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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC/RFT PATCH 09/18] crypto: streebog - fix unaligned memory accesses
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 09:57:49 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190402165747.GA13413@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190402161557.lg37muib4qy4az22@altlinux.org>

On Tue, Apr 02, 2019 at 07:15:57PM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote:
> > >  
> > >  static void streebog_stage2(struct streebog_state *ctx, const u8 *data)
> > >  {
> > > -	streebog_g(&ctx->h, &ctx->N, data);
> > > +	struct streebog_uint512 m;
> > > +
> > > +	memcpy(&m, data, sizeof(m));
> > > +
> > > +	streebog_g(&ctx->h, &ctx->N, &m);
> > >  
> > >  	streebog_add512(&ctx->N, &buffer512, &ctx->N);
> > > -	streebog_add512(&ctx->Sigma, (const struct streebog_uint512 *)data,
> > > -			&ctx->Sigma);
> > > +	streebog_add512(&ctx->Sigma, &m, &ctx->Sigma);
> > >  }
> > 
> > As I understand, this is the actual fix.
> 
> Probably, even better would be to use CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
> to optimize out memcpy() for such architectures.
> 

Having multiple code paths is more error-prone, and contrary to popular belief
you can't break alignment rules without informing the compiler, even when
CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS.  See
https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/10631429/.

If you want to code up something yourself using get_unaligned_le64() or
__attribute__((packed)), that probably would be the way to go.  But for now I
just want to fix it to not cause a test failure.  I don't have any particular
interest in optimizing Streebog myself, especially the C implementation (if you
really cared about performance you'd add an assembly implementation).

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-02 16:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-31 20:04 [RFC/RFT PATCH 00/18] crypto: fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 01/18] crypto: x86/poly1305 - fix overflow during partial reduction Eric Biggers
2019-04-01  7:52   ` Martin Willi
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 02/18] crypto: crct10dif-generic - fix use via crypto_shash_digest() Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 03/18] crypto: x86/crct10dif-pcl " Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 04/18] crypto: skcipher - restore default skcipher_walk::iv on error Eric Biggers
2019-04-08  6:23   ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-08 17:27     ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-09  6:37       ` Herbert Xu
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 05/18] crypto: skcipher - don't WARN on unprocessed data after slow walk step Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 06/18] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - set cra_name correctly Eric Biggers
2019-04-01  7:57   ` Martin Willi
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 07/18] crypto: gcm - fix incompatibility between "gcm" and "gcm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-01 15:56   ` Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 08/18] crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-02 15:48   ` Sasha Levin
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 09/18] crypto: streebog - fix unaligned memory accesses Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 21:47   ` Vitaly Chikunov
2019-04-02 16:15     ` Vitaly Chikunov
2019-04-02 16:57       ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 10/18] crypto: cts - don't support empty messages Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 11/18] crypto: arm64/cbcmac - handle empty messages in same way as template Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 12/18] crypto: testmgr - expand ability to test for errors Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 13/18] crypto: testmgr - identify test vectors by name rather than number Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 14/18] crypto: testmgr - add helpers for fuzzing against generic implementation Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 15/18] crypto: testmgr - fuzz hashes against their " Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 16/18] crypto: testmgr - fuzz skciphers " Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 17/18] crypto: testmgr - fuzz AEADs " Eric Biggers
2019-03-31 20:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 18/18] crypto: run initcalls for generic implementations earlier Eric Biggers
2019-04-08  5:53   ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-08 17:44     ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-09  6:24       ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-09 18:16         ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-11  6:26           ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-08  6:44 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 00/18] crypto: fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation Herbert Xu

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