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* [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use
@ 2024-04-15 22:19 Hailey Mothershead
  2024-04-15 22:49 ` Eric Biggers
  2024-04-26  9:30 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead,cipher " Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Hailey Mothershead @ 2024-04-15 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: herbert; +Cc: davem, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, hailmo

I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
previously held the private key.

Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com>
---
 crypto/aead.c   | 3 +--
 crypto/cipher.c | 3 +--
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/aead.c b/crypto/aead.c
index 16991095270d..c4ece86c45bc 100644
--- a/crypto/aead.c
+++ b/crypto/aead.c
@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
 	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
 	ret = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
-	memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
-	kfree(buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/cipher.c b/crypto/cipher.c
index b47141ed4a9f..395f0c2fbb9f 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher.c
@@ -34,8 +34,7 @@ static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
 	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
 	ret = cia->cia_setkey(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), alignbuffer, keylen);
-	memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
-	kfree(buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
 	return ret;
 
 }
-- 
2.40.1

memsets removed and first patch in series dropped.

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use
  2024-04-15 22:19 [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use Hailey Mothershead
@ 2024-04-15 22:49 ` Eric Biggers
  2024-04-16 19:14   ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead, cipher " Mothershead, Hailey
  2024-04-26  9:30 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead,cipher " Herbert Xu
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2024-04-15 22:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Hailey Mothershead; +Cc: herbert, davem, linux-crypto, linux-kernel

On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 10:19:15PM +0000, Hailey Mothershead wrote:
> I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
> cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
> needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
> previously held the private key.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com>
> ---
>  crypto/aead.c   | 3 +--
>  crypto/cipher.c | 3 +--
>  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/aead.c b/crypto/aead.c
> index 16991095270d..c4ece86c45bc 100644
> --- a/crypto/aead.c
> +++ b/crypto/aead.c
> @@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
>  	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
>  	ret = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
> -	memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
> -	kfree(buffer);
> +	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/crypto/cipher.c b/crypto/cipher.c
> index b47141ed4a9f..395f0c2fbb9f 100644
> --- a/crypto/cipher.c
> +++ b/crypto/cipher.c
> @@ -34,8 +34,7 @@ static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
>  	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
>  	ret = cia->cia_setkey(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), alignbuffer, keylen);
> -	memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
> -	kfree(buffer);
> +	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
>  	return ret;

Well, the memset()s that you're removing already did the zeroization.  This
patch seems worthwhile as a code simplification, but please don't characterize
it as a bug fix, because it's not.

- Eric

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead, cipher - zeroize key buffer after use
  2024-04-15 22:49 ` Eric Biggers
@ 2024-04-16 19:14   ` Mothershead, Hailey
  2024-04-17  6:13     ` Eric Biggers
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mothershead, Hailey @ 2024-04-16 19:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Eric Biggers
  Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

> On 4/15/24, 3:50 PM, "Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org <mailto:ebiggers@kernel.org>> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 10:19:15PM +0000, Hailey Mothershead wrote:
> > I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
> > cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
> > needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
> > previously held the private key.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com <mailto:hailmo@amazon.com>>
> > ---
> > crypto/aead.c | 3 +--
> > crypto/cipher.c | 3 +--
> > 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/crypto/aead.c b/crypto/aead.c
> > index 16991095270d..c4ece86c45bc 100644
> > --- a/crypto/aead.c
> > +++ b/crypto/aead.c
> > @@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
> > alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
> > memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
> > ret = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
> > - memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
> > - kfree(buffer);
> > + kfree_sensitive(buffer);
> > return ret;
> > }
> >
> > diff --git a/crypto/cipher.c b/crypto/cipher.c
> > index b47141ed4a9f..395f0c2fbb9f 100644
> > --- a/crypto/cipher.c
> > +++ b/crypto/cipher.c
> > @@ -34,8 +34,7 @@ static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
> > alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
> > memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
> > ret = cia->cia_setkey(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), alignbuffer, keylen);
> > - memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
> > - kfree(buffer);
> > + kfree_sensitive(buffer);
> > return ret;
>
>
> Well, the memset()s that you're removing already did the zeroization. This
> patch seems worthwhile as a code simplification, but please don't characterize
> it as a bug fix, because it's not.
>
>
> - Eric

kfree_sensitive uses memzero_explicit() instead of the memset()s used
above. The memzero_explicit header states -

* Note: usually using memset() is just fine (!), but in cases
* where clearing out _local_ data at the end of a scope is
* necessary, memzero_explicit() should be used instead in
* order to prevent the compiler from optimising away zeroing.

It accomplishes this by calling memset() and then adding a barrier. Since
FIPS requires this data be zeroed out, and the current memset() and
kfree() don't guarantee this, I do not think the commit message is
misleading. I can clarify the message with the above information if that
is preferred.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead, cipher - zeroize key buffer after use
  2024-04-16 19:14   ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead, cipher " Mothershead, Hailey
@ 2024-04-17  6:13     ` Eric Biggers
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2024-04-17  6:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mothershead, Hailey
  Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 07:14:28PM +0000, Mothershead, Hailey wrote:
> > On 4/15/24, 3:50 PM, "Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org <mailto:ebiggers@kernel.org>> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 10:19:15PM +0000, Hailey Mothershead wrote:
> > > I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
> > > cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
> > > needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
> > > previously held the private key.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com <mailto:hailmo@amazon.com>>
> > > ---
> > > crypto/aead.c | 3 +--
> > > crypto/cipher.c | 3 +--
> > > 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/crypto/aead.c b/crypto/aead.c
> > > index 16991095270d..c4ece86c45bc 100644
> > > --- a/crypto/aead.c
> > > +++ b/crypto/aead.c
> > > @@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
> > > alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
> > > memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
> > > ret = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
> > > - memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
> > > - kfree(buffer);
> > > + kfree_sensitive(buffer);
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > diff --git a/crypto/cipher.c b/crypto/cipher.c
> > > index b47141ed4a9f..395f0c2fbb9f 100644
> > > --- a/crypto/cipher.c
> > > +++ b/crypto/cipher.c
> > > @@ -34,8 +34,7 @@ static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
> > > alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
> > > memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
> > > ret = cia->cia_setkey(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), alignbuffer, keylen);
> > > - memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
> > > - kfree(buffer);
> > > + kfree_sensitive(buffer);
> > > return ret;
> >
> >
> > Well, the memset()s that you're removing already did the zeroization. This
> > patch seems worthwhile as a code simplification, but please don't characterize
> > it as a bug fix, because it's not.
> >
> >
> > - Eric
> 
> kfree_sensitive uses memzero_explicit() instead of the memset()s used
> above. The memzero_explicit header states -
> 
> * Note: usually using memset() is just fine (!), but in cases
> * where clearing out _local_ data at the end of a scope is
> * necessary, memzero_explicit() should be used instead in
> * order to prevent the compiler from optimising away zeroing.
> 
> It accomplishes this by calling memset() and then adding a barrier. Since
> FIPS requires this data be zeroed out, and the current memset() and
> kfree() don't guarantee this, I do not think the commit message is
> misleading. I can clarify the message with the above information if that
> is preferred.
> 

It's heap data, not local data.  So no, memzero_explicit() isn't actually needed
here.  It would convey the intent better, but it's not actually needed.

- Eric

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use
  2024-04-15 22:19 [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use Hailey Mothershead
  2024-04-15 22:49 ` Eric Biggers
@ 2024-04-26  9:30 ` Herbert Xu
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2024-04-26  9:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Hailey Mothershead; +Cc: davem, linux-crypto, linux-kernel

On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 10:19:15PM +0000, Hailey Mothershead wrote:
> I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
> cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
> needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
> previously held the private key.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com>
> ---
>  crypto/aead.c   | 3 +--
>  crypto/cipher.c | 3 +--
>  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Patch applied.  Thanks.
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

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Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2024-04-15 22:19 [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use Hailey Mothershead
2024-04-15 22:49 ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-16 19:14   ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead, cipher " Mothershead, Hailey
2024-04-17  6:13     ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-26  9:30 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: aead,cipher " Herbert Xu

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