From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B672FC3F6B0 for ; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:46:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239329AbiHXTqG (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Aug 2022 15:46:06 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42756 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229664AbiHXTqF (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Aug 2022 15:46:05 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 40D6379A6E; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 12:46:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098417.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.17.1.5/8.17.1.5) with ESMTP id 27OJPM1n007073; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:45:55 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=message-id : date : subject : to : cc : references : from : in-reply-to : content-type : content-transfer-encoding : mime-version; s=pp1; bh=ncbFd3RKOyk3UBhCn1Wb6P/0yuzM8GZ5YQYqxjnzXfw=; b=SziQgu3BHzOq4IV5KalKdIbLWPwFp6pahley1QZf+lApCWrXvA4eTx5lJQEEt7GtTrUo Mx0Kt5YXwzQu9SwDwOnPSrWcshyNg4XL0s+XDtUCRpruLmUJzmsOlRBBKVH3tL5iUpPH 2tK4gwxxMMDWWl+2MygM/NCqMMqJyJn1Ez/D48rw55fXkNRWdd6dpWEQwkmJNWJ1iuoz ZYy1IGBdopofl/OVvgUwd/FAC6MYUFIAbvYmSNA4U7tziSepWVpnGMvlqQMrj12prvST S4gIcanE4VthxAAVwrm2ekjvGL4BPIz22WysksnKDIPIgOhj2V6mPTIABO2ClF0Fs+eM KA== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3j5t4qgpaw-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:45:54 +0000 Received: from m0098417.ppops.net (m0098417.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.17.1.5/8.17.1.5) with ESMTP id 27OJQiCF010408; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:45:53 GMT Received: from ppma04dal.us.ibm.com (7a.29.35a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.53.41.122]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3j5t4qgpa0-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:45:53 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma04dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma04dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 27OJZ44u019983; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:45:52 GMT Received: from b03cxnp08025.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp08025.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.17]) by ppma04dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3j2q8a9yjn-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:45:52 +0000 Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.236]) by b03cxnp08025.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 27OJjpEI5440224 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:45:51 GMT Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D3DABE056; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:46:35 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CA48BE053; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:46:34 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [9.47.158.152] (unknown [9.47.158.152]) by b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 19:46:34 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: <1d0557ec-82a4-564f-fb6e-219966b2c600@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2022 15:45:50 -0400 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.12.0 Subject: Re: [RESEND PATCH] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix ECDSA use via keyctl uapi Content-Language: en-US To: Denis Kenzior , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20220824190409.4286-1-denkenz@gmail.com> From: Stefan Berger In-Reply-To: <20220824190409.4286-1-denkenz@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: WOtspsK91uZIN07azF1R84a7Qb8_hmsb X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: ThmQ7FUkRWPYNM_6YVqF2dCLSV_f_77p Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.895,Hydra:6.0.517,FMLib:17.11.122.1 definitions=2022-08-24_11,2022-08-22_02,2022-06-22_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 clxscore=1011 mlxscore=0 suspectscore=0 impostorscore=0 malwarescore=0 bulkscore=0 phishscore=0 priorityscore=1501 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 spamscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2207270000 definitions=main-2208240071 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On 8/24/22 15:04, Denis Kenzior wrote: > When support for ECDSA keys was added, constraints for data & signature > sizes were never updated. This makes it impossible to use such keys via > keyctl API from userspace; fix that. > > Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys") > Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior Same comment again as here: https://lore.kernel.org/all/4b82b766-4482-762f-f366-cf5a47321ef7@linux.ibm.com/#t Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > index 2f8352e88860..eca5671ad3f2 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > @@ -186,8 +186,28 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, > > len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); > info->key_size = len * 8; > - info->max_data_size = len; > - info->max_sig_size = len; > + > + if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) { > + /* > + * ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could > + * operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size. > + * For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1 > + * based keys. Set max_data_size to be at least as large as > + * the largest supported hash size (SHA512) > + */ > + info->max_data_size = 64; > + > + /* > + * Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input, > + * which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in > + * ASN.1. Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here. > + */ > + info->max_sig_size = 2 * (len + 3) + 2; > + } else { > + info->max_data_size = len; > + info->max_sig_size = len; > + } > + > info->max_enc_size = len; > info->max_dec_size = len; > info->supported_ops = (KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT |