From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/7] crypto: lrw - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 23:46:29 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190410064635.11813-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190410064635.11813-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
Fix this in the LRW template by checking the return value of
skcipher_walk_virt().
This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation. When the extra
self-tests were run on a KASAN-enabled kernel, a KASAN use-after-free
splat occured during lrw(aes) testing.
Fixes: c778f96bf347 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
crypto/lrw.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/lrw.c b/crypto/lrw.c
index 0430ccd087286..b6666c595a686 100644
--- a/crypto/lrw.c
+++ b/crypto/lrw.c
@@ -162,8 +162,10 @@ static int xor_tweak(struct skcipher_request *req, bool second_pass)
}
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&w, req, false);
- iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
counter[0] = be32_to_cpu(iv[3]);
counter[1] = be32_to_cpu(iv[2]);
counter[2] = be32_to_cpu(iv[1]);
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-10 6:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-10 6:46 [PATCH v2 0/7] crypto: fixes in preparation of new fuzz tests Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 6:46 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] crypto: salsa20 - don't access already-freed walk.iv Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] crypto: gcm - fix incompatibility between "gcm" and "gcm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-18 14:00 ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-18 18:41 ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-19 5:52 ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18 ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-18 14:03 ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-10 6:46 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] crypto: vmx - return correct error code on failed setkey Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 18:08 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] crypto: fixes in preparation of new fuzz tests Ard Biesheuvel
2019-04-18 14:24 ` Herbert Xu
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