From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6090FC433E0 for ; Thu, 2 Jul 2020 07:40:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E3D020899 for ; Thu, 2 Jul 2020 07:40:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726442AbgGBHk1 (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Jul 2020 03:40:27 -0400 Received: from helcar.hmeau.com ([216.24.177.18]:38002 "EHLO fornost.hmeau.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726362AbgGBHk1 (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Jul 2020 03:40:27 -0400 Received: from gwarestrin.arnor.me.apana.org.au ([192.168.0.7]) by fornost.hmeau.com with smtp (Exim 4.92 #5 (Debian)) id 1jqtpU-0002an-Rn; Thu, 02 Jul 2020 17:40:21 +1000 Received: by gwarestrin.arnor.me.apana.org.au (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Thu, 02 Jul 2020 17:40:20 +1000 Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 17:40:20 +1000 From: Herbert Xu To: Ard Biesheuvel , "David S. Miller" Cc: Horia =?utf-8?Q?Geant=C4=83?= , Aymen Sghaier , Linux Crypto Mailing List , Iuliana Prodan Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: caam - Remove broken arc4 support Message-ID: <20200702074020.GA4253@gondor.apana.org.au> References: <20200702043648.GA21823@gondor.apana.org.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Jul 02, 2020 at 09:27:33AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > I do wonder if the others are doing any better - n2 and bcm iproc also > appear to keep the state in the TFM object, while I'd expect the > setkey() to be a simple memcpy(), and the initial state derivation to > be part of the encrypt flow, right? bcm at least appears to be doing the right thing, but of course without the hardware or a reference manual I can't be sure. David can probably tell us whether n2 is capable of updating the state at ent->enc_key_addr after each arc4 operation. > Maybe we should add a test for this to tcrypt, i.e., do setkey() once > and do two encryptions of the same input, and check whether we get > back the original data. Yes we could certainly add an arc4-only test. Alternatively we could kill the only in-kernel user (auth_gss) and then try to remove the arc4 interface completely (and hope that nobody complains :) Thanks, -- Email: Herbert Xu Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt