public inbox for linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: Replace strlcpy with strscpy
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2023 00:22:58 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230613002258.3535506-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com> (raw)

strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().

Direct replacement is safe here since return value of -E2BIG
is used to check for truncation instead of sizeof(dest).

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89

Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
---
 crypto/lrw.c |    4 ++--
 crypto/xts.c |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/lrw.c b/crypto/lrw.c
index 1b0f76ba3eb5..bb8c1575645b 100644
--- a/crypto/lrw.c
+++ b/crypto/lrw.c
@@ -359,8 +359,8 @@ static int lrw_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	if (!strncmp(cipher_name, "ecb(", 4)) {
 		unsigned len;
 
-		len = strlcpy(ecb_name, cipher_name + 4, sizeof(ecb_name));
-		if (len < 2 || len >= sizeof(ecb_name))
+		len = strscpy(ecb_name, cipher_name + 4, sizeof(ecb_name));
+		if (len < 2)
 			goto err_free_inst;
 
 		if (ecb_name[len - 1] != ')')
diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
index 09be909a6a1a..8a9f9653426e 100644
--- a/crypto/xts.c
+++ b/crypto/xts.c
@@ -398,8 +398,8 @@ static int xts_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	if (!strncmp(cipher_name, "ecb(", 4)) {
 		unsigned len;
 
-		len = strlcpy(ctx->name, cipher_name + 4, sizeof(ctx->name));
-		if (len < 2 || len >= sizeof(ctx->name))
+		len = strscpy(ctx->name, cipher_name + 4, sizeof(ctx->name));
+		if (len < 2)
 			goto err_free_inst;
 
 		if (ctx->name[len - 1] != ')')
-- 
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog



             reply	other threads:[~2023-06-13  0:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-13  0:22 Azeem Shaikh [this message]
2023-06-13  2:37 ` [PATCH] crypto: Replace strlcpy with strscpy Eric Biggers
2023-06-13 14:26   ` Azeem Shaikh

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20230613002258.3535506-1-azeemshaikh38@gmail.com \
    --to=azeemshaikh38@gmail.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox