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From: "George Spelvin" <linux@horizon.com>
To: hannes@stressinduktion.org, linux@horizon.com
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	tytso@mit.edu
Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC] random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
Date: 21 Jul 2014 07:21:02 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140721112102.19300.qmail@ns.horizon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1405891964.9562.42.camel@localhost>

> I don't like partial reads/writes and think that a lot of people get
> them wrong, because they often only check for negative return values.

The v1 patch, which did it right IMHO, didn't do partial reads in the
case we're talking about:

+	if (count > 256)
+		return -EINVAL;

> In case of urandom extraction, I wouldn't actually limit the number of
> bytes. A lot of applications I have seen already extract more than 128
> out of urandom (not for seeding a prng but just to mess around with some
> memory). I don't see a reason why getrandom shouldn't be used for that.
> It just adds one more thing to look out for if using getrandom() in
> urandom mode, especially during porting an application over to this new
> interface.

Again, I disagree.  If it's "just messing around" code, use /dev/urandom.
It's more portable and you don't care about the fd exhaustion attacks.

If it's actual code to be used in anger, fix it to not abuse /dev/urandom.

You're right that a quick hack might be "broken on purpose", but without
exception, *all* code that I have seen which reads 64 or more bytes from
/dev/*random is broken, and highlighting the brokenness is a highly
desirable thing.

The sole and exclusive reason for this syscall to exist at all is to
solve a security problem.  Supporting broken security code does no favors
to anyone.

  reply	other threads:[~2014-07-21 11:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-20 16:26 [PATCH, RFC] random: introduce getrandom(2) system call George Spelvin
2014-07-20 17:03 ` George Spelvin
2014-07-20 21:32   ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-21 11:21     ` George Spelvin [this message]
2014-07-21 15:27       ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-22  1:02         ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-22  4:44           ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-22  9:49             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-22 22:59               ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-23  9:47                 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-23 11:52                   ` George Spelvin
2014-07-23 12:10                     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-30 12:50                       ` Pavel Machek
2014-07-20 17:24 ` Theodore Ts'o
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2014-07-17 18:48 Mark Kettenis
2014-07-17 20:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-17 21:28   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 21:37     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-17 22:21   ` David Lang
2014-07-17  9:18 Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 10:57 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-17 12:52   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 13:15     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2014-07-17 12:09 ` Tobias Klauser
2014-07-17 12:52   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 16:12 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-07-17 17:01   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 17:05     ` Bob Beck
2014-07-17 17:34       ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 17:45         ` Bob Beck
2014-07-17 17:46           ` Bob Beck
2014-07-17 17:57             ` Bob Beck
2014-07-17 22:30           ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 19:56         ` Bob Beck
2014-07-21  0:25     ` Dwayne Litzenberger
2014-07-21  7:18       ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-17 19:31 ` Greg KH
2014-07-17 19:33 ` Greg KH
2014-07-17 19:48 ` Zach Brown
     [not found]   ` <20140717194812.GC24196-fypN+1c5dIyjpB87vu3CluTW4wlIGRCZ@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-17 20:54     ` Theodore Ts'o
     [not found]       ` <20140717205417.GT1491-AKGzg7BKzIDYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-17 21:39         ` Zach Brown
2014-07-17 20:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]   ` <53C8319A.8090108-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-17 21:14     ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-18 16:36 ` Rolf Eike Beer
2014-07-20 15:50 ` Andi Kleen
2014-07-20 17:06   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-20 17:27 ` Andreas Schwab
2014-07-20 17:41   ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-07-21  6:18 ` Dwayne Litzenberger
2014-07-23  8:42 ` Manuel Schölling

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