From: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: "Rodolfo Giometti" <giometti@enneenne.com>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Jens Wiklander" <jenswi@kernel.org>,
"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
"Sahil Malhotra" <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>,
"Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 23:35:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <01692969-8e92-4a08-bde9-aad86674504f@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <61ca7c37-7b42-48a3-be2e-95deb4d999a2@gmail.com>
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On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
>>> On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
>>>> This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can
>>>> use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256
>>>> and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that
>>>> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation.
>>>
>>> I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective,
>>> this encourages very poor practices. AES-GCM even allows userspace
>>> to extract the secret authentication key.
>>>
>>> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined
>>> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday
>>> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless
>>> the key is ephemeral.
>>>
>>> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting
>>> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API
>>> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the
>>> authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't
>>> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case,
>>> and the API can't enforce that limit.
>>>
>>> For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices.
>>> They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them
>>> at random for each encryption without any problems.
>>>
>>> - XAES-256-GCM
>>> - XChaCha20-Poly1305
>>> - AEGIS-256
>>>
>>> AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally
>>> leaking if two plaintexts are equal. This happens whenever there is
>>> a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions.
>>
>> The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular
>> relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type.
>>
>> At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down
>> the potential user base.
>>
>> The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use
>> trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem
>> that only this patch set can presumebly sort out.
>>
>> And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much
>> the break down of what is wrong here.
>>
>> If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that
>> it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really.
>>
>> These are the main topics what I would focus on.
>
> This whole patchset looks like a solution looking for a problem.
>
> The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service
> like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want.
> That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you
> have bigger problems.
Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance,
time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or
daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is.
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 4:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 14:04 [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-19 0:25 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 0:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:57 ` Marco Felsch
2026-11-18 15:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 10:18 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 23:42 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 0:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 0:43 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 1:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 4:35 ` Demi Marie Obenour [this message]
2026-11-19 5:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 10:19 ` Rodolfo Giometti
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