From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: Don't overwrite CRNG state in crng_initialize() Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2017 10:26:19 +0100 Message-ID: <12520331.ppYG2MRRyi@positron.chronox.de> References: <1486611086-2290-1-git-send-email-alden.tondettar@gmail.com> <20170209064725.GA4363@kroah.com> <20170209090432.GA18039@rincewind> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , Theodore Ts'o , Arnd Bergmann , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: Alden Tondettar Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20170209090432.GA18039@rincewind> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org Am Donnerstag, 9. Februar 2017, 02:04:32 CET schrieb Alden Tondettar: Hi Alden, > On Thu, Feb 09, 2017 at 07:47:25AM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 08:31:26PM -0700, Alden Tondettar wrote: > > > In short, the situation is: > > > > > > A) No usable hardware RNG or arch_get_random() (or we don't trust it...) > > > > Wait, why would you not trust arch_get_random()? Is it broken somehow > > on some arches? If so, why not fix that as well? > > arch_get_random() makes use of RDRAND and similar CPU features. Some people > do not wish to trust black-box RNG implementations. Furthermore, this function is only implemented on x86. On other arches, it is a noop. Ciao Stephan