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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/7] crypto: lrw - don't access already-freed walk.iv
Date: Tue,  9 Apr 2019 23:46:29 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190410064635.11813-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190410064635.11813-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv.  But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.

Fix this in the LRW template by checking the return value of
skcipher_walk_virt().

This bug was detected by my patches that improve testmgr to fuzz
algorithms against their generic implementation.  When the extra
self-tests were run on a KASAN-enabled kernel, a KASAN use-after-free
splat occured during lrw(aes) testing.

Fixes: c778f96bf347 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 crypto/lrw.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/lrw.c b/crypto/lrw.c
index 0430ccd087286..b6666c595a686 100644
--- a/crypto/lrw.c
+++ b/crypto/lrw.c
@@ -162,8 +162,10 @@ static int xor_tweak(struct skcipher_request *req, bool second_pass)
 	}
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&w, req, false);
-	iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
+	iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
 	counter[0] = be32_to_cpu(iv[3]);
 	counter[1] = be32_to_cpu(iv[2]);
 	counter[2] = be32_to_cpu(iv[1]);
-- 
2.21.0


  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-10  6:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-10  6:46 [PATCH v2 0/7] crypto: fixes in preparation of new fuzz tests Eric Biggers
2019-04-10  6:46 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2019-04-10  6:46 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] crypto: salsa20 - don't access already-freed walk.iv Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18   ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10  6:46 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18   ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10  6:46 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18   ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-10  6:46 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] crypto: gcm - fix incompatibility between "gcm" and "gcm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18   ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-18 14:00   ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-18 18:41     ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-19  5:52       ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-10  6:46 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and "ccm_base" Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 19:18   ` Sasha Levin
2019-04-18 14:03   ` Herbert Xu
2019-04-10  6:46 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] crypto: vmx - return correct error code on failed setkey Eric Biggers
2019-04-10 18:08 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] crypto: fixes in preparation of new fuzz tests Ard Biesheuvel
2019-04-18 14:24 ` Herbert Xu

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