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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>, Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>,
	linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand()
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2024 21:54:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240829215404.GA3058135@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0697a6c9-85a3-4f56-879c-b096fb5072b8@suse.de>

On Thu, Aug 29, 2024 at 12:39:33PM +0200, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
> On 8/27/24 19:52, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 13, 2024 at 01:15:04PM +0200, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
> > > Separate out the HKDF functions into a separate module to
> > > to make them available to other callers.
> > > And add a testsuite to the module with test vectors
> > > from RFC 5869 to ensure the integrity of the algorithm.
> [ .. ]
> > > +	desc->tfm = hmac_tfm;
> > > +
> > > +	for (i = 0; i < okmlen; i += hashlen) {
> > > +
> > > +		err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
> > > +		if (err)
> > > +			goto out;
> > > +
> > > +		if (prev) {
> > > +			err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prev, hashlen);
> > > +			if (err)
> > > +				goto out;
> > > +		}
> > > +
> > > +		if (info && infolen) {
> > 
> > 'if (infolen)' instead of 'if (info && infolen)'.  The latter is a bad practice
> > because it can hide bugs.
> > 
> Do I need to set a 'WARN_ON(!info)' (or something) in this case? Or are the
> '->update' callbacks expected to handle it themselves?

No, if someone does pass NULL with a nonzero length there will be a crash.  But
the same will happen with another invalid pointer that is not NULL.  It's just a
bad practice to insert random NULL checks like this because it can hide bugs.
Really a call like info=NULL, infolen=10 is ambiguous --- you've made it
silently override infolen to 0 but how do you know the caller wanted that?

> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_HKDF
> > > +int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
> > > +		 unsigned int ikmlen, const u8 *salt, unsigned int saltlen,
> > > +		 u8 *prk);
> > > +int hkdf_expand(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm,
> > > +		const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
> > > +		u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen);
> > > +#else
> > > +static inline int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm,
> > > +			       const u8 *ikm, unsigned int ikmlen,
> > > +			       const u8 *salt, unsigned int saltlen,
> > > +			       u8 *prk)
> > > +{
> > > +	return -ENOTSUP;
> > > +}
> > > +static inline int hkdf_expand(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm,
> > > +			      const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
> > > +			      u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen)
> > > +{
> > > +	return -ENOTSUP;
> > > +}
> > > +#endif
> > > +#endif
> > 
> > This header is missing <crypto/hash.h> which it depends on.
> > 
> > Also the !CONFIG_CRYPTO_HKDF stubs are unnecessary and should not be included.
> > 
> But that would mean that every call to '#include <crypto/hkdf.h>' would need
> to be encapsulated by 'CONFIG_CRYPTO_HKDF' (or the file itself is
> conditionally compiled on that symbol).

No, it doesn't mean that.  As long as the functions are not called when
!CONFIG_CRYPTO_HKDF, it doesn't hurt to have declarations of them.

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2024-08-29 21:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-13 11:15 [PATCHv9 0/9] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 11:15 ` [PATCH 1/9] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-27 17:52   ` Eric Biggers
2024-08-29 10:39     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-29 21:54       ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2024-08-30  6:13         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 11:15 ` [PATCH 2/9] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 11:15 ` [PATCH 3/9] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 11:15 ` [PATCH 4/9] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 11:15 ` [PATCH 5/9] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 11:15 ` [PATCH 6/9] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 19:45   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-08-14  6:11     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 11:15 ` [PATCH 7/9] nvme-fabrics: reset admin connection for secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 19:46   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-08-13 11:15 ` [PATCH 8/9] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 11:15 ` [PATCH 9/9] nvmet: add tls_concat and tls_key debugfs entries Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-13 19:47   ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-08-16 18:32 ` [PATCHv9 0/9] nvme: implement secure concatenation Kamaljit Singh
2024-08-19  6:43   ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-08-19 17:44     ` Kamaljit Singh
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2024-10-18  6:33 [PATCHv11 0/9] nvme: implement secure concatenaion Hannes Reinecke
2024-10-18  6:33 ` [PATCH 1/9] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-10-11 15:54 [PATCHv10 0/9] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-10-11 15:54 ` [PATCH 1/9] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-10-14 19:38   ` Eric Biggers
2024-10-15 15:05     ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-10-15 15:41       ` Eric Biggers
2024-10-16  6:40         ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-10-16 16:27           ` Eric Biggers
2024-07-22 14:21 [PATCHv8 0/9] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-22 14:21 ` [PATCH 1/9] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-07-23  1:36   ` Eric Biggers
2024-07-23  6:24     ` Hannes Reinecke

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