From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B963AC4363D for ; Fri, 2 Oct 2020 13:34:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 72ABA21D94 for ; Fri, 2 Oct 2020 13:34:00 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1601645640; bh=r8sE4T1WJ1sRR0dXb4x/LbPIxOFPFnbbV6tkOMGQhjk=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:List-ID:From; b=Zfci2GPpTe/VoQilD/zcdPB41Wgex33cvFhOEVYsnUe8xzzY3KCe3hAfjl4UWjCx3 T5Mz3hrcryFuNdD352o2lNPt9L4Op8+zJtWNSZmXDy3O9JT8tl4tLyuNc0LFtWtcCd Q0Q5r+FEUeXKv3T2wUzeyDpVf6KNrEwaH+nsRGHk= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726386AbgJBNd7 (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Oct 2020 09:33:59 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:39584 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726017AbgJBNd7 (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Oct 2020 09:33:59 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-74-64.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.74.64]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2A9AD21D92; Fri, 2 Oct 2020 13:33:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1601645638; bh=r8sE4T1WJ1sRR0dXb4x/LbPIxOFPFnbbV6tkOMGQhjk=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=ey4Uqhr5SplFwaM0FVnMRpRGViz49oWAGj2/qyXpESRZ9aq5/kbUfEO6dQe7pBUlF xQqLlWGvlcIRi7SqSZG8VZhkIr5b2iGmXZ03tf01zpN38/r8n0ihWfvus/RyawOPFz efEBAPgnunvIcvuVbe1a2e1LHFnqn7L0gwaWpD0s= Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 15:33:58 +0200 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Willy Tarreau Cc: Torsten Duwe , "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Nicolai Stange , LKML , Arnd Bergmann , "Eric W. Biederman" , "Alexander E. Patrakov" , "Ahmed S. Darwish" , Matthew Garrett , Vito Caputo , Andreas Dilger , Jan Kara , Ray Strode , William Jon McCann , zhangjs , Andy Lutomirski , Florian Weimer , Lennart Poettering , Peter Matthias , Marcelo Henrique Cerri , Neil Horman , Randy Dunlap , Julia Lawall , Dan Carpenter , Andy Lavr , Eric Biggers , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Stephan =?iso-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= , Petr Tesarik Subject: Re: [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Message-ID: <20201002133358.GA3386034@kroah.com> References: <20200921075857.4424-1-nstange@suse.de> <20201002123836.GA14807@lst.de> <20201002131555.GD3783@1wt.eu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20201002131555.GD3783@1wt.eu> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Oct 02, 2020 at 03:15:55PM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote: > On Fri, Oct 02, 2020 at 02:38:36PM +0200, Torsten Duwe wrote: > > Almost two weeks passed and these are the "relevant" replies: > > > > Jason personally does not like FIPS, and is afraid of > > "subpar crypto". Albeit this patch set strictly isn't about > > crypto at all; the crypto subsystem is in the unlucky position > > to just depend on a good entropy source. > > > > Greg claims that Linux (kernel) isn't about choice, which is clearly > > wrong. > > I think there's a small misunderstanding here, my understanding is > that for quite a while, the possibilities offered by the various > random subsystems or their proposed derivative used to range from > "you have to choose between a fast system that may be vulnerable > to some attacks, a system that might not be vulnerable to certain > attacks but might not always boot, or a slow system not vulnerable > to certain attacks". Greg's point seems to be that if we add an > option, it means it's yet another tradeoff between these possibilities > and that someone will still not be happy at the end of the chain. If > the proposed solution covers everything at once (performance, > reliability, unpredictability), then there probably is no more reason > for keeping alternate solutions at all, hence there's no need to give > the user the choice between multiple options when only one is known > to always be valid. At least that's how I see it and it makes sense > to me. Thanks for spelling it out in much more detail than I was willing to :) thanks, greg k-h