Linux cryptographic layer development
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From: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Siddha, Suresh B" <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>,
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <linux-crypto@ml.breakpoint.cc>,
	"akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	"mingo@elte.hu" <mingo@elte.hu>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH crypto] AES: Add support to Intel AES-NI	instructions
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2008 09:14:22 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1229476462.5936.314.camel@yhuang-dev.sh.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20081216233128.GA13942@gondor.apana.org.au>

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On Wed, 2008-12-17 at 07:31 +0800, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 15, 2008 at 11:38:01PM +1100, Herbert Xu wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 15, 2008 at 04:21:06PM +1100, Herbert Xu wrote:
> > >
> > > > a. Do not touch SSE state in soft_irq
> > > > b. Disable/restore soft_irq in kernel_fpu_begin/kernel_fpu_end
> > > > c. Use a per-CPU data structure to save kernel FPU state during
> > > > soft_irq.
>  
> > Here's another option
> > 
> > d. When we're in interrupt context, schedule a task to perform
> > the encryption asynchronously.
> 
> We can also hybridise b. and d.:
> 
> e. When we're in interrupt context, if TS is clear, then we defer
> the operation to a thread.  Otherwise if user-space has touched
> the FPU we save the state, if not then we simply clear TS.  In
> either case we perform the operation immediately and then reset
> TS if user-space didn't touch the FPU.
> 
> This is based on the fact that it should be fairly rare for us
> to interrupt a kernel FPU/SSE operation.  The common case would
> be interrupting a user process or a kernel context which is not
> engaging in any kernel FPU operations.

Yes. This is a better solution with much better performance. How about
hybridise b. and a.:

f. if TS is clear, then use x86_64 implementation. Otherwise if
user-space has touched the FPU, we save the state, if not then simply
clear TS.

I think that could be simpler to be implemented.

Best Regards,
Huang Ying


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  reply	other threads:[~2008-12-17  1:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-12-12  4:08 [RFC PATCH crypto] AES: Add support to Intel AES-NI instructions Huang Ying
2008-12-12 19:57 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2008-12-15  2:19   ` Huang Ying
2008-12-15  3:38     ` Herbert Xu
2008-12-15  5:14       ` Huang Ying
2008-12-15  5:21         ` Herbert Xu
2008-12-15  5:48           ` Huang Ying
2008-12-15 12:38           ` Herbert Xu
2008-12-16 23:31             ` Herbert Xu
2008-12-17  1:14               ` Huang Ying [this message]
2008-12-17  1:26                 ` Herbert Xu
2008-12-17  3:33                   ` Huang Ying
2008-12-17  3:39                     ` Herbert Xu
2008-12-15 18:26       ` Suresh Siddha
2008-12-15  9:07     ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2008-12-15 11:28       ` Herbert Xu

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