From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>,
Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>,
Lars Persson <larper@axis.com>, Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>,
Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, qat-linux@intel.com,
dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 4/9] dm integrity: Remove VLA usage
Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 17:28:38 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180629002843.31095-5-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180629002843.31095-1-keescook@chromium.org>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this uses
the new SHASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE from the crypto layer to allocate the upper
bounds on stack usage.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
index 86438b2f10dd..85e8ce1625a2 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
@@ -521,7 +521,12 @@ static void section_mac(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned section, __u8 result
}
memset(result + size, 0, JOURNAL_MAC_SIZE - size);
} else {
- __u8 digest[size];
+ __u8 digest[SHASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+
+ if (WARN_ON(size > sizeof(digest))) {
+ dm_integrity_io_error(ic, "digest_size", -EINVAL);
+ goto err;
+ }
r = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
if (unlikely(r)) {
dm_integrity_io_error(ic, "crypto_shash_final", r);
@@ -1244,7 +1249,7 @@ static void integrity_metadata(struct work_struct *w)
struct bio *bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(dio, sizeof(struct dm_integrity_io));
char *checksums;
unsigned extra_space = unlikely(digest_size > ic->tag_size) ? digest_size - ic->tag_size : 0;
- char checksums_onstack[ic->tag_size + extra_space];
+ char checksums_onstack[SHASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
unsigned sectors_to_process = dio->range.n_sectors;
sector_t sector = dio->range.logical_sector;
@@ -1253,8 +1258,14 @@ static void integrity_metadata(struct work_struct *w)
checksums = kmalloc((PAGE_SIZE >> SECTOR_SHIFT >> ic->sb->log2_sectors_per_block) * ic->tag_size + extra_space,
GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN);
- if (!checksums)
+ if (!checksums) {
checksums = checksums_onstack;
+ if (WARN_ON(extra_space &&
+ digest_size > sizeof(checksums_onstack))) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
__bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio, iter, dio->orig_bi_iter) {
unsigned pos;
@@ -1466,7 +1477,7 @@ static bool __journal_read_write(struct dm_integrity_io *dio, struct bio *bio,
} while (++s < ic->sectors_per_block);
#ifdef INTERNAL_VERIFY
if (ic->internal_hash) {
- char checksums_onstack[max(crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash), ic->tag_size)];
+ char checksums_onstack[max(SHASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE, MAX_TAG_SIZE)];
integrity_sector_checksum(ic, logical_sector, mem + bv.bv_offset, checksums_onstack);
if (unlikely(memcmp(checksums_onstack, journal_entry_tag(ic, je), ic->tag_size))) {
@@ -1516,7 +1527,7 @@ static bool __journal_read_write(struct dm_integrity_io *dio, struct bio *bio,
if (ic->internal_hash) {
unsigned digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash);
if (unlikely(digest_size > ic->tag_size)) {
- char checksums_onstack[digest_size];
+ char checksums_onstack[SHASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
integrity_sector_checksum(ic, logical_sector, (char *)js, checksums_onstack);
memcpy(journal_entry_tag(ic, je), checksums_onstack, ic->tag_size);
} else
@@ -1937,7 +1948,7 @@ static void do_journal_write(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned write_start,
unlikely(from_replay) &&
#endif
ic->internal_hash) {
- char test_tag[max(crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->internal_hash), ic->tag_size)];
+ char test_tag[max_t(size_t, SHASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE, MAX_TAG_SIZE)];
integrity_sector_checksum(ic, sec + ((l - j) << ic->sb->log2_sectors_per_block),
(char *)access_journal_data(ic, i, l), test_tag);
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-29 0:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-29 0:28 [PATCH v3 0/9] Crypto: Remove VLA usage (part 1) Kees Cook
2018-06-29 0:28 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] crypto: xcbc: Remove VLA usage Kees Cook
2018-06-29 0:28 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] crypto: cbc: " Kees Cook
2018-06-29 0:28 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] crypto: shash: " Kees Cook
2018-06-29 0:28 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-06-29 20:43 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] dm integrity: " Arnd Bergmann
2018-06-29 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2018-07-01 6:29 ` Herbert Xu
2018-06-29 0:28 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] crypto: ahash: " Kees Cook
2018-06-29 0:28 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] dm verity fec: " Kees Cook
2018-06-29 0:28 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] crypto alg: Introduce generic max blocksize and alignmask Kees Cook
2018-06-29 0:28 ` [PATCH v3 8/9] crypto: qat: Remove VLA usage Kees Cook
2018-06-29 0:28 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] crypto: shash: Remove VLA usage in unaligned hashing Kees Cook
2018-06-30 7:03 ` [dm-devel] " Eric Biggers
2018-07-01 17:04 ` Kees Cook
2018-07-01 17:20 ` Eric Biggers
2018-07-02 17:34 ` Kees Cook
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