From: Pierre Habouzit <madcoder@debian.org>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] MPI module
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 09:12:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090130081210.GA8157@artemis> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090130032506.GA2822@gondor.apana.org.au>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2245 bytes --]
On Fri, Jan 30, 2009 at 03:25:06AM +0000, Herbert Xu wrote:
> Pierre Habouzit <madcoder@debian.org> wrote:
> >
> > My endgame is simple, I'd like to see an in-kernel SSL/TLS
> > implementation in Linux happen. There are many reasons to want that,
> > ranging from performance reasons (waking the userland each time you
> > perform a handshake isn't particularly nice, and it's easy to make
> > system-wide session caches) to really cool features being enabled:
> > - you can send "secure" file descriptors around through Unix Sockets,
> > or prepare a "secure" socket, let it be your stdin/stdout pair and
> > exec a service knowing nothing about SSL (think inetd-like stuff) ;
> > - you can deploy secure services where the actual server knows nothing
> > about the certificate that is used ;
> > - you can have a system-wide service dealing with peer certificate
> > validations and have a real system-wide policy in this regard ;
> > - you could even think of some netfilter stuff to enforce security on
> > a given socket, even if the service behind the socket knows nothing
> > about it (bye bye stunnel)...
> >
> > Nowadays, the kernel has most of what we need cipher-wise for TLS/SSL.
> > Only the key-exchange protocols and the very TLS protocol are lacking.
> > I'm currently addressing the former issue, namely, bringing RSA and
> > Diffie-Hellman to the kernel.
>
> Stop right there. There is absolutely no reason why you need
> to do the TLS stuff in kernel to achieve the goals you listed
> above.
>
> What you should do is have user-space create the session, and
> then give the keys to the kernel to do the data-path. Please
> take a look at IPsec for an example of how the work is divided
> between user-space and the kernel.
So let me rephrase that to be sure we've understood each other. What you
suggest is to have an IKE-like daemon dealing with the keys and all the
handshakes, and that the kernel would only deal with the symmetric
ciphers used on the data path. Is that right ?
--
·O· Pierre Habouzit
··O madcoder@debian.org
OOO http://www.madism.org
[-- Attachment #2: Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 197 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-01-30 8:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-01-30 0:15 [RFC] MPI module Pierre Habouzit
2009-01-30 3:25 ` Herbert Xu
2009-01-30 8:12 ` Pierre Habouzit [this message]
2009-01-30 12:41 ` Herbert Xu
2009-01-30 18:54 ` Loc Ho
2009-01-31 22:34 ` Pierre Habouzit
2009-02-07 0:59 ` Loc Ho
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20090130081210.GA8157@artemis \
--to=madcoder@debian.org \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox