From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
stable@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 21:30:44 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180413013046.404-3-tytso@mit.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180413013046.404-1-tytso@mit.edu>
Until the primary_crng is fully initialized, don't initialize the NUMA
crng nodes. Otherwise users of /dev/urandom on NUMA systems before
the CRNG is fully initialized can get very bad quality randomness. Of
course everyone should move to getrandom(2) where this won't be an
issue, but there's a lot of legacy code out there.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly...")
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.8+
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 2154a5fe4c81..681ee0c0de24 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -787,6 +787,32 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+static void numa_crng_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct crng_state *crng;
+ struct crng_state **pool;
+
+ pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
+ for_each_online_node(i) {
+ crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
+ spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
+ crng_initialize(crng);
+ pool[i] = crng;
+ }
+ mb();
+ if (cmpxchg(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool)) {
+ for_each_node(i)
+ kfree(pool[i]);
+ kfree(pool);
+ }
+}
+#else
+static int numa_crng_init(void) {}
+#endif
+
/*
* crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally.
@@ -893,6 +919,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
invalidate_batched_entropy();
+ numa_crng_init();
crng_init = 2;
process_random_ready_list();
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
@@ -1727,28 +1754,9 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
*/
static int rand_initialize(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
- int i;
- struct crng_state *crng;
- struct crng_state **pool;
-#endif
-
init_std_data(&input_pool);
init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
- for_each_online_node(i) {
- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
- crng_initialize(crng);
- pool[i] = crng;
- }
- mb();
- crng_node_pool = pool;
-#endif
return 0;
}
early_initcall(rand_initialize);
--
2.16.1.72.g5be1f00a9a
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-13 1:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-13 1:30 [PATCH 1/5] random: fix crng_ready() test Theodore Ts'o
2018-04-13 1:30 ` [PATCH 2/5] random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness() Theodore Ts'o
2018-04-13 1:30 ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2018-04-13 22:31 ` [PATCH 3/5] random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized kbuild test robot
2018-04-13 1:30 ` [PATCH 4/5] random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying Theodore Ts'o
2018-04-13 1:30 ` [PATCH 5/5] random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG Theodore Ts'o
2018-04-13 5:38 ` [PATCH 1/5] random: fix crng_ready() test Stephan Mueller
2018-04-13 12:53 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-04-13 13:05 ` Stephan Mueller
2018-04-13 17:00 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-17 0:07 ` Srivatsa S. Bhat
2018-05-17 20:53 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-17 6:01 ` Christophe LEROY
2018-05-17 20:56 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-02 16:18 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
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