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From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
To: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, tytso@mit.edu,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, gmazyland@gmail.com,
	Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: memzero_explicit - make sure to clear out sensitive data
Date: Mon, 08 Sep 2014 08:17:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1410157025.11627.10.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1410125018-27277-1-git-send-email-dborkman@redhat.com>

On So, 2014-09-07 at 23:23 +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> Recently, in commit 13aa93c70e71 ("random: add and use memzero_explicit()
> for clearing data"), we have found that GCC may optimize some memset()
> cases away when it detects a stack variable is not being used anymore
> and going out of scope. This can happen, for example, in cases when we
> are clearing out sensitive information such as keying material or any
> e.g. intermediate results from crypto computations, etc.
> 
> With the help of Coccinelle, we can figure out and fix such occurences
> in the crypto subsytem as well. Julia Lawall provided the following
> Coccinelle program:
> 
>   @@
>   type T;
>   identifier x;
>   @@
> 
>   T x;
>   ... when exists
>       when any
>   -memset
>   +memzero_explicit
>      (&x,
>   -0,
>      ...)
>   ... when != x
>       when strict
> 
>   @@
>   type T;
>   identifier x;
>   @@
> 
>   T x[...];
>   ... when exists
>       when any
>   -memset
>   +memzero_explicit
>      (x,
>   -0,
>      ...)
>   ... when != x
>       when strict

I think this Coccinelle patch won't make it completely unnecessary for a
manual audit as it does not take optimizations (dead code eliminitation)
into account?

> 
> Therefore, make use of the drop-in replacement memzero_explicit() for
> exactly such cases instead of using memset().
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>

Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org

Thanks,
Hannes

  reply	other threads:[~2014-09-08  6:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-07 21:23 [PATCH v2] crypto: memzero_explicit - make sure to clear out sensitive data Daniel Borkmann
2014-09-08  6:17 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa [this message]
2014-09-08  7:00   ` Julia Lawall
2014-09-08  7:59     ` Daniel Borkmann
2014-09-15 11:52 ` Herbert Xu
2014-09-25 20:23   ` Daniel Borkmann

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