* [PATCH 1/8] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand()
[not found] <20240718150658.99580-1-hare@kernel.org>
@ 2024-07-18 15:06 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-18 23:14 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-07-18 15:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Sagi Grimberg, Keith Busch, linux-nvme, Hannes Reinecke,
Eric Biggers, linux-crypto
Separate out the HKDF functions into a separate file to make them
available to other callers.
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
---
crypto/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/hkdf.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/crypto/hkdf.c | 68 ++++---------------------
include/crypto/hkdf.h | 18 +++++++
4 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/hkdf.c
create mode 100644 include/crypto/hkdf.h
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index edbbaa3ffef5..b77fc360f0ff 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECHAINIV) += echainiv.o
crypto_hash-y += ahash.o
crypto_hash-y += shash.o
+crypto_hash-y += hkdf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH2) += crypto_hash.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2) += akcipher.o
diff --git a/crypto/hkdf.c b/crypto/hkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..22e343851c0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/hkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of HKDF ("HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
+ * Function"), aka RFC 5869. See also the original paper (Krawczyk 2010):
+ * "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme".
+ *
+ * This is used to derive keys from the fscrypt master keys.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <crypto/hkdf.h>
+
+/*
+ * HKDF consists of two steps:
+ *
+ * 1. HKDF-Extract: extract a pseudorandom key of length HKDF_HASHLEN bytes from
+ * the input keying material and optional salt.
+ * 2. HKDF-Expand: expand the pseudorandom key into output keying material of
+ * any length, parameterized by an application-specific info string.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869 section 2.2), unsalted */
+int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
+ unsigned int ikmlen, u8 *prk)
+{
+ unsigned int prklen = crypto_shash_digestsize(hmac_tfm);
+ u8 *default_salt;
+ int err;
+
+ default_salt = kzalloc(prklen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!default_salt)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, default_salt, prklen);
+ if (!err)
+ err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hmac_tfm, ikm, ikmlen, prk);
+
+ kfree(default_salt);
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hkdf_extract);
+
+/*
+ * HKDF-Expand (RFC 5869 section 2.3).
+ * This expands the pseudorandom key, which was already keyed into @hmac_tfm,
+ * into @okmlen bytes of output keying material parameterized by the
+ * application-specific @info of length @infolen bytes.
+ * This is thread-safe and may be called by multiple threads in parallel.
+ */
+int hkdf_expand(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm,
+ const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
+ u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen)
+{
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hmac_tfm);
+ unsigned int i, hashlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(hmac_tfm);
+ int err;
+ const u8 *prev = NULL;
+ u8 counter = 1;
+ u8 *tmp;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(okmlen > 255 * hashlen))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tmp = kzalloc(hashlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ desc->tfm = hmac_tfm;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < okmlen; i += hashlen) {
+
+ err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (prev) {
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prev, hashlen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, info, infolen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(counter) != 1);
+ if (okmlen - i < hashlen) {
+ err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, tmp);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ memcpy(&okm[i], tmp, okmlen - i);
+ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ } else {
+ err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, &okm[i]);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ counter++;
+ prev = &okm[i];
+ }
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ memzero_explicit(okm, okmlen); /* so caller doesn't need to */
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ kfree(tmp);
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hkdf_expand);
diff --git a/fs/crypto/hkdf.c b/fs/crypto/hkdf.c
index 5a384dad2c72..9c2f9aca9412 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/hkdf.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/hkdf.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <crypto/hkdf.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
@@ -44,20 +45,6 @@
* there's no way to persist a random salt per master key from kernel mode.
*/
-/* HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869 section 2.2), unsalted */
-static int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
- unsigned int ikmlen, u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN])
-{
- static const u8 default_salt[HKDF_HASHLEN];
- int err;
-
- err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, default_salt, HKDF_HASHLEN);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- return crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hmac_tfm, ikm, ikmlen, prk);
-}
-
/*
* Compute HKDF-Extract using the given master key as the input keying material,
* and prepare an HMAC transform object keyed by the resulting pseudorandom key.
@@ -118,61 +105,24 @@ int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context,
u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen)
{
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hkdf->hmac_tfm);
- u8 prefix[9];
- unsigned int i;
+ u8 *prefix;
int err;
- const u8 *prev = NULL;
- u8 counter = 1;
- u8 tmp[HKDF_HASHLEN];
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(okmlen > 255 * HKDF_HASHLEN))
return -EINVAL;
+ prefix = kzalloc(okmlen + 9, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!prefix)
+ return -ENOMEM;
desc->tfm = hkdf->hmac_tfm;
memcpy(prefix, "fscrypt\0", 8);
prefix[8] = context;
+ memcpy(prefix + 9, info, infolen);
- for (i = 0; i < okmlen; i += HKDF_HASHLEN) {
-
- err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- if (prev) {
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prev, HKDF_HASHLEN);
- if (err)
- goto out;
- }
-
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prefix, sizeof(prefix));
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, info, infolen);
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(counter) != 1);
- if (okmlen - i < HKDF_HASHLEN) {
- err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, tmp);
- if (err)
- goto out;
- memcpy(&okm[i], tmp, okmlen - i);
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- } else {
- err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, &okm[i]);
- if (err)
- goto out;
- }
- counter++;
- prev = &okm[i];
- }
- err = 0;
-out:
- if (unlikely(err))
- memzero_explicit(okm, okmlen); /* so caller doesn't need to */
- shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ err = hkdf_expand(hkdf->hmac_tfm, prefix, infolen + 8,
+ okm, okmlen);
+ kfree(prefix);
return err;
}
diff --git a/include/crypto/hkdf.h b/include/crypto/hkdf.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bf06c080d7ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/hkdf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * HKDF: HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF), RFC 5869
+ *
+ * Extracted from fs/crypto/hkdf.c, which has
+ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_HKDF_H
+#define _CRYPTO_HKDF_H
+
+int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
+ unsigned int ikmlen, u8 *prk);
+int hkdf_expand(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm,
+ const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
+ u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen);
+
+#endif
--
2.35.3
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