From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.3 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FSL_HELO_FAKE,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C711C0650F for ; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 17:15:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 50C2D21880 for ; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 17:15:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1565284514; bh=kyGM/qQKhDJIBrPc+j1pg6hHWKXYr9tMgkcFnysFN74=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:List-ID:From; b=QAB8i1Vt7myhOuOn8XU+6pP0ymq93CeWSgrX1vS4LciaJjNjVhivU7b0fHOI0NIG3 YiKSGHif3LwSb4yK4j95MgeieJWwRwG8qXfJe1Rt42VuuMPw1QqBq4rWLgInk4QVVP dDAhlmNE5LrHC8fwp87IUc+QDiWIezNEGWvhjA+o= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2404079AbfHHRPN (ORCPT ); Thu, 8 Aug 2019 13:15:13 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:40288 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728020AbfHHRPN (ORCPT ); Thu, 8 Aug 2019 13:15:13 -0400 Received: from gmail.com (unknown [104.132.1.77]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 021E92184E; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 17:15:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1565284512; bh=kyGM/qQKhDJIBrPc+j1pg6hHWKXYr9tMgkcFnysFN74=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=L/AUcgekcAa7FaOUC3I52nk2J7FozQrmXzSY5K0YJO02HLbXWWmF4MAj/sQpNLcDt j85pchv/GzqFwmQkofIYd3qj7AyxPhWGJxFUIhySd28nPKcgI9q1wa4W0KmBOk+W7z Y0qUS3HM+qIqVbRigJO68to35ZCul45HwEZvLLy4= Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2019 10:15:10 -0700 From: Eric Biggers To: Pascal Van Leeuwen Cc: Milan Broz , Ard Biesheuvel , "linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" , "herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" , "agk@redhat.com" , "snitzer@redhat.com" , "dm-devel@redhat.com" Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2] md/dm-crypt - reuse eboiv skcipher for IV generation Message-ID: <20190808171508.GA201004@gmail.com> Mail-Followup-To: Pascal Van Leeuwen , Milan Broz , Ard Biesheuvel , "linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" , "herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" , "agk@redhat.com" , "snitzer@redhat.com" , "dm-devel@redhat.com" References: <20190807055022.15551-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> <20190808083059.GB5319@sol.localdomain> <67b4f0ee-b169-8af4-d7af-1c53a66ba587@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Aug 08, 2019 at 01:23:10PM +0000, Pascal Van Leeuwen wrote: > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Milan Broz > > Sent: Thursday, August 8, 2019 2:53 PM > > To: Pascal Van Leeuwen ; Eric Biggers > > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel ; linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; > > herbert@gondor.apana.org.au; agk@redhat.com; snitzer@redhat.com; dm-devel@redhat.com > > Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2] md/dm-crypt - reuse eboiv skcipher for IV generation > > > > On 08/08/2019 11:31, Pascal Van Leeuwen wrote: > > >> -----Original Message----- > > >> From: Eric Biggers > > >> Sent: Thursday, August 8, 2019 10:31 AM > > >> To: Pascal Van Leeuwen > > >> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel ; linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; > > >> herbert@gondor.apana.org.au; agk@redhat.com; snitzer@redhat.com; dm-devel@redhat.com; > > >> gmazyland@gmail.com > > >> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2] md/dm-crypt - reuse eboiv skcipher for IV generation > > >> > > >> On Wed, Aug 07, 2019 at 04:14:22PM +0000, Pascal Van Leeuwen wrote: > > >>>>>> In your case, we are not dealing with known plaintext attacks, > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> Since this is XTS, which is used for disk encryption, I would argue > > >>>>> we do! For the tweak encryption, the sector number is known plaintext, > > >>>>> same as for EBOIV. Also, you may be able to control data being written > > >>>>> to the disk encrypted, either directly or indirectly. > > >>>>> OK, part of the data into the CTS encryption will be previous ciphertext, > > >>>>> but that may be just 1 byte with the rest being the known plaintext. > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> The tweak encryption uses a dedicated key, so leaking it does not have > > >>>> the same impact as it does in the EBOIV case. > > >>>> > > >>> Well ... yes and no. The spec defines them as seperately controllable - > > >>> deviating from the original XEX definition - but in most practicle use cases > > >>> I've seen, the same key is used for both, as having 2 keys just increases > > >>> key storage requirements and does not actually improve effective security > > >>> (of the algorithm itself, implementation peculiarities like this one aside > > >>> :-), as XEX has been proven secure using a single key. And the security > > >>> proof for XTS actually builds on that while using 2 keys deviates from it. > > >>> > > >> > > >> This is a common misconception. Actually, XTS needs 2 distinct keys to be a > > >> CCA-secure tweakable block cipher, due to another subtle difference from XEX: > > >> XEX (by which I really mean "XEX[E,2]") builds the sequence of masks starting > > >> with x^1, while XTS starts with x^0. If only 1 key is used, the inclusion of > > >> the 0th power in XTS allows the attack described in Section 6 of the XEX paper > > >> (https://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf). > > >> > > > Interesting ... I'm not a cryptographer, just a humble HW engineer specialized > > > in implementing crypto. I'm basing my views mostly on the Liskov/Minematsu > > > "Comments on XTS", who assert that using 2 keys in XTS was misguided. > > > (and I never saw any follow-on comments asserting that this view was wrong ...) > > > On not avoiding j=0 in the XTS spec they actually comment: > > > "This difference is significant in security, but has no impact on effectiveness > > > for practical applications.", which I read as "not relevant for normal use". See page 6 of "Comments on XTS": Note that j = 0 must be excluded, as f(0, v) = v for any v, which implies ρ = 1. Moreover, if j = 0 was allowed, a simple attack based on this fact existed, as pointed out by [6] and [3]. Hence if XEX is used, one must be careful to avoid j being 0. The part you quoted is only talking about XTS *as specified*, i.e. with 2 keys. > > > > > > In any case, it's frequently *used* with both keys being equal for performance > > > and key storage reasons. It's broken, so it's broken. Doesn't matter who is using it. > > > > There is already check in kernel for XTS "weak" keys (tweak and encryption keys must not be > > the same). > > > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/include/crypto/xts.h# > > n27 > > > > For now it applies only in FIPS mode... (and if I see correctly it is duplicated in all > > drivers). > > > I never had any need to look into FIPS for XTS before, but this actually appears > to be accurate. FIPS indeed *requires this*. Much to my surprise, I might add. > Still looking for some actual rationale that goes beyond suggestion and innuendo > (and is not too heavy on the math ;-) though. As I said, the attack is explained in the original XEX paper. Basically the adversary can submit a chosen ciphertext query for the first block of sector 0 to leak the first "mask" of that sector, then submit a chosen plaintext or ciphertext query for the reminder of the sector such that they can predict the output with 100% certainty. (The standard security model for tweakable block ciphers says the output must appear random.) - Eric