From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Subject: [PATCH 06/11] crypto: x86/aesni-gcm - make 'struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s' static const
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 12:17:57 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190110201802.82442-7-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190110201802.82442-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Add missing static keywords to fix the following sparse warnings:
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c:197:24: warning: symbol 'aesni_gcm_tfm_sse' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c:246:24: warning: symbol 'aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c:291:24: warning: symbol 'aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen4' was not declared. Should it be static?
I also made the affected structures 'const', and adjusted the
indentation in the struct definition to not be insane.
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 34 ++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
index 1321700d6647f..9b5ccde3ef315 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
@@ -175,26 +175,18 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize(void *ctx,
struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
-static struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s {
-void (*init)(void *ctx,
- struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
- u8 *iv,
- u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad,
- unsigned long aad_len);
-void (*enc_update)(void *ctx,
- struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
- const u8 *in,
- unsigned long plaintext_len);
-void (*dec_update)(void *ctx,
- struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
- const u8 *in,
- unsigned long ciphertext_len);
-void (*finalize)(void *ctx,
- struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
- u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
+static const struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s {
+ void (*init)(void *ctx, struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *iv,
+ u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len);
+ void (*enc_update)(void *ctx, struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
+ const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len);
+ void (*dec_update)(void *ctx, struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
+ const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len);
+ void (*finalize)(void *ctx, struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
+ u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
} *aesni_gcm_tfm;
-struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_sse = {
+static const struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_sse = {
.init = &aesni_gcm_init,
.enc_update = &aesni_gcm_enc_update,
.dec_update = &aesni_gcm_dec_update,
@@ -243,7 +235,7 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2(void *ctx,
const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
-struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2 = {
+static const struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2 = {
.init = &aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2,
.enc_update = &aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2,
.dec_update = &aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2,
@@ -288,7 +280,7 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4(void *ctx,
const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
-struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen4 = {
+static const struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen4 = {
.init = &aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4,
.enc_update = &aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4,
.dec_update = &aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4,
@@ -778,7 +770,7 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
{
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
- struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s *gcm_tfm = aesni_gcm_tfm;
+ const struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s *gcm_tfm = aesni_gcm_tfm;
struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
unsigned long left = req->cryptlen;
--
2.20.1.97.g81188d93c3-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-10 20:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-10 20:17 [PATCH 00/11] crypto: misc fixes/cleanups Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:17 ` [PATCH 01/11] crypto: gcm - use correct endianness type in gcm_hash_len() Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:17 ` [PATCH 02/11] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - include <crypto/internal/rsa.h> Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:17 ` [PATCH 03/11] crypto: streebog - use correct endianness type Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:17 ` [PATCH 04/11] crypto: testmgr - handle endianness correctly in alg_test_crc32c() Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:17 ` [PATCH 05/11] crypto: user - forward declare crypto_nlsk Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:17 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2019-01-10 20:17 ` [PATCH 07/11] crypto: tgr192 - fix unaligned memory access Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:17 ` [PATCH 08/11] crypto: stat - remove unused mutex Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:18 ` [PATCH 09/11] crypto: af_alg - make some functions static Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:18 ` [PATCH 10/11] crypto: af_alg - use list_for_each_entry() in af_alg_count_tsgl() Eric Biggers
2019-01-10 20:18 ` [PATCH 11/11] crypto: af_alg - remove redundant initializations of sk_family Eric Biggers
2019-01-18 10:57 ` [PATCH 00/11] crypto: misc fixes/cleanups Herbert Xu
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