From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
Tudor-Dan Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>,
Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>,
Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] crypto: dh - fix double free of ctx->p
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2017 15:25:14 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171101222517.41602-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171101222517.41602-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com>
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
When setting the secret with the software Diffie-Hellman implementation,
if allocating 'g' failed (e.g. if it was longer than
MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS), then 'p' was freed twice: once immediately, and
once later when the crypto_kpp tfm was destroyed. Fix it by using
dh_free_ctx() in the error paths, as that sets the pointers to NULL.
KASAN report:
MPI: mpi too large (32760 bits)
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mpi_free+0x131/0x170
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006c7cdf90 by task reproduce_doubl/367
CPU: 1 PID: 367 Comm: reproduce_doubl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00040-g05298abde6fe #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
? mpi_free+0x131/0x170
print_address_description+0x79/0x2a0
? mpi_free+0x131/0x170
kasan_report+0x236/0x340
? akcipher_register_instance+0x90/0x90
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20
mpi_free+0x131/0x170
? akcipher_register_instance+0x90/0x90
dh_exit_tfm+0x3d/0x140
crypto_kpp_exit_tfm+0x52/0x70
crypto_destroy_tfm+0xb3/0x250
__keyctl_dh_compute+0x640/0xe90
? kasan_slab_free+0x12f/0x180
? dh_data_from_key+0x240/0x240
? key_create_or_update+0x1ee/0xb20
? key_instantiate_and_link+0x440/0x440
? lock_contended+0xee0/0xee0
? kfree+0xcf/0x210
? SyS_add_key+0x268/0x340
keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1
? __keyctl_dh_compute+0xe90/0xe90
? SyS_add_key+0x26d/0x340
? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x3f4/0x560
SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x43ccf9
RSP: 002b:00007ffeeec96158 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000248b9b9 RCX: 000000000043ccf9
RDX: 00007ffeeec96170 RSI: 00007ffeeec96160 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0248b9b9143dc936
R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000409670 R14: 0000000000409700 R15: 0000000000000000
Allocated by task 367:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
kasan_kmalloc+0xeb/0x180
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x114/0x300
mpi_alloc+0x4b/0x230
mpi_read_raw_data+0xbe/0x360
dh_set_secret+0x1dc/0x460
__keyctl_dh_compute+0x623/0xe90
keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1
SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
Freed by task 367:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
kasan_slab_free+0xab/0x180
kfree+0xb5/0x210
mpi_free+0xcb/0x170
dh_set_secret+0x2d7/0x460
__keyctl_dh_compute+0x623/0xe90
keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1
SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
Fixes: 802c7f1c84e4 ("crypto: dh - Add DH software implementation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
crypto/dh.c | 18 +++++++++---------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh.c b/crypto/dh.c
index b1032a5c1bfa..b488f1782ced 100644
--- a/crypto/dh.c
+++ b/crypto/dh.c
@@ -71,10 +71,8 @@ static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)
return -EINVAL;
ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size);
- if (!ctx->g) {
- mpi_free(ctx->p);
+ if (!ctx->g)
return -EINVAL;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -89,18 +87,20 @@ static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
dh_free_ctx(ctx);
if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto err_free_ctx;
if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto err_free_ctx;
ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
- if (!ctx->xa) {
- dh_clear_params(ctx);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if (!ctx->xa)
+ goto err_free_ctx;
return 0;
+
+err_free_ctx:
+ dh_free_ctx(ctx);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
--
2.15.0.403.gc27cc4dac6-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-01 22:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-01 22:25 [PATCH 0/4] crypto: dh - input validation fixes Eric Biggers
2017-11-01 22:25 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2017-11-02 10:55 ` [PATCH 1/4] crypto: dh - fix double free of ctx->p Tudor Ambarus
2017-11-02 17:30 ` Eric Biggers
2017-11-01 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/4] crypto: dh - don't permit 'p' to be 0 Eric Biggers
2017-11-02 11:40 ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-11-02 17:31 ` Eric Biggers
2017-11-03 6:23 ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-11-01 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/4] crypto: qat - fix double free of ctx->p Eric Biggers
2017-11-02 17:34 ` Eric Biggers
2017-11-01 22:25 ` [PATCH 4/4] crypto: dh - don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p' Eric Biggers
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