linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
To: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC] random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 13:24:57 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140720172457.GG5017@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140720162622.29664.qmail@ns.horizon.com>

On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 12:26:22PM -0400, George Spelvin wrote:
> One basic question... why limit this to /dev/random?
> 
> If we're trying to avoid fd exhaustion attacks, wouldn't an "atomically
> read a file into a buffer" system call (that could be used on
> /dev/urandom, or /etc/hostname, or /proc/foo, or...) be more useful?
> 
> E.g.
> 
> ssize_t readat(int dirfd, char const *path, struct stat *st,
> 	char *buf, size_t len, int flags);
> 
> It's basically equivalent to openat(), optional fstat() (if st is non-NULL),
> read(), close(), but it doesn't allocate an fd number.
> 
> Is it necessary to have a system call just for entropy?
> 
> If you want a "urandom that blocks until seeded", you can always create
> another device node for the purpose.

I'd really rather not go down this path.  Your readat(2) proposal is
interesting, but it adds a whole lot of complications.  For example,
just simply booting a new kernel doesn't guarantee that a new device
node for "blocks until seeded" will exist.  So that means a lot of
applications will just either continue to use /dev/urandom, or have to
put in fallback code to first try the new device name, and then fall
back to /dev/urandom.  (And of course, they have to deal with what to
do if /dev/urandom doesn't exist --- which presumably would be
raise(SIGKILL), but we're now talking about a number of lines of codes
that application writers would have to get right.)

Readat(2) would also have to get linked into auditing, and LSM, and
honestly, it's a lot more work that I'm not all that interested in
doing and trying to get right.

> If you do stick with a random-specific call, specifying the entropy
> in bits (with some specified convention for the last fractional byte)
> is anothet interesting idea.  Perhaps too prone to bugs, though.
> (People thinking it's bytes and producing low-entropy keys.)

Definitely not worth the complexity.

							- Ted

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-07-20 17:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-20 16:26 [PATCH, RFC] random: introduce getrandom(2) system call George Spelvin
2014-07-20 17:03 ` George Spelvin
2014-07-20 21:32   ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-21 11:21     ` George Spelvin
2014-07-21 15:27       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-22  1:02         ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-22  4:44           ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-22  9:49             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-22 22:59               ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-23  9:47                 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-23 11:52                   ` George Spelvin
2014-07-23 12:10                     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-30 12:50                       ` Pavel Machek
2014-07-20 17:24 ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2014-07-17 18:48 Mark Kettenis
2014-07-17 20:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-17 21:28   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 21:37     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-17 22:21   ` David Lang
2014-07-17  9:18 Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 10:57 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-17 12:52   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 13:15     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-17 12:09 ` Tobias Klauser
2014-07-17 12:52   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 16:12 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-07-17 17:01   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 17:05     ` Bob Beck
2014-07-17 17:34       ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 17:45         ` Bob Beck
2014-07-17 17:46           ` Bob Beck
2014-07-17 17:57             ` Bob Beck
2014-07-17 22:30           ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 19:56         ` Bob Beck
2014-07-21  0:25     ` Dwayne Litzenberger
2014-07-21  7:18       ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 19:31 ` Greg KH
2014-07-17 19:33 ` Greg KH
2014-07-17 19:48 ` Zach Brown
     [not found]   ` <20140717194812.GC24196-fypN+1c5dIyjpB87vu3CluTW4wlIGRCZ@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-17 20:54     ` Theodore Ts'o
     [not found]       ` <20140717205417.GT1491-AKGzg7BKzIDYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-17 21:39         ` Zach Brown
2014-07-17 20:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]   ` <53C8319A.8090108-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-17 21:14     ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-18 16:36 ` Rolf Eike Beer
2014-07-20 15:50 ` Andi Kleen
2014-07-20 17:06   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-20 17:27 ` Andreas Schwab
2014-07-20 17:41   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-21  6:18 ` Dwayne Litzenberger
2014-07-23  8:42 ` Manuel Schölling

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20140720172457.GG5017@thunk.org \
    --to=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@horizon.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).