgtable_stage2_unmap,
>>> - may_block));
>>> +
>>> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm))
>>> + kvm_realm_unmap_range(kvm, start, size, !only_shared);
>>> + else
>>> + WARN_ON(stage2_apply_range(mmu, start, end,
>>> + kvm_pgtable_stage2_unmap,
>>> + may_block));
>>> }
>>>
>>> void kvm_stage2_unmap_range(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t start, u64 size)
>>> @@ -345,7 +350,10 @@ static void stage2_flush_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
>>> phys_addr_t addr = memslot->base_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
>>> phys_addr_t end = addr + PAGE_SIZE * memslot->npages;
>>>
>>> - kvm_stage2_flush_range(&kvm->arch.mmu, addr, end);
>>> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm))
>>> + kvm_realm_unmap_range(kvm, addr, end - addr, false);
>>> + else
>>> + kvm_stage2_flush_range(&kvm->arch.mmu, addr, end);
>>> }
>>>
>>> /**
>>> @@ -1037,6 +1045,10 @@ void stage2_unmap_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
>>> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
>>> int idx, bkt;
>>>
>>> + /* For realms this is handled by the RMM so nothing to do here */
>>> + if (kvm_is_realm(kvm))
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
>>> mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
>>> write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>>> @@ -1062,6 +1074,7 @@ void kvm_free_stage2_pgd(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)
>>> if (kvm_is_realm(kvm) &&
>>> (kvm_realm_state(kvm) != REALM_STATE_DEAD &&
>>> kvm_realm_state(kvm) != REALM_STATE_NONE)) {
>>> + kvm_stage2_unmap_range(mmu, 0, (~0ULL) & PAGE_MASK);
>>> write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>>> kvm_realm_destroy_rtts(kvm, pgt->ia_bits);
>>> return;
>>> @@ -1428,6 +1441,71 @@ static bool kvm_vma_mte_allowed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>>> return vma->vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED;
>>> }
>>>
>>> +static int realm_map_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa,
>>> + kvm_pfn_t pfn, unsigned long map_size,
>>> + enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot,
>>> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache)
>>> +{
>>> + struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
>>> + struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
>>> +
>>> + if (WARN_ON(!(prot & KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W)))
>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>> +
>>> + if (!realm_is_addr_protected(realm, ipa))
>>> + return realm_map_non_secure(realm, ipa, page, map_size,
>>> + memcache);
>>> +
>>> + return realm_map_protected(realm, ipa, page, map_size, memcache);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int private_memslot_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>> + phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>>> + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
>>> +{
>>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>> + gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(kvm);
>>> + gfn_t gfn = (fault_ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>>> + bool is_priv_gfn = !((fault_ipa & gpa_stolen_mask) == gpa_stolen_mask);
>>> + bool priv_exists = kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn);
>>> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;
>>> + kvm_pfn_t pfn;
>>> + int ret;
>>> +
>>> + if (priv_exists != is_priv_gfn) {
>>> + kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu,
>>> + fault_ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask,
>>> + PAGE_SIZE,
>>> + kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu),
>>> + false, is_priv_gfn);
>>> +
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + if (!is_priv_gfn) {
>>> + /* Not a private mapping, handling normally */
>>> + return -EAGAIN;
>>> + }
>>>
>>
>> Instead of that EAGAIN, it better to handle as below?
>
> I'm not finding the below easier to read.
>
>> arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
>> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>> index 1eddbc7d7156..33ef95b5c94a 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>> @@ -1480,11 +1480,6 @@ static int private_memslot_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> - if (!is_priv_gfn) {
>> - /* Not a private mapping, handling normally */
>> - return -EAGAIN;
>> - }
>> -
>> ret = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(memcache,
>> kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu));
>> if (ret)
>> @@ -1925,12 +1920,25 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> gfn = kvm_gpa_from_fault(vcpu->kvm, ipa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> memslot = gfn_to_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
>>
>> - if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(memslot)) {
>> - ret = private_memslot_fault(vcpu, fault_ipa, memslot);
>> - if (ret != -EAGAIN)
>> + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(memslot) &&
>> + kvm_is_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, ipa)) {
>
> I presume kvm_is_private_gpa() is defined as something like:
>
> static bool kvm_is_private_gpa(kvm, phys_addr_t ipa)
> {
> gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(kvm);
> return !((ipa & gpa_stolen_mask) == gpa_stolen_mask);
> }
>
>> + ret = private_memslot_fault(vcpu, ipa, memslot);
>
> So this handles the case in private_memslot_fault() where is_priv_gfn is
> true. So there's a little bit of simplification in
> private_memslot_fault().
>
>> goto out;
>> }
>> + /* attribute msimatch. shared access fault on a mem with private attribute */
>> + if (kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, gfn)) {
>> + /* let VMM fixup the memory attribute */
>> + kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu,
>> + kvm_gpa_from_fault(vcpu->kvm, ipa),
>> + PAGE_SIZE,
>> + kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu),
>> + false, false);
>
> And then we have to duplicate the code here for calling
> kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(). Which seems a bit ugly to me. Am I
> missing something? Your patch doesn't seem complete.
>
What confused me was I was looking at EAGAIN as retry access. But here
it is not a retry. It is an error condition for handling the fault as a
shared access fault. IMHO having that check in the caller makes it
simpler. ie,
if it is a private fault private_memslot_fault handle it with the fault
exit condition that indicates an attribute mismatch
if it is a shared fault the existing fault handling code handles it with
the fault exit condition indicating an attribute mismatch.
If you find the change not clean, can we rename the error to EINVAL?
>
>> +
>> + ret = 0;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>>
>> + /* Slot can be be private, but fault addr is not, handle that as normal fault */
>> hva = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(memslot, gfn, &writable);
>> write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu);
>> if (kvm_is_error_hva(hva) || (write_fault && !writable)) {
>
>
> Note your email had a signature line "--" here which causes my email
> client to remove the rest of your reply - it's worth dropping that from
> the git output when sending diffs. I've attempted to include your
> second diff below manually.
>
>> Instead of referring this as stolen bits is it better to do
>>
>> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
>> arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 21 ++++++++-------------
>> 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>> index 0b50572d3719..790412fd53b8 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>> @@ -710,14 +710,28 @@ static inline bool kvm_realm_is_created(struct kvm *kvm)
>> return kvm_is_realm(kvm) && kvm_realm_state(kvm) != REALM_STATE_NONE;
>> }
>>
>> -static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(struct kvm *kvm)
>> +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_from_fault(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t fault_addr)
>> {
>> + gpa_t addr_mask;
>> +
>> if (kvm_is_realm(kvm)) {
>> struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
>>
>> - return BIT(realm->ia_bits - 1);
>> + addr_mask = BIT(realm->ia_bits - 1);
>> + /* clear shared bit and return */
>> + return fault_addr & ~addr_mask;
>> }
>> - return 0;
>> + return fault_addr;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline bool kvm_is_private_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t fault_addr)
>> +{
>> + /*
>> + * For Realms, the shared address is an alias of the private GPA
>> + * with top bit set and we have a single address space. Thus if the
>> + * fault address matches the GPA, it is the private GPA
>> + */
>> + return fault_addr == kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, fault_addr);
>> }
>
> Ah, so here's the missing function from above.
>
>>
>> static inline bool vcpu_is_rec(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>> index eb8b8d013f3e..1eddbc7d7156 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>> @@ -1464,20 +1464,18 @@ static int private_memslot_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
>> {
>> struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>> - gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(kvm);
>> - gfn_t gfn = (fault_ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> - bool is_priv_gfn = !((fault_ipa & gpa_stolen_mask) == gpa_stolen_mask);
>> - bool priv_exists = kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn);
>> + gfn_t gfn = kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, fault_ipa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;
>> kvm_pfn_t pfn;
>> int ret;
>>
>> - if (priv_exists != is_priv_gfn) {
>> + if (!kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn)) {
>> + /* let VMM fixup the memory attribute */
>> kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu,
>> - fault_ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask,
>> + kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, fault_ipa),
>> PAGE_SIZE,
>> kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu),
>> - false, is_priv_gfn);
>> + false, true);
>>
>> return 0;
>> }
>> @@ -1527,7 +1525,6 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>> long vma_pagesize, fault_granule;
>> enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
>> struct kvm_pgtable *pgt;
>> - gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(vcpu->kvm);
>>
>> if (fault_is_perm)
>> fault_granule = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule(vcpu);
>> @@ -1640,7 +1637,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>> if (vma_pagesize == PMD_SIZE || vma_pagesize == PUD_SIZE)
>> fault_ipa &= ~(vma_pagesize - 1);
>>
>> - gfn = (ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> + gfn = kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, ipa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> mte_allowed = kvm_vma_mte_allowed(vma);
>>
>> vfio_allow_any_uc = vma->vm_flags & VM_ALLOW_ANY_UNCACHED;
>> @@ -1835,7 +1832,6 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
>> unsigned long hva;
>> bool is_iabt, write_fault, writable;
>> - gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(vcpu->kvm);
>> gfn_t gfn;
>> int ret, idx;
>>
>> @@ -1926,7 +1922,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> nested = &nested_trans;
>> }
>>
>> - gfn = (ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> + gfn = kvm_gpa_from_fault(vcpu->kvm, ipa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> memslot = gfn_to_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
>>
>> if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(memslot)) {
>> @@ -1978,8 +1974,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> * of the page size.
>> */
>> ipa |= kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu) & GENMASK(11, 0);
>> - ipa &= ~gpa_stolen_mask;
>> - ret = io_mem_abort(vcpu, ipa);
>> + ret = io_mem_abort(vcpu, kvm_gpa_from_fault(vcpu->kvm, ipa));
>> goto out_unlock;
>> }
>
> I can see your point that kvm_gpa_from_fault() makes sense. I'm still
> not convinced about the duplication of the kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit()
> call though.
>
> How about the following (untested):
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> index 0b50572d3719..fa03520d7933 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> @@ -710,14 +710,14 @@ static inline bool kvm_realm_is_created(struct kvm *kvm)
> return kvm_is_realm(kvm) && kvm_realm_state(kvm) != REALM_STATE_NONE;
> }
>
> -static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(struct kvm *kvm)
> +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_from_fault(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t fault_ipa)
> {
> if (kvm_is_realm(kvm)) {
> struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
>
> - return BIT(realm->ia_bits - 1);
> + return fault_ipa & ~BIT(realm->ia_bits - 1);
> }
> - return 0;
> + return fault_ipa;
> }
>
> static inline bool vcpu_is_rec(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> index d7e8b0c4f2a3..c0a3054201a9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> @@ -1468,9 +1468,9 @@ static int private_memslot_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot)
> {
> struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
> - gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(kvm);
> - gfn_t gfn = (fault_ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> - bool is_priv_gfn = !((fault_ipa & gpa_stolen_mask) == gpa_stolen_mask);
> + gpa_t gpa = kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, fault_ipa);
> + gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + bool is_priv_gfn = (gpa == fault_ipa);
> bool priv_exists = kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn);
> struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;
> kvm_pfn_t pfn;
> @@ -1478,7 +1478,7 @@ static int private_memslot_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>
> if (priv_exists != is_priv_gfn) {
>
Can we also have a helper with document for this?
static inline bool kvm_is_private_gpa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t fault_addr)
{
/*
* For Realms, the shared address is an alias of the private GPA
* with top bit set and we have a single address space. Thus if the
* fault address matches the GPA, it is the private GPA
*/
return fault_addr == kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, fault_addr);
}
> kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu,
> - fault_ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask,
> + gpa,
> PAGE_SIZE,
> kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu),
> false, is_priv_gfn);
> @@ -1531,7 +1531,6 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> long vma_pagesize, fault_granule;
> enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
> struct kvm_pgtable *pgt;
> - gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(vcpu->kvm);
>
> if (fault_is_perm)
> fault_granule = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule(vcpu);
> @@ -1648,7 +1647,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> if (vma_pagesize == PMD_SIZE || vma_pagesize == PUD_SIZE)
> fault_ipa &= ~(vma_pagesize - 1);
>
> - gfn = (ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + gfn = kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, ipa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> mte_allowed = kvm_vma_mte_allowed(vma);
>
> vfio_allow_any_uc = vma->vm_flags & VM_ALLOW_ANY_UNCACHED;
> @@ -1843,7 +1842,6 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
> unsigned long hva;
> bool is_iabt, write_fault, writable;
> - gpa_t gpa_stolen_mask = kvm_gpa_stolen_bits(vcpu->kvm);
> gfn_t gfn;
> int ret, idx;
>
> @@ -1934,7 +1932,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> nested = &nested_trans;
> }
>
> - gfn = (ipa & ~gpa_stolen_mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + gfn = kvm_gpa_from_fault(vcpu->kvm, ipa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> memslot = gfn_to_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
>
> if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(memslot)) {
> @@ -1986,8 +1984,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * of the page size.
> */
> ipa |= kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu) & GENMASK(11, 0);
> - ipa &= ~gpa_stolen_mask;
> - ret = io_mem_abort(vcpu, ipa);
> + ret = io_mem_abort(vcpu, kvm_gpa_from_fault(vcpu->kvm, ipa));
> goto out_unlock;
> }
>
>
> Thanks,
> Steve
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-23 4:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-21 15:38 [PATCH v4 00/43] arm64: Support for Arm CCA in KVM Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 01/43] KVM: Prepare for handling only shared mappings in mmu_notifier events Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 02/43] kvm: arm64: pgtable: Track the number of pages in the entry level Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 03/43] kvm: arm64: Include kvm_emulate.h in kvm/arm_psci.h Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 04/43] arm64: RME: Handle Granule Protection Faults (GPFs) Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 05/43] arm64: RME: Add SMC definitions for calling the RMM Steven Price
2024-08-22 15:44 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-09-06 0:11 ` Gavin Shan
2024-09-08 23:56 ` Gavin Shan
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 06/43] arm64: RME: Add wrappers for RMI calls Steven Price
2024-08-22 16:56 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 07/43] arm64: RME: Check for RME support at KVM init Steven Price
2024-09-12 8:49 ` Gavin Shan
2024-09-12 9:27 ` Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 08/43] arm64: RME: Define the user ABI Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 09/43] arm64: RME: ioctls to create and configure realms Steven Price
2024-09-06 19:05 ` Shanker Donthineni
2024-09-10 10:43 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 10/43] kvm: arm64: Expose debug HW register numbers for Realm Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 11/43] arm64: kvm: Allow passing machine type in KVM creation Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 12/43] arm64: RME: Keep a spare page delegated to the RMM Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 13/43] arm64: RME: RTT tear down Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 14/43] arm64: RME: Allocate/free RECs to match vCPUs Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 15/43] arm64: RME: Support for the VGIC in realms Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 16/43] KVM: arm64: Support timers in realm RECs Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 17/43] arm64: RME: Allow VMM to set RIPAS Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 18/43] arm64: RME: Handle realm enter/exit Steven Price
2024-08-22 3:53 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2024-08-22 15:05 ` Steven Price
2024-08-22 3:58 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2024-08-22 15:05 ` Steven Price
2024-08-22 4:04 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2024-08-22 15:06 ` Steven Price
2024-08-22 14:14 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 19/43] KVM: arm64: Handle realm MMIO emulation Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 20/43] arm64: RME: Allow populating initial contents Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 21/43] arm64: RME: Runtime faulting of memory Steven Price
2024-08-22 3:32 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2024-08-22 15:14 ` Steven Price
2024-08-22 3:50 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2024-08-22 15:40 ` Steven Price
2024-08-23 4:30 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2024-09-02 13:25 ` Matias Ezequiel Vara Larsen
2024-09-02 15:34 ` Steven Price
2024-09-04 14:48 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2024-09-04 15:59 ` Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 22/43] KVM: arm64: Handle realm VCPU load Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 23/43] KVM: arm64: Validate register access for a Realm VM Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 24/43] KVM: arm64: Handle Realm PSCI requests Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 25/43] KVM: arm64: WARN on injected undef exceptions Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 26/43] arm64: Don't expose stolen time for realm guests Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 27/43] arm64: rme: allow userspace to inject aborts Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 28/43] arm64: rme: support RSI_HOST_CALL Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 29/43] arm64: rme: Allow checking SVE on VM instance Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 30/43] arm64: RME: Always use 4k pages for realms Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 31/43] arm64: rme: Prevent Device mappings for Realms Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 32/43] arm_pmu: Provide a mechanism for disabling the physical IRQ Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 33/43] arm64: rme: Enable PMU support with a realm guest Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 34/43] kvm: rme: Hide KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM for realm guests Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 35/43] arm64: RME: Propagate number of breakpoints and watchpoints to userspace Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 36/43] arm64: RME: Set breakpoint parameters through SET_ONE_REG Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 37/43] arm64: RME: Initialize PMCR.N with number counter supported by RMM Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 38/43] arm64: RME: Propagate max SVE vector length from RMM Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 39/43] arm64: RME: Configure max SVE vector length for a Realm Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 40/43] arm64: RME: Provide register list for unfinalized RME RECs Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 41/43] arm64: RME: Provide accurate register list Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 42/43] arm64: kvm: Expose support for private memory Steven Price
2024-08-21 15:38 ` [PATCH v4 43/43] KVM: arm64: Allow activating realms Steven Price
2024-09-02 5:13 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2024-09-02 10:17 ` Steven Price
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