* [PATCH 01/10] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand()
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-14 4:39 ` Herbert Xu
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 1/6] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
` (9 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
Separate out the HKDF functions into a separate module to
to make them available to other callers.
And add a testsuite to the module with test vectors
from RFC 5869 (and additional vectors for SHA384 and SHA512)
to ensure the integrity of the algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
crypto/Kconfig | 6 +
crypto/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/hkdf.c | 573 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
fs/crypto/hkdf.c | 85 ++-----
include/crypto/hkdf.h | 20 ++
6 files changed, 616 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/hkdf.c
create mode 100644 include/crypto/hkdf.h
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index a779cab668c2..03656e7b55bb 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -141,6 +141,12 @@ config CRYPTO_ACOMP
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
select CRYPTO_ACOMP2
+config CRYPTO_HKDF
+ tristate
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256 if !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
+ select CRYPTO_SHA512 if !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
+ select CRYPTO_HASH2
+
config CRYPTO_MANAGER
tristate "Cryptographic algorithm manager"
select CRYPTO_MANAGER2
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 4c99e5d376f6..5ec5b994d9ae 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH2) += crypto_hash.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2) += akcipher.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SIG2) += sig.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP2) += kpp.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HKDF) += hkdf.o
dh_generic-y := dh.o
dh_generic-y += dh_helper.o
diff --git a/crypto/hkdf.c b/crypto/hkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2434c5c42545
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/hkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,573 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of HKDF ("HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
+ * Function"), aka RFC 5869. See also the original paper (Krawczyk 2010):
+ * "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme".
+ *
+ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <crypto/hkdf.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+/*
+ * HKDF consists of two steps:
+ *
+ * 1. HKDF-Extract: extract a pseudorandom key from the input keying material
+ * and optional salt.
+ * 2. HKDF-Expand: expand the pseudorandom key into output keying material of
+ * any length, parameterized by an application-specific info string.
+ *
+ */
+
+/**
+ * hkdf_extract - HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869 section 2.2)
+ * @hmac_tfm: an HMAC transform using the hash function desired for HKDF. The
+ * caller is responsible for setting the @prk afterwards.
+ * @ikm: input keying material
+ * @ikmlen: length of @ikm
+ * @salt: input salt value
+ * @saltlen: length of @salt
+ * @prk: resulting pseudorandom key
+ *
+ * Extracts a pseudorandom key @prk from the input keying material
+ * @ikm with length @ikmlen and salt @salt with length @saltlen.
+ * The length of @prk is given by the digest size of @hmac_tfm.
+ * For an 'unsalted' version of HKDF-Extract @salt must be set
+ * to all zeroes and @saltlen must be set to the length of @prk.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success with the pseudorandom key stored in @prk,
+ * or a negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
+ unsigned int ikmlen, const u8 *salt, unsigned int saltlen,
+ u8 *prk)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, salt, saltlen);
+ if (!err)
+ err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hmac_tfm, ikm, ikmlen, prk);
+
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hkdf_extract);
+
+/**
+ * hkdf_expand - HKDF-Expand (RFC 5869 section 2.3)
+ * @hmac_tfm: hash context keyed with pseudorandom key
+ * @info: application-specific information
+ * @infolen: length of @info
+ * @okm: output keying material
+ * @okmlen: length of @okm
+ *
+ * This expands the pseudorandom key, which was already keyed into @hmac_tfm,
+ * into @okmlen bytes of output keying material parameterized by the
+ * application-specific @info of length @infolen bytes.
+ * This is thread-safe and may be called by multiple threads in parallel.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success with output keying material stored in @okm,
+ * or a negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int hkdf_expand(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm,
+ const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
+ u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen)
+{
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hmac_tfm);
+ unsigned int i, hashlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(hmac_tfm);
+ int err;
+ const u8 *prev = NULL;
+ u8 counter = 1;
+ u8 tmp[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE] = {};
+
+ if (WARN_ON(okmlen > 255 * hashlen))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ desc->tfm = hmac_tfm;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < okmlen; i += hashlen) {
+ err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (prev) {
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prev, hashlen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (infolen) {
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, info, infolen);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(counter) != 1);
+ if (okmlen - i < hashlen) {
+ err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, tmp);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ memcpy(&okm[i], tmp, okmlen - i);
+ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ } else {
+ err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, &okm[i]);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ counter++;
+ prev = &okm[i];
+ }
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ memzero_explicit(okm, okmlen); /* so caller doesn't need to */
+ shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ memzero_explicit(tmp, HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE);
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hkdf_expand);
+
+struct hkdf_testvec {
+ const char *test;
+ const u8 *ikm;
+ const u8 *salt;
+ const u8 *info;
+ const u8 *prk;
+ const u8 *okm;
+ u16 ikm_size;
+ u16 salt_size;
+ u16 info_size;
+ u16 prk_size;
+ u16 okm_size;
+};
+
+/*
+ * HKDF test vectors from RFC5869
+ *
+ * Additional HKDF test vectors from
+ * https://github.com/brycx/Test-Vector-Generation/blob/master/HKDF/hkdf-hmac-sha2-test-vectors.md
+ */
+static const struct hkdf_testvec hkdf_sha256_tv[] = {
+ {
+ .test = "basic hdkf test",
+ .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b",
+ .ikm_size = 22,
+ .salt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c",
+ .salt_size = 13,
+ .info = "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9",
+ .info_size = 10,
+ .prk = "\x07\x77\x09\x36\x2c\x2e\x32\xdf\x0d\xdc\x3f\x0d\xc4\x7b\xba\x63"
+ "\x90\xb6\xc7\x3b\xb5\x0f\x9c\x31\x22\xec\x84\x4a\xd7\xc2\xb3\xe5",
+ .prk_size = 32,
+ .okm = "\x3c\xb2\x5f\x25\xfa\xac\xd5\x7a\x90\x43\x4f\x64\xd0\x36\x2f\x2a"
+ "\x2d\x2d\x0a\x90\xcf\x1a\x5a\x4c\x5d\xb0\x2d\x56\xec\xc4\xc5\xbf"
+ "\x34\x00\x72\x08\xd5\xb8\x87\x18\x58\x65",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }, {
+ .test = "hkdf test with long input",
+ .ikm = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+ "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"
+ "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+ "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f"
+ "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f",
+ .ikm_size = 80,
+ .salt = "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f"
+ "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f"
+ "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f"
+ "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f"
+ "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf",
+ .salt_size = 80,
+ .info = "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf"
+ "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf"
+ "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf"
+ "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef"
+ "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff",
+ .info_size = 80,
+ .prk = "\x06\xa6\xb8\x8c\x58\x53\x36\x1a\x06\x10\x4c\x9c\xeb\x35\xb4\x5c"
+ "\xef\x76\x00\x14\x90\x46\x71\x01\x4a\x19\x3f\x40\xc1\x5f\xc2\x44",
+ .prk_size = 32,
+ .okm = "\xb1\x1e\x39\x8d\xc8\x03\x27\xa1\xc8\xe7\xf7\x8c\x59\x6a\x49\x34"
+ "\x4f\x01\x2e\xda\x2d\x4e\xfa\xd8\xa0\x50\xcc\x4c\x19\xaf\xa9\x7c"
+ "\x59\x04\x5a\x99\xca\xc7\x82\x72\x71\xcb\x41\xc6\x5e\x59\x0e\x09"
+ "\xda\x32\x75\x60\x0c\x2f\x09\xb8\x36\x77\x93\xa9\xac\xa3\xdb\x71"
+ "\xcc\x30\xc5\x81\x79\xec\x3e\x87\xc1\x4c\x01\xd5\xc1\xf3\x43\x4f"
+ "\x1d\x87",
+ .okm_size = 82,
+ }, {
+ .test = "hkdf test with zero salt and info",
+ .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b",
+ .ikm_size = 22,
+ .salt = NULL,
+ .salt_size = 0,
+ .info = NULL,
+ .info_size = 0,
+ .prk = "\x19\xef\x24\xa3\x2c\x71\x7b\x16\x7f\x33\xa9\x1d\x6f\x64\x8b\xdf"
+ "\x96\x59\x67\x76\xaf\xdb\x63\x77\xac\x43\x4c\x1c\x29\x3c\xcb\x04",
+ .prk_size = 32,
+ .okm = "\x8d\xa4\xe7\x75\xa5\x63\xc1\x8f\x71\x5f\x80\x2a\x06\x3c\x5a\x31"
+ "\xb8\xa1\x1f\x5c\x5e\xe1\x87\x9e\xc3\x45\x4e\x5f\x3c\x73\x8d\x2d"
+ "\x9d\x20\x13\x95\xfa\xa4\xb6\x1a\x96\xc8",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }, {
+ .test = "hkdf test with short input",
+ .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b",
+ .ikm_size = 11,
+ .salt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c",
+ .salt_size = 13,
+ .info = "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9",
+ .info_size = 10,
+ .prk = "\x82\x65\xf6\x9d\x7f\xf7\xe5\x01\x37\x93\x01\x5c\xa0\xef\x92\x0c"
+ "\xb1\x68\x21\x99\xc8\xbc\x3a\x00\xda\x0c\xab\x47\xb7\xb0\x0f\xdf",
+ .prk_size = 32,
+ .okm = "\x58\xdc\xe1\x0d\x58\x01\xcd\xfd\xa8\x31\x72\x6b\xfe\xbc\xb7\x43"
+ "\xd1\x4a\x7e\xe8\x3a\xa0\x57\xa9\x3d\x59\xb0\xa1\x31\x7f\xf0\x9d"
+ "\x10\x5c\xce\xcf\x53\x56\x92\xb1\x4d\xd5",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }, {
+ .test = "unsalted hkdf test with zero info",
+ .ikm = "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c"
+ "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c",
+ .ikm_size = 22,
+ .salt = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+ .salt_size = 32,
+ .info = NULL,
+ .info_size = 0,
+ .prk = "\xaa\x84\x1e\x1f\x35\x74\xf3\x2d\x13\xfb\xa8\x00\x5f\xcd\x9b\x8d"
+ "\x77\x67\x82\xa5\xdf\xa1\x92\x38\x92\xfd\x8b\x63\x5d\x3a\x89\xdf",
+ .prk_size = 32,
+ .okm = "\x59\x68\x99\x17\x9a\xb1\xbc\x00\xa7\xc0\x37\x86\xff\x43\xee\x53"
+ "\x50\x04\xbe\x2b\xb9\xbe\x68\xbc\x14\x06\x63\x6f\x54\xbd\x33\x8a"
+ "\x66\xa2\x37\xba\x2a\xcb\xce\xe3\xc9\xa7",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }
+};
+
+static const struct hkdf_testvec hkdf_sha384_tv[] = {
+ {
+ .test = "basic hkdf test",
+ .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b",
+ .ikm_size = 22,
+ .salt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c",
+ .salt_size = 13,
+ .info = "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9",
+ .info_size = 10,
+ .prk = "\x70\x4b\x39\x99\x07\x79\xce\x1d\xc5\x48\x05\x2c\x7d\xc3\x9f\x30"
+ "\x35\x70\xdd\x13\xfb\x39\xf7\xac\xc5\x64\x68\x0b\xef\x80\xe8\xde"
+ "\xc7\x0e\xe9\xa7\xe1\xf3\xe2\x93\xef\x68\xec\xeb\x07\x2a\x5a\xde",
+ .prk_size = 48,
+ .okm = "\x9b\x50\x97\xa8\x60\x38\xb8\x05\x30\x90\x76\xa4\x4b\x3a\x9f\x38"
+ "\x06\x3e\x25\xb5\x16\xdc\xbf\x36\x9f\x39\x4c\xfa\xb4\x36\x85\xf7"
+ "\x48\xb6\x45\x77\x63\xe4\xf0\x20\x4f\xc5",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }, {
+ .test = "hkdf test with long input",
+ .ikm = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+ "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"
+ "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+ "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f"
+ "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f",
+ .ikm_size = 80,
+ .salt = "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f"
+ "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f"
+ "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f"
+ "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f"
+ "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf",
+ .salt_size = 80,
+ .info = "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf"
+ "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf"
+ "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf"
+ "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef"
+ "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff",
+ .info_size = 80,
+ .prk = "\xb3\x19\xf6\x83\x1d\xff\x93\x14\xef\xb6\x43\xba\xa2\x92\x63\xb3"
+ "\x0e\x4a\x8d\x77\x9f\xe3\x1e\x9c\x90\x1e\xfd\x7d\xe7\x37\xc8\x5b"
+ "\x62\xe6\x76\xd4\xdc\x87\xb0\x89\x5c\x6a\x7d\xc9\x7b\x52\xce\xbb",
+ .prk_size = 48,
+ .okm = "\x48\x4c\xa0\x52\xb8\xcc\x72\x4f\xd1\xc4\xec\x64\xd5\x7b\x4e\x81"
+ "\x8c\x7e\x25\xa8\xe0\xf4\x56\x9e\xd7\x2a\x6a\x05\xfe\x06\x49\xee"
+ "\xbf\x69\xf8\xd5\xc8\x32\x85\x6b\xf4\xe4\xfb\xc1\x79\x67\xd5\x49"
+ "\x75\x32\x4a\x94\x98\x7f\x7f\x41\x83\x58\x17\xd8\x99\x4f\xdb\xd6"
+ "\xf4\xc0\x9c\x55\x00\xdc\xa2\x4a\x56\x22\x2f\xea\x53\xd8\x96\x7a"
+ "\x8b\x2e",
+ .okm_size = 82,
+ }, {
+ .test = "hkdf test with zero salt and info",
+ .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b",
+ .ikm_size = 22,
+ .salt = NULL,
+ .salt_size = 0,
+ .info = NULL,
+ .info_size = 0,
+ .prk = "\x10\xe4\x0c\xf0\x72\xa4\xc5\x62\x6e\x43\xdd\x22\xc1\xcf\x72\x7d"
+ "\x4b\xb1\x40\x97\x5c\x9a\xd0\xcb\xc8\xe4\x5b\x40\x06\x8f\x8f\x0b"
+ "\xa5\x7c\xdb\x59\x8a\xf9\xdf\xa6\x96\x3a\x96\x89\x9a\xf0\x47\xe5",
+ .prk_size = 48,
+ .okm = "\xc8\xc9\x6e\x71\x0f\x89\xb0\xd7\x99\x0b\xca\x68\xbc\xde\xc8\xcf"
+ "\x85\x40\x62\xe5\x4c\x73\xa7\xab\xc7\x43\xfa\xde\x9b\x24\x2d\xaa"
+ "\xcc\x1c\xea\x56\x70\x41\x5b\x52\x84\x9c",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }, {
+ .test = "hkdf test with short input",
+ .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b",
+ .ikm_size = 11,
+ .salt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c",
+ .salt_size = 13,
+ .info = "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9",
+ .info_size = 10,
+ .prk = "\x6d\x31\x69\x98\x28\x79\x80\x88\xb3\x59\xda\xd5\x0b\x8f\x01\xb0"
+ "\x15\xf1\x7a\xa3\xbd\x4e\x27\xa6\xe9\xf8\x73\xb7\x15\x85\xca\x6a"
+ "\x00\xd1\xf0\x82\x12\x8a\xdb\x3c\xf0\x53\x0b\x57\xc0\xf9\xac\x72",
+ .prk_size = 48,
+ .okm = "\xfb\x7e\x67\x43\xeb\x42\xcd\xe9\x6f\x1b\x70\x77\x89\x52\xab\x75"
+ "\x48\xca\xfe\x53\x24\x9f\x7f\xfe\x14\x97\xa1\x63\x5b\x20\x1f\xf1"
+ "\x85\xb9\x3e\x95\x19\x92\xd8\x58\xf1\x1a",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }, {
+ .test = "unsalted hkdf test with zero info",
+ .ikm = "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c"
+ "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c",
+ .ikm_size = 22,
+ .salt = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+ .salt_size = 48,
+ .info = NULL,
+ .info_size = 0,
+ .prk = "\x9d\x2d\xa5\x06\x6f\x05\xd1\x6c\x59\xfe\xdf\x6c\x5f\x32\xc7\x5e"
+ "\xda\x9a\x47\xa7\x9c\x93\x6a\xa4\x4c\xb7\x63\xa8\xe2\x2f\xfb\xfc"
+ "\xd8\xfe\x55\x43\x58\x53\x47\x21\x90\x39\xd1\x68\x28\x36\x33\xf5",
+ .prk_size = 48,
+ .okm = "\x6a\xd7\xc7\x26\xc8\x40\x09\x54\x6a\x76\xe0\x54\x5d\xf2\x66\x78"
+ "\x7e\x2b\x2c\xd6\xca\x43\x73\xa1\xf3\x14\x50\xa7\xbd\xf9\x48\x2b"
+ "\xfa\xb8\x11\xf5\x54\x20\x0e\xad\x8f\x53",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }
+};
+
+static const struct hkdf_testvec hkdf_sha512_tv[] = {
+ {
+ .test = "basic hkdf test",
+ .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b",
+ .ikm_size = 22,
+ .salt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c",
+ .salt_size = 13,
+ .info = "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9",
+ .info_size = 10,
+ .prk = "\x66\x57\x99\x82\x37\x37\xde\xd0\x4a\x88\xe4\x7e\x54\xa5\x89\x0b"
+ "\xb2\xc3\xd2\x47\xc7\xa4\x25\x4a\x8e\x61\x35\x07\x23\x59\x0a\x26"
+ "\xc3\x62\x38\x12\x7d\x86\x61\xb8\x8c\xf8\x0e\xf8\x02\xd5\x7e\x2f"
+ "\x7c\xeb\xcf\x1e\x00\xe0\x83\x84\x8b\xe1\x99\x29\xc6\x1b\x42\x37",
+ .prk_size = 64,
+ .okm = "\x83\x23\x90\x08\x6c\xda\x71\xfb\x47\x62\x5b\xb5\xce\xb1\x68\xe4"
+ "\xc8\xe2\x6a\x1a\x16\xed\x34\xd9\xfc\x7f\xe9\x2c\x14\x81\x57\x93"
+ "\x38\xda\x36\x2c\xb8\xd9\xf9\x25\xd7\xcb",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }, {
+ .test = "hkdf test with long input",
+ .ikm = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+ "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"
+ "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+ "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f"
+ "\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f",
+ .ikm_size = 80,
+ .salt = "\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f"
+ "\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f"
+ "\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f"
+ "\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f"
+ "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf",
+ .salt_size = 80,
+ .info = "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf"
+ "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf"
+ "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf"
+ "\xe0\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef"
+ "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff",
+ .info_size = 80,
+ .prk = "\x35\x67\x25\x42\x90\x7d\x4e\x14\x2c\x00\xe8\x44\x99\xe7\x4e\x1d"
+ "\xe0\x8b\xe8\x65\x35\xf9\x24\xe0\x22\x80\x4a\xd7\x75\xdd\xe2\x7e"
+ "\xc8\x6c\xd1\xe5\xb7\xd1\x78\xc7\x44\x89\xbd\xbe\xb3\x07\x12\xbe"
+ "\xb8\x2d\x4f\x97\x41\x6c\x5a\x94\xea\x81\xeb\xdf\x3e\x62\x9e\x4a",
+ .prk_size = 64,
+ .okm = "\xce\x6c\x97\x19\x28\x05\xb3\x46\xe6\x16\x1e\x82\x1e\xd1\x65\x67"
+ "\x3b\x84\xf4\x00\xa2\xb5\x14\xb2\xfe\x23\xd8\x4c\xd1\x89\xdd\xf1"
+ "\xb6\x95\xb4\x8c\xbd\x1c\x83\x88\x44\x11\x37\xb3\xce\x28\xf1\x6a"
+ "\xa6\x4b\xa3\x3b\xa4\x66\xb2\x4d\xf6\xcf\xcb\x02\x1e\xcf\xf2\x35"
+ "\xf6\xa2\x05\x6c\xe3\xaf\x1d\xe4\x4d\x57\x20\x97\xa8\x50\x5d\x9e"
+ "\x7a\x93",
+ .okm_size = 82,
+ }, {
+ .test = "hkdf test with zero salt and info",
+ .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b"
+ "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b",
+ .ikm_size = 22,
+ .salt = NULL,
+ .salt_size = 0,
+ .info = NULL,
+ .info_size = 0,
+ .prk = "\xfd\x20\x0c\x49\x87\xac\x49\x13\x13\xbd\x4a\x2a\x13\x28\x71\x21"
+ "\x24\x72\x39\xe1\x1c\x9e\xf8\x28\x02\x04\x4b\x66\xef\x35\x7e\x5b"
+ "\x19\x44\x98\xd0\x68\x26\x11\x38\x23\x48\x57\x2a\x7b\x16\x11\xde"
+ "\x54\x76\x40\x94\x28\x63\x20\x57\x8a\x86\x3f\x36\x56\x2b\x0d\xf6",
+ .prk_size = 64,
+ .okm = "\xf5\xfa\x02\xb1\x82\x98\xa7\x2a\x8c\x23\x89\x8a\x87\x03\x47\x2c"
+ "\x6e\xb1\x79\xdc\x20\x4c\x03\x42\x5c\x97\x0e\x3b\x16\x4b\xf9\x0f"
+ "\xff\x22\xd0\x48\x36\xd0\xe2\x34\x3b\xac",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }, {
+ .test = "hkdf test with short input",
+ .ikm = "\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b\x0b",
+ .ikm_size = 11,
+ .salt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c",
+ .salt_size = 13,
+ .info = "\xf0\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9",
+ .info_size = 10,
+ .prk = "\x67\x40\x9c\x9c\xac\x28\xb5\x2e\xe9\xfa\xd9\x1c\x2f\xda\x99\x9f"
+ "\x7c\xa2\x2e\x34\x34\xf0\xae\x77\x28\x63\x83\x65\x68\xad\x6a\x7f"
+ "\x10\xcf\x11\x3b\xfd\xdd\x56\x01\x29\xa5\x94\xa8\xf5\x23\x85\xc2"
+ "\xd6\x61\xd7\x85\xd2\x9c\xe9\x3a\x11\x40\x0c\x92\x06\x83\x18\x1d",
+ .prk_size = 64,
+ .okm = "\x74\x13\xe8\x99\x7e\x02\x06\x10\xfb\xf6\x82\x3f\x2c\xe1\x4b\xff"
+ "\x01\x87\x5d\xb1\xca\x55\xf6\x8c\xfc\xf3\x95\x4d\xc8\xaf\xf5\x35"
+ "\x59\xbd\x5e\x30\x28\xb0\x80\xf7\xc0\x68",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }, {
+ .test = "unsalted hkdf test with zero info",
+ .ikm = "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c"
+ "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c",
+ .ikm_size = 22,
+ .salt = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+ .salt_size = 64,
+ .info = NULL,
+ .info_size = 0,
+ .prk = "\x53\x46\xb3\x76\xbf\x3a\xa9\xf8\x4f\x8f\x6e\xd5\xb1\xc4\xf4\x89"
+ "\x17\x2e\x24\x4d\xac\x30\x3d\x12\xf6\x8e\xcc\x76\x6e\xa6\x00\xaa"
+ "\x88\x49\x5e\x7f\xb6\x05\x80\x31\x22\xfa\x13\x69\x24\xa8\x40\xb1"
+ "\xf0\x71\x9d\x2d\x5f\x68\xe2\x9b\x24\x22\x99\xd7\x58\xed\x68\x0c",
+ .prk_size = 64,
+ .okm = "\x14\x07\xd4\x60\x13\xd9\x8b\xc6\xde\xce\xfc\xfe\xe5\x5f\x0f\x90"
+ "\xb0\xc7\xf6\x3d\x68\xeb\x1a\x80\xea\xf0\x7e\x95\x3c\xfc\x0a\x3a"
+ "\x52\x40\xa1\x55\xd6\xe4\xda\xa9\x65\xbb",
+ .okm_size = 42,
+ }
+};
+
+static int hkdf_test(const char *shash, const struct hkdf_testvec *tv)
+{ struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
+ u8 *prk = NULL, *okm = NULL;
+ unsigned int prk_size;
+ const char *driver;
+ int err;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(shash, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("%s(%s): failed to allocate transform: %ld\n",
+ tv->test, shash, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ driver = crypto_shash_driver_name(tfm);
+
+ prk_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ prk = kzalloc(prk_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!prk) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ if (tv->prk_size != prk_size) {
+ pr_err("%s(%s): prk size mismatch (vec %u, digest %u\n",
+ tv->test, driver, tv->prk_size, prk_size);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ err = hkdf_extract(tfm, tv->ikm, tv->ikm_size,
+ tv->salt, tv->salt_size, prk);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("%s(%s): hkdf_extract failed with %d\n",
+ tv->test, driver, err);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(prk, tv->prk, tv->prk_size)) {
+ pr_err("%s(%s): hkdf_extract prk mismatch\n",
+ tv->test, driver);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "prk: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, prk, tv->prk_size, false);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ okm = kzalloc(tv->okm_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!okm) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tv->prk, tv->prk_size);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("%s(%s): failed to set prk, error %d\n",
+ tv->test, driver, err);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ err = hkdf_expand(tfm, tv->info, tv->info_size,
+ okm, tv->okm_size);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("%s(%s): hkdf_expand() failed with %d\n",
+ tv->test, driver, err);
+ } else if (memcmp(okm, tv->okm, tv->okm_size)) {
+ pr_err("%s(%s): hkdf_expand() okm mismatch\n",
+ tv->test, driver);
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "okm: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, okm, tv->okm_size, false);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ }
+out_free:
+ kfree(okm);
+ kfree(prk);
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int __init crypto_hkdf_module_init(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0, i;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS))
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hkdf_sha256_tv); i++) {
+ ret = hkdf_test("hmac(sha256)", &hkdf_sha256_tv[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hkdf_sha384_tv); i++) {
+ ret = hkdf_test("hmac(sha384)", &hkdf_sha384_tv[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hkdf_sha512_tv); i++) {
+ ret = hkdf_test("hmac(sha512)", &hkdf_sha512_tv[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit crypto_hkdf_module_exit(void) {}
+
+module_init(crypto_hkdf_module_init);
+module_exit(crypto_hkdf_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF)");
diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
index 5aff5934baa1..0ea56f588a4a 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
bool "FS Encryption (Per-file encryption)"
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HASH
+ select CRYPTO_HKDF
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
select KEYS
diff --git a/fs/crypto/hkdf.c b/fs/crypto/hkdf.c
index 5a384dad2c72..855a0f4b7318 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/hkdf.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/hkdf.c
@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
- * Implementation of HKDF ("HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
- * Function"), aka RFC 5869. See also the original paper (Krawczyk 2010):
- * "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme".
- *
* This is used to derive keys from the fscrypt master keys.
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
@@ -11,6 +7,7 @@
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <crypto/hkdf.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
@@ -44,20 +41,6 @@
* there's no way to persist a random salt per master key from kernel mode.
*/
-/* HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869 section 2.2), unsalted */
-static int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
- unsigned int ikmlen, u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN])
-{
- static const u8 default_salt[HKDF_HASHLEN];
- int err;
-
- err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, default_salt, HKDF_HASHLEN);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- return crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hmac_tfm, ikm, ikmlen, prk);
-}
-
/*
* Compute HKDF-Extract using the given master key as the input keying material,
* and prepare an HMAC transform object keyed by the resulting pseudorandom key.
@@ -69,6 +52,7 @@ int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key,
unsigned int master_key_size)
{
struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
+ static const u8 default_salt[HKDF_HASHLEN];
u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN];
int err;
@@ -84,7 +68,8 @@ int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key,
goto err_free_tfm;
}
- err = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, master_key, master_key_size, prk);
+ err = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, master_key, master_key_size,
+ default_salt, HKDF_HASHLEN, prk);
if (err)
goto err_free_tfm;
@@ -118,61 +103,21 @@ int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context,
u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen)
{
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hkdf->hmac_tfm);
- u8 prefix[9];
- unsigned int i;
+ u8 *full_info;
int err;
- const u8 *prev = NULL;
- u8 counter = 1;
- u8 tmp[HKDF_HASHLEN];
-
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(okmlen > 255 * HKDF_HASHLEN))
- return -EINVAL;
+ full_info = kzalloc(infolen + 9, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!full_info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
desc->tfm = hkdf->hmac_tfm;
- memcpy(prefix, "fscrypt\0", 8);
- prefix[8] = context;
-
- for (i = 0; i < okmlen; i += HKDF_HASHLEN) {
-
- err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- if (prev) {
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prev, HKDF_HASHLEN);
- if (err)
- goto out;
- }
-
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prefix, sizeof(prefix));
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- err = crypto_shash_update(desc, info, infolen);
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(counter) != 1);
- if (okmlen - i < HKDF_HASHLEN) {
- err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, tmp);
- if (err)
- goto out;
- memcpy(&okm[i], tmp, okmlen - i);
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- } else {
- err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, &okm[i]);
- if (err)
- goto out;
- }
- counter++;
- prev = &okm[i];
- }
- err = 0;
-out:
- if (unlikely(err))
- memzero_explicit(okm, okmlen); /* so caller doesn't need to */
- shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ memcpy(full_info, "fscrypt\0", 8);
+ full_info[8] = context;
+ memcpy(full_info + 9, info, infolen);
+
+ err = hkdf_expand(hkdf->hmac_tfm, full_info, infolen + 9,
+ okm, okmlen);
+ kfree_sensitive(full_info);
return err;
}
diff --git a/include/crypto/hkdf.h b/include/crypto/hkdf.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6a9678f508f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/hkdf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * HKDF: HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF), RFC 5869
+ *
+ * Extracted from fs/crypto/hkdf.c, which has
+ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_HKDF_H
+#define _CRYPTO_HKDF_H
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+
+int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
+ unsigned int ikmlen, const u8 *salt, unsigned int saltlen,
+ u8 *prk);
+int hkdf_expand(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm,
+ const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
+ u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen);
+#endif
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 01/10] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand()
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 01/10] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-14 4:39 ` Herbert Xu
0 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2024-12-14 4:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Reinecke
Cc: hch, kbusch, sagi, linux-nvme, ebiggers, linux-crypto, hare
Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org> wrote:
> Separate out the HKDF functions into a separate module to
> to make them available to other callers.
> And add a testsuite to the module with test vectors
> from RFC 5869 (and additional vectors for SHA384 and SHA512)
> to ensure the integrity of the algorithm.
>
> Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
> Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> ---
> crypto/Kconfig | 6 +
> crypto/Makefile | 1 +
> crypto/hkdf.c | 573 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> fs/crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
> fs/crypto/hkdf.c | 85 ++-----
> include/crypto/hkdf.h | 20 ++
> 6 files changed, 616 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 crypto/hkdf.c
> create mode 100644 include/crypto/hkdf.h
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/6] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh()
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 01/10] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 02/10] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() Hannes Reinecke
` (8 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
Add a function to refresh a generated PSK in the specified keyring.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
---
drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/nvme-keyring.h | 10 +++++-
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
index ed5167f942d8..8cb253fcd586 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
@@ -124,6 +124,70 @@ static struct key *nvme_tls_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
return key_ref_to_ptr(keyref);
}
+/**
+ * nvme_tls_psk_refresh - Refresh TLS PSK
+ * @keyring: Keyring holding the TLS PSK
+ * @hostnqn: Host NQN to use
+ * @subnqn: Subsystem NQN to use
+ * @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
+ * @data: TLS PSK key material
+ * @data_len: Length of @data
+ * @digest: TLS PSK digest
+ *
+ * Refresh a generated version 1 TLS PSK with the identity generated
+ * from @hmac_id, @hostnqn, @subnqn, and @digest in the keyring given
+ * by @keyring.
+ *
+ * Returns the updated key success or an error pointer otherwise.
+ */
+struct key *nvme_tls_psk_refresh(struct key *keyring,
+ const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn, u8 hmac_id,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, const char *digest)
+{
+ key_perm_t keyperm =
+ KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ |
+ KEY_POS_WRITE | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR |
+ KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
+ char *identity;
+ key_ref_t keyref;
+ key_serial_t keyring_id;
+ struct key *key;
+
+ if (!hostnqn || !subnqn || !data || !data_len)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ identity = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "NVMe1G%02d %s %s %s",
+ hmac_id, hostnqn, subnqn, digest);
+ if (!identity)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (!keyring)
+ keyring = nvme_keyring;
+ keyring_id = key_serial(keyring);
+ pr_debug("keyring %x refresh tls psk '%s'\n",
+ keyring_id, identity);
+ keyref = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring, true),
+ "psk", identity, data, data_len,
+ keyperm, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN |
+ KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyref)) {
+ pr_debug("refresh tls psk '%s' failed, error %ld\n",
+ identity, PTR_ERR(keyref));
+ kfree(identity);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ }
+ kfree(identity);
+ /*
+ * Set the default timeout to 1 hour
+ * as suggested in TP8018.
+ */
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(keyref);
+ key_set_timeout(key, 3600);
+ return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_tls_psk_refresh);
+
/*
* NVMe PSK priority list
*
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h b/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h
index 19d2b256180f..f7bbcbeb4b13 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h
@@ -8,13 +8,21 @@
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_KEYRING)
+struct key *nvme_tls_psk_refresh(struct key *keyring,
+ const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn, u8 hmac_id,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, const char *digest);
key_serial_t nvme_tls_psk_default(struct key *keyring,
const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn);
key_serial_t nvme_keyring_id(void);
struct key *nvme_tls_key_lookup(key_serial_t key_id);
#else
-
+static inline struct key *nvme_tls_psk_refresh(struct key *keyring,
+ const char *hostnqn, char *subnqn, u8 hmac_id,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, const char *digest)
+{
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
+}
static inline key_serial_t nvme_tls_psk_default(struct key *keyring,
const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn)
{
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH 02/10] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk()
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 01/10] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 1/6] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 03/10] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() Hannes Reinecke
` (7 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
Add a function to generate a NVMe PSK from the shared credentials
negotiated by DH-HMAC-CHAP.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
---
drivers/nvme/common/auth.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/nvme-auth.h | 3 ++
2 files changed, 101 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
index a3455f1d67fa..32a12899d0ce 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/dh.h>
+#include <crypto/hkdf.h>
#include <linux/nvme.h>
#include <linux/nvme-auth.h>
@@ -471,5 +472,102 @@ int nvme_auth_generate_key(u8 *secret, struct nvme_dhchap_key **ret_key)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_key);
+/**
+ * nvme_auth_generate_psk - Generate a PSK for TLS
+ * @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
+ * @skey: Session key
+ * @skey_len: Length of @skey
+ * @c1: Value of challenge C1
+ * @c2: Value of challenge C2
+ * @hash_len: Hash length of the hash algorithm
+ * @ret_psk: Pointer too the resulting generated PSK
+ * @ret_len: length of @ret_psk
+ *
+ * Generate a PSK for TLS as specified in NVMe base specification, section 8.13.5.9:
+ * Generated PSK for TLS
+ *
+ * The generated PSK for TLS shall be computed applying the HMAC function using the
+ * hash function H( ) selected by the HashID parameter in the DH-HMAC-CHAP_Challenge
+ * message with the session key KS as key to the concatenation of the two challenges
+ * C1 and C2 (i.e., generated PSK = HMAC(KS, C1 || C2)).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success with a valid generated PSK pointer in @ret_psk and the length
+ * of @ret_psk in @ret_len, or a negative error number otherwise.
+ */
+int nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
+ u8 *c1, u8 *c2, size_t hash_len, u8 **ret_psk,size_t *ret_len)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *shash;
+ u8 *psk;
+ const char *hmac_name;
+ int ret, psk_len;
+
+ if (!c1 || !c2) {
+ pr_warn("%s: invalid parameter\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id);
+ if (!hmac_name) {
+ pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n",
+ __func__, hmac_id);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ psk_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ psk = kzalloc(psk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!psk) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_tfm;
+ }
+
+ shash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!shash) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_psk;
+ }
+
+ shash->tfm = tfm;
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, skey, skey_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, c1, hash_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, c2, hash_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, psk);
+ if (!ret) {
+ *ret_psk = psk;
+ *ret_len = psk_len;
+ }
+
+out_free_shash:
+ kfree_sensitive(shash);
+out_free_psk:
+ if (ret)
+ kfree_sensitive(psk);
+out_free_tfm:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_psk);
+
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NVMe Authentication framework");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
index c1d0bc5d9624..b13884b04dfd 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
@@ -40,5 +40,8 @@ int nvme_auth_gen_pubkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
int nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
u8 *ctrl_key, size_t ctrl_key_len,
u8 *sess_key, size_t sess_key_len);
+int nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
+ u8 *c1, u8 *c2, size_t hash_len,
+ u8 **ret_psk, size_t *ret_len);
#endif /* _NVME_AUTH_H */
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH 03/10] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest()
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 02/10] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 04/10] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk() Hannes Reinecke
` (6 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
Add a function to calculate the PSK digest as specified in TP8018.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
---
drivers/nvme/common/auth.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/nvme-auth.h | 2 +
2 files changed, 141 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
index 32a12899d0ce..12ce9125693f 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
@@ -569,5 +569,144 @@ int nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_psk);
+/**
+ * nvme_auth_generate_digest - Generate TLS PSK digest
+ * @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
+ * @psk: Generated input PSK
+ * @psk_len: Lenght of @psk
+ * @subsysnqn: NQN of the subsystem
+ * @hostnqn: NQN of the host
+ * @ret_digest: Pointer to the returned digest
+ *
+ * Generate a TLS PSK digest as specified in TP8018 Section 3.6.1.3:
+ * TLS PSK and PSK identity Derivation
+ *
+ * The PSK digest shall be computed by encoding in Base64 (refer to RFC 4648)
+ * the result of the application of the HMAC function using the hash function
+ * specified in item 4 above (ie the hash function of the cipher suite associated
+ * with the PSK identity) with the PSK as HMAC key to the concatenation of:
+ * - the NQN of the host (i.e., NQNh) not including the null terminator;
+ * - a space character;
+ * - the NQN of the NVM subsystem (i.e., NQNc) not including the null terminator;
+ * - a space character; and
+ * - the seventeen ASCII characters "NVMe-over-Fabrics"
+ * (i.e., <PSK digest> = Base64(HMAC(PSK, NQNh || " " || NQNc || " " || "NVMe-over-Fabrics"))).
+ * The length of the PSK digest depends on the hash function used to compute
+ * it as follows:
+ * - If the SHA-256 hash function is used, the resulting PSK digest is 44 characters long; or
+ * - If the SHA-384 hash function is used, the resulting PSK digest is 64 characters long.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success with a valid digest pointer in @ret_digest, or a negative
+ * error number on failure.
+ */
+int nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+ char *subsysnqn, char *hostnqn, u8 **ret_digest)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *shash;
+ u8 *digest, *enc;
+ const char *hmac_name;
+ size_t digest_len, hmac_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(!subsysnqn || !hostnqn))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id);
+ if (!hmac_name) {
+ pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n",
+ __func__, hmac_id);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ switch (nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(hmac_id)) {
+ case 32:
+ hmac_len = 44;
+ break;
+ case 48:
+ hmac_len = 64;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm '%s'\n",
+ __func__, hmac_name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ enc = kzalloc(hmac_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!enc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto out_free_enc;
+ }
+
+ digest_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ digest = kzalloc(digest_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!digest) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_tfm;
+ }
+
+ shash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!shash) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_digest;
+ }
+
+ shash->tfm = tfm;
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, psk, psk_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, hostnqn, strlen(hostnqn));
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, " ", 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, subsysnqn, strlen(subsysnqn));
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, " NVMe-over-Fabrics", 18);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, digest);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+
+ ret = base64_encode(digest, digest_len, enc);
+ if (ret < hmac_len)
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ else {
+ *ret_digest = enc;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+out_free_shash:
+ kfree_sensitive(shash);
+out_free_digest:
+ kfree_sensitive(digest);
+out_free_tfm:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+out_free_enc:
+ if (ret)
+ kfree_sensitive(enc);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_digest);
+
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NVMe Authentication framework");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
index b13884b04dfd..998f06bf10fd 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
@@ -43,5 +43,7 @@ int nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
int nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
u8 *c1, u8 *c2, size_t hash_len,
u8 **ret_psk, size_t *ret_len);
+int nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+ char *subsysnqn, char *hostnqn, u8 **ret_digest);
#endif /* _NVME_AUTH_H */
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH 04/10] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk()
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 03/10] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 05/10] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
` (5 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
Add a function to derive the TLS PSK as specified TP8018.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
---
drivers/nvme/common/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/nvme/common/auth.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/nvme-auth.h | 2 +
3 files changed, 114 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/Kconfig b/drivers/nvme/common/Kconfig
index 244432e0b73d..da963e4f3f1f 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/Kconfig
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ config NVME_AUTH
select CRYPTO_SHA512
select CRYPTO_DH
select CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS
+ select CRYPTO_HKDF
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
index 12ce9125693f..9ea8b4aab739 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#include <linux/nvme.h>
#include <linux/nvme-auth.h>
+#define HKDF_MAX_HASHLEN 64
+
static u32 nvme_dhchap_seqnum;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(nvme_dhchap_mutex);
@@ -708,5 +710,114 @@ int nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_digest);
+/**
+ * nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk - Derive TLS PSK
+ * @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
+ * @psk: generated input PSK
+ * @psk_len: size of @psk
+ * @psk_digest: TLS PSK digest
+ * @ret_psk: Pointer to the resulting TLS PSK
+ *
+ * Derive a TLS PSK as specified in TP8018 Section 3.6.1.3:
+ * TLS PSK and PSK identity Derivation
+ *
+ * The TLS PSK shall be derived as follows from an input PSK
+ * (i.e., either a retained PSK or a generated PSK) and a PSK
+ * identity using the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand-Label operations
+ * (refer to RFC 5869 and RFC 8446) where the hash function is the
+ * one specified by the hash specifier of the PSK identity:
+ * 1. PRK = HKDF-Extract(0, Input PSK); and
+ * 2. TLS PSK = HKDF-Expand-Label(PRK, "nvme-tls-psk", PskIdentityContext, L),
+ * where PskIdentityContext is the hash identifier indicated in
+ * the PSK identity concatenated to a space character and to the
+ * Base64 PSK digest (i.e., "<hash> <PSK digest>") and L is the
+ * output size in bytes of the hash function (i.e., 32 for SHA-256
+ * and 48 for SHA-384).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success with a valid psk pointer in @ret_psk or a negative
+ * error number otherwise.
+ */
+int nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(int hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+ u8 *psk_digest, u8 **ret_psk)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
+ const char *hmac_name;
+ const char *psk_prefix = "tls13 nvme-tls-psk";
+ static const char default_salt[HKDF_MAX_HASHLEN];
+ size_t info_len, prk_len;
+ char *info;
+ unsigned char *prk, *tls_key;
+ int ret;
+
+ hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id);
+ if (!hmac_name) {
+ pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algorithm %d\n",
+ __func__, hmac_id);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (hmac_id == NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512) {
+ pr_warn("%s: unsupported hash algorithm %s\n",
+ __func__, hmac_name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(hmac_tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm);
+
+ prk_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(hmac_tfm);
+ prk = kzalloc(prk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!prk) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_shash;
+ }
+
+ if (WARN_ON(prk_len > HKDF_MAX_HASHLEN)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free_prk;
+ }
+ ret = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, psk, psk_len,
+ default_salt, prk_len, prk);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_prk;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, prk, prk_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_prk;
+
+ info_len = strlen(psk_digest) + strlen(psk_prefix) + 5;
+ info = kzalloc(info_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!info) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_prk;
+ }
+
+ put_unaligned_be16(psk_len, info);
+ memcpy(info + 2, psk_prefix, strlen(psk_prefix));
+ sprintf(info + 2 + strlen(psk_prefix), "%02d %s", hmac_id, psk_digest);
+
+ tls_key = kzalloc(psk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tls_key) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_info;
+ }
+ ret = hkdf_expand(hmac_tfm, info, strlen(info), tls_key, psk_len);
+ if (ret) {
+ kfree(tls_key);
+ goto out_free_info;
+ }
+ *ret_psk = tls_key;
+
+out_free_info:
+ kfree(info);
+out_free_prk:
+ kfree(prk);
+out_free_shash:
+ crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk);
+
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NVMe Authentication framework");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
index 998f06bf10fd..60e069a6757f 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
@@ -45,5 +45,7 @@ int nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
u8 **ret_psk, size_t *ret_len);
int nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
char *subsysnqn, char *hostnqn, u8 **ret_digest);
+int nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(int hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+ u8 *psk_digest, u8 **ret_psk);
#endif /* _NVME_AUTH_H */
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH 05/10] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh()
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 04/10] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk() Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 06/10] nvme: always include <linux/key.h> Hannes Reinecke
` (4 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
Add a function to refresh a generated PSK in the specified keyring.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
---
drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/nvme-keyring.h | 10 +++++-
2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
index ed5167f942d8..8cb253fcd586 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
@@ -124,6 +124,70 @@ static struct key *nvme_tls_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
return key_ref_to_ptr(keyref);
}
+/**
+ * nvme_tls_psk_refresh - Refresh TLS PSK
+ * @keyring: Keyring holding the TLS PSK
+ * @hostnqn: Host NQN to use
+ * @subnqn: Subsystem NQN to use
+ * @hmac_id: Hash function identifier
+ * @data: TLS PSK key material
+ * @data_len: Length of @data
+ * @digest: TLS PSK digest
+ *
+ * Refresh a generated version 1 TLS PSK with the identity generated
+ * from @hmac_id, @hostnqn, @subnqn, and @digest in the keyring given
+ * by @keyring.
+ *
+ * Returns the updated key success or an error pointer otherwise.
+ */
+struct key *nvme_tls_psk_refresh(struct key *keyring,
+ const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn, u8 hmac_id,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, const char *digest)
+{
+ key_perm_t keyperm =
+ KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ |
+ KEY_POS_WRITE | KEY_POS_LINK | KEY_POS_SETATTR |
+ KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
+ char *identity;
+ key_ref_t keyref;
+ key_serial_t keyring_id;
+ struct key *key;
+
+ if (!hostnqn || !subnqn || !data || !data_len)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ identity = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "NVMe1G%02d %s %s %s",
+ hmac_id, hostnqn, subnqn, digest);
+ if (!identity)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (!keyring)
+ keyring = nvme_keyring;
+ keyring_id = key_serial(keyring);
+ pr_debug("keyring %x refresh tls psk '%s'\n",
+ keyring_id, identity);
+ keyref = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring, true),
+ "psk", identity, data, data_len,
+ keyperm, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN |
+ KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyref)) {
+ pr_debug("refresh tls psk '%s' failed, error %ld\n",
+ identity, PTR_ERR(keyref));
+ kfree(identity);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ }
+ kfree(identity);
+ /*
+ * Set the default timeout to 1 hour
+ * as suggested in TP8018.
+ */
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(keyref);
+ key_set_timeout(key, 3600);
+ return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_tls_psk_refresh);
+
/*
* NVMe PSK priority list
*
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h b/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h
index 19d2b256180f..f7bbcbeb4b13 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h
@@ -8,13 +8,21 @@
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_KEYRING)
+struct key *nvme_tls_psk_refresh(struct key *keyring,
+ const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn, u8 hmac_id,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, const char *digest);
key_serial_t nvme_tls_psk_default(struct key *keyring,
const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn);
key_serial_t nvme_keyring_id(void);
struct key *nvme_tls_key_lookup(key_serial_t key_id);
#else
-
+static inline struct key *nvme_tls_psk_refresh(struct key *keyring,
+ const char *hostnqn, char *subnqn, u8 hmac_id,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, const char *digest)
+{
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
+}
static inline key_serial_t nvme_tls_psk_default(struct key *keyring,
const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn)
{
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH 06/10] nvme: always include <linux/key.h>
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 05/10] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-24 11:44 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 07/10] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (3 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
To avoid build errors when NVME_KEYRING is not set.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c | 1 -
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 1 -
drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 1 -
include/linux/nvme-keyring.h | 2 ++
4 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
index 8cb253fcd586..32d16c53133b 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
-#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <linux/nvme.h>
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
index 3e416af2659f..b5e11a0f7ba8 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/nvme-tcp.h>
#include <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
index 7c51c2a8c109..fa59a7996efa 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/nvme-tcp.h>
#include <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h b/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h
index f7bbcbeb4b13..ab8971afa973 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme-keyring.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#ifndef _NVME_KEYRING_H
#define _NVME_KEYRING_H
+#include <linux/key.h>
+
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_KEYRING)
struct key *nvme_tls_psk_refresh(struct key *keyring,
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH 07/10] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 06/10] nvme: always include <linux/key.h> Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-24 11:45 ` Sagi Grimberg
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 08/10] nvme-fabrics: reset admin connection for secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (2 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
Add a fabrics option 'concat' to request secure channel concatenation.
When secure channel concatenation is enabled a 'generated PSK' is inserted
into the keyring such that it's available after reset.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/host/auth.c | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c | 34 ++++++++++-
drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h | 3 +
drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 2 +
drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c | 4 +-
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++--
include/linux/nvme.h | 7 +++
7 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
index 371e14f0a203..f23a4c6326d7 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include "nvme.h"
#include "fabrics.h"
#include <linux/nvme-auth.h>
+#include <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
#define CHAP_BUF_SIZE 4096
static struct kmem_cache *nvme_chap_buf_cache;
@@ -131,7 +132,12 @@ static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_negotiate_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES;
data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE;
data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction);
- data->sc_c = 0; /* No secure channel concatenation */
+ if (!ctrl->opts->concat || chap->qid != 0)
+ data->sc_c = NVME_AUTH_SECP_NOSC;
+ else if (ctrl->opts->tls_key)
+ data->sc_c = NVME_AUTH_SECP_REPLACETLSPSK;
+ else
+ data->sc_c = NVME_AUTH_SECP_NEWTLSPSK;
data->napd = 1;
data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.authid = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_AUTH_ID;
data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.halen = 3;
@@ -311,8 +317,9 @@ static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
data->hl = chap->hash_len;
data->dhvlen = cpu_to_le16(chap->host_key_len);
memcpy(data->rval, chap->response, chap->hash_len);
- if (ctrl->ctrl_key) {
+ if (ctrl->ctrl_key)
chap->bi_directional = true;
+ if (ctrl->ctrl_key || ctrl->opts->concat) {
get_random_bytes(chap->c2, chap->hash_len);
data->cvalid = 1;
memcpy(data->rval + chap->hash_len, chap->c2,
@@ -322,7 +329,10 @@ static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
} else {
memset(chap->c2, 0, chap->hash_len);
}
- chap->s2 = nvme_auth_get_seqnum();
+ if (ctrl->opts->concat)
+ chap->s2 = 0;
+ else
+ chap->s2 = nvme_auth_get_seqnum();
data->seqnum = cpu_to_le32(chap->s2);
if (chap->host_key_len) {
dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host public key %*ph\n",
@@ -677,6 +687,90 @@ static void nvme_auth_free_dhchap(struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
crypto_free_kpp(chap->dh_tfm);
}
+void nvme_auth_revoke_tls_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "Wipe generated TLS PSK %08x\n",
+ key_serial(ctrl->opts->tls_key));
+ key_revoke(ctrl->opts->tls_key);
+ key_put(ctrl->opts->tls_key);
+ ctrl->opts->tls_key = NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_revoke_tls_key);
+
+static int nvme_auth_secure_concat(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ u8 *psk, *digest, *tls_psk;
+ struct key *tls_key;
+ size_t psk_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!chap->sess_key) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d no session key negotiated\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
+
+ if (chap->qid) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: secure concatenation not supported on I/O queues\n",
+ chap->qid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ ret = nvme_auth_generate_psk(chap->hash_id, chap->sess_key,
+ chap->sess_key_len,
+ chap->c1, chap->c2,
+ chap->hash_len, &psk, &psk_len);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d failed to generate PSK, error %d\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: generated psk %*ph\n", __func__, (int)psk_len, psk);
+
+ ret = nvme_auth_generate_digest(chap->hash_id, psk, psk_len,
+ ctrl->opts->subsysnqn,
+ ctrl->opts->host->nqn, &digest);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d failed to generate digest, error %d\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, ret);
+ goto out_free_psk;
+ };
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: generated digest %s\n",
+ __func__, digest);
+ ret = nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(chap->hash_id, psk, psk_len, digest, &tls_psk);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d failed to derive TLS psk, error %d\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, ret);
+ goto out_free_digest;
+ };
+
+ tls_key = nvme_tls_psk_refresh(ctrl->opts->keyring, ctrl->opts->host->nqn,
+ ctrl->opts->subsysnqn, chap->hash_id,
+ tls_psk, psk_len, digest);
+ if (IS_ERR(tls_key)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tls_key);
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d failed to insert generated key, error %d\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, ret);
+ tls_key = NULL;
+ }
+ kfree_sensitive(tls_psk);
+ if (ctrl->opts->tls_key)
+ nvme_auth_revoke_tls_key(ctrl);
+ ctrl->opts->tls_key = tls_key;
+out_free_digest:
+ kfree_sensitive(digest);
+out_free_psk:
+ kfree_sensitive(psk);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static void nvme_queue_auth_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap =
@@ -833,6 +927,13 @@ static void nvme_queue_auth_work(struct work_struct *work)
}
if (!ret) {
chap->error = 0;
+ if (ctrl->opts->concat &&
+ (ret = nvme_auth_secure_concat(ctrl, chap))) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d failed to enable secure concatenation\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+ chap->error = ret;
+ }
return;
}
@@ -912,6 +1013,12 @@ static void nvme_ctrl_auth_work(struct work_struct *work)
"qid 0: authentication failed\n");
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Only run authentication on the admin queue for
+ * secure concatenation
+ */
+ if (ctrl->opts->concat)
+ return;
for (q = 1; q < ctrl->queue_count; q++) {
ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, q);
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
index 432efcbf9e2f..93e9041b9657 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
@@ -472,8 +472,9 @@ int nvmf_connect_admin_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
result = le32_to_cpu(res.u32);
ctrl->cntlid = result & 0xFFFF;
if (result & (NVME_CONNECT_AUTHREQ_ATR | NVME_CONNECT_AUTHREQ_ASCR)) {
- /* Secure concatenation is not implemented */
- if (result & NVME_CONNECT_AUTHREQ_ASCR) {
+ /* Check for secure concatenation */
+ if ((result & NVME_CONNECT_AUTHREQ_ASCR) &&
+ !ctrl->opts->concat) {
dev_warn(ctrl->device,
"qid 0: secure concatenation is not supported\n");
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -550,7 +551,7 @@ int nvmf_connect_io_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u16 qid)
/* Secure concatenation is not implemented */
if (result & NVME_CONNECT_AUTHREQ_ASCR) {
dev_warn(ctrl->device,
- "qid 0: secure concatenation is not supported\n");
+ "qid %d: secure concatenation is not supported\n", qid);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_free_data;
}
@@ -706,6 +707,7 @@ static const match_table_t opt_tokens = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TCP_TLS
{ NVMF_OPT_TLS, "tls" },
+ { NVMF_OPT_CONCAT, "concat" },
#endif
{ NVMF_OPT_ERR, NULL }
};
@@ -735,6 +737,7 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
opts->tls = false;
opts->tls_key = NULL;
opts->keyring = NULL;
+ opts->concat = false;
options = o = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!options)
@@ -1053,6 +1056,14 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
}
opts->tls = true;
break;
+ case NVMF_OPT_CONCAT:
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_TCP_TLS)) {
+ pr_err("TLS is not supported\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ opts->concat = true;
+ break;
default:
pr_warn("unknown parameter or missing value '%s' in ctrl creation request\n",
p);
@@ -1079,6 +1090,23 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
pr_warn("failfast tmo (%d) larger than controller loss tmo (%d)\n",
opts->fast_io_fail_tmo, ctrl_loss_tmo);
}
+ if (opts->concat) {
+ if (opts->tls) {
+ pr_err("Secure concatenation over TLS is not supported\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (opts->tls_key) {
+ pr_err("Cannot specify a TLS key for secure concatenation\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!opts->dhchap_secret) {
+ pr_err("Need to enable DH-CHAP for secure concatenation\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
opts->host = nvmf_host_add(hostnqn, &hostid);
if (IS_ERR(opts->host)) {
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h
index 21d75dc4a3a0..9cf5b020adba 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ enum {
NVMF_OPT_TLS = 1 << 25,
NVMF_OPT_KEYRING = 1 << 26,
NVMF_OPT_TLS_KEY = 1 << 27,
+ NVMF_OPT_CONCAT = 1 << 28,
};
/**
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ enum {
* @keyring: Keyring to use for key lookups
* @tls_key: TLS key for encrypted connections (TCP)
* @tls: Start TLS encrypted connections (TCP)
+ * @concat: Enabled Secure channel concatenation (TCP)
* @disable_sqflow: disable controller sq flow control
* @hdr_digest: generate/verify header digest (TCP)
* @data_digest: generate/verify data digest (TCP)
@@ -130,6 +132,7 @@ struct nvmf_ctrl_options {
struct key *keyring;
struct key *tls_key;
bool tls;
+ bool concat;
bool disable_sqflow;
bool hdr_digest;
bool data_digest;
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h
index 313a4f978a2c..77171c0acb02 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h
@@ -1132,6 +1132,7 @@ void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl);
int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid);
int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid);
void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl);
+void nvme_auth_revoke_tls_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl);
#else
static inline int nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
{
@@ -1154,6 +1155,7 @@ static inline int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
static inline void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {};
+static inline void nvme_auth_revoke_tls_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {};
#endif
u32 nvme_command_effects(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvme_ns *ns,
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
index b68a9e5f1ea3..efb35eef1915 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
@@ -780,10 +780,10 @@ static umode_t nvme_tls_attrs_are_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
return 0;
if (a == &dev_attr_tls_key.attr &&
- !ctrl->opts->tls)
+ !ctrl->opts->tls && !ctrl->opts->concat)
return 0;
if (a == &dev_attr_tls_configured_key.attr &&
- !ctrl->opts->tls_key)
+ (!ctrl->opts->tls_key || ctrl->opts->concat))
return 0;
if (a == &dev_attr_tls_keyring.attr &&
!ctrl->opts->keyring)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
index b5e11a0f7ba8..9268c6f2c99f 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static inline bool nvme_tcp_tls_configured(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_TCP_TLS))
return 0;
- return ctrl->opts->tls;
+ return ctrl->opts->tls || ctrl->opts->concat;
}
static inline struct blk_mq_tags *nvme_tcp_tagset(struct nvme_tcp_queue *queue)
@@ -1947,7 +1947,7 @@ static int nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
if (nvme_tcp_tls_configured(ctrl)) {
if (ctrl->opts->tls_key)
pskid = key_serial(ctrl->opts->tls_key);
- else {
+ else if (ctrl->opts->tls) {
pskid = nvme_tls_psk_default(ctrl->opts->keyring,
ctrl->opts->host->nqn,
ctrl->opts->subsysnqn);
@@ -1977,9 +1977,25 @@ static int __nvme_tcp_alloc_io_queues(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
{
int i, ret;
- if (nvme_tcp_tls_configured(ctrl) && !ctrl->tls_pskid) {
- dev_err(ctrl->device, "no PSK negotiated\n");
- return -ENOKEY;
+ if (nvme_tcp_tls_configured(ctrl)) {
+ if (ctrl->opts->concat) {
+ /*
+ * The generated PSK is stored in the
+ * fabric options
+ */
+ if (!ctrl->opts->tls_key) {
+ dev_err(ctrl->device, "no PSK generated\n");
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
+ if (ctrl->tls_pskid &&
+ ctrl->tls_pskid != key_serial(ctrl->opts->tls_key)) {
+ dev_err(ctrl->device, "Stale PSK id %08x\n", ctrl->tls_pskid);
+ ctrl->tls_pskid = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (!ctrl->tls_pskid) {
+ dev_err(ctrl->device, "no PSK negotiated\n");
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
}
for (i = 1; i < ctrl->queue_count; i++) {
@@ -2210,6 +2226,31 @@ static void nvme_tcp_reconnect_or_remove(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
}
}
+/*
+ * The TLS key is set by secure concatenation after negotiation
+ * has been completed on the admin queue. We need to revoke the
+ * key when:
+ * - concatenation is enabled
+ * (otherwise it's a static key set by the user)
+ * and
+ * - the generated key is present in ctrl->tls_key
+ * (otherwise there's nothing to revoke)
+ * and
+ * - a valid PSK key ID has been set in ctrl->tls_pskid
+ * (otherwise TLS negotiation has not run).
+ *
+ * We cannot always revoke the key, as we're calling
+ * nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue() twice during secure
+ * concatenation, once on a 'normal' connection to run
+ * the DH-HMAC-CHAP negotiation (which generates the key,
+ * so it _must not_ be set), and once after the negotiation
+ * (which uses the key, so it _must_ be set).
+ */
+static bool nvme_tcp_key_revoke_needed(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+ return ctrl->opts->concat && ctrl->opts->tls_key && ctrl->tls_pskid;
+}
+
static int nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, bool new)
{
struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
@@ -2313,6 +2354,8 @@ static void nvme_tcp_error_recovery_work(struct work_struct *work)
struct nvme_tcp_ctrl, err_work);
struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = &tcp_ctrl->ctrl;
+ if (nvme_tcp_key_revoke_needed(ctrl))
+ nvme_auth_revoke_tls_key(ctrl);
nvme_stop_keep_alive(ctrl);
flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work);
nvme_tcp_teardown_io_queues(ctrl, false);
@@ -2353,6 +2396,8 @@ static void nvme_reset_ctrl_work(struct work_struct *work)
container_of(work, struct nvme_ctrl, reset_work);
int ret;
+ if (nvme_tcp_key_revoke_needed(ctrl))
+ nvme_auth_revoke_tls_key(ctrl);
nvme_stop_ctrl(ctrl);
nvme_tcp_teardown_ctrl(ctrl, false);
@@ -2848,7 +2893,7 @@ static struct nvmf_transport_ops nvme_tcp_transport = {
NVMF_OPT_HDR_DIGEST | NVMF_OPT_DATA_DIGEST |
NVMF_OPT_NR_WRITE_QUEUES | NVMF_OPT_NR_POLL_QUEUES |
NVMF_OPT_TOS | NVMF_OPT_HOST_IFACE | NVMF_OPT_TLS |
- NVMF_OPT_KEYRING | NVMF_OPT_TLS_KEY,
+ NVMF_OPT_KEYRING | NVMF_OPT_TLS_KEY | NVMF_OPT_CONCAT,
.create_ctrl = nvme_tcp_create_ctrl,
};
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme.h b/include/linux/nvme.h
index b58d9405d65e..fe8858d19813 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme.h
@@ -1678,6 +1678,13 @@ enum {
NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_INVALID = 0xff,
};
+enum {
+ NVME_AUTH_SECP_NOSC = 0x00,
+ NVME_AUTH_SECP_SC = 0x01,
+ NVME_AUTH_SECP_NEWTLSPSK = 0x02,
+ NVME_AUTH_SECP_REPLACETLSPSK = 0x03,
+};
+
union nvmf_auth_protocol {
struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_protocol_descriptor dhchap;
};
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH 08/10] nvme-fabrics: reset admin connection for secure concatenation
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 07/10] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 10/10] nvmet: add tls_concat and tls_key debugfs entries Hannes Reinecke
10 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
When secure concatenation is requested the connection needs to be
reset to enable TLS encryption on the new cnnection.
That implies that the original connection used for the DH-CHAP
negotiation really shouldn't be used, and we should reset as soon
as the DH-CHAP negotiation has succeeded on the admin queue.
Based on an idea from Sagi.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
---
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
index 9268c6f2c99f..3ce5cfe8a135 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c
@@ -2260,6 +2260,16 @@ static int nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, bool new)
if (ret)
return ret;
+ if (ctrl->opts && ctrl->opts->concat && !ctrl->tls_pskid) {
+ /* See comments for nvme_tcp_key_revoke_needed() */
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "restart admin queue for secure concatenation\n");
+ nvme_stop_keep_alive(ctrl);
+ nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue(ctrl, false);
+ ret = nvme_tcp_configure_admin_queue(ctrl, false);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
if (ctrl->icdoff) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
dev_err(ctrl->device, "icdoff is not supported!\n");
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 08/10] nvme-fabrics: reset admin connection for secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-24 11:46 ` Sagi Grimberg
2025-01-08 16:33 ` Keith Busch
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 10/10] nvmet: add tls_concat and tls_key debugfs entries Hannes Reinecke
10 siblings, 2 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
Evaluate the SC_C flag during DH-CHAP-HMAC negotiation and insert
the generated PSK once negotiation has finished.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/target/auth.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 49 +++++++++++++++---
drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c | 33 +++++++++---
drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h | 38 +++++++++++---
drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 23 +++++++-
5 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
index 7897d02c681d..7470ac020db6 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/nvme-auth.h>
+#include <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include "nvmet.h"
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ int nvmet_setup_dhgroup(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, u8 dhgroup_id)
return ret;
}
-u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
+u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvmet_req *req)
{
int ret = 0;
struct nvmet_host_link *p;
@@ -164,6 +165,11 @@ u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
goto out_unlock;
}
+ if (nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(req->sq)) {
+ pr_debug("host %s tls enabled\n", ctrl->hostnqn);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
ret = nvmet_setup_dhgroup(ctrl, host->dhchap_dhgroup_id);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_warn("Failed to setup DH group");
@@ -232,6 +238,9 @@ u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
void nvmet_auth_sq_free(struct nvmet_sq *sq)
{
cancel_delayed_work(&sq->auth_expired_work);
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS
+ sq->tls_key = 0;
+#endif
kfree(sq->dhchap_c1);
sq->dhchap_c1 = NULL;
kfree(sq->dhchap_c2);
@@ -260,6 +269,12 @@ void nvmet_destroy_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
nvme_auth_free_key(ctrl->ctrl_key);
ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS
+ if (ctrl->tls_key) {
+ key_put(ctrl->tls_key);
+ ctrl->tls_key = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
}
bool nvmet_check_auth_status(struct nvmet_req *req)
@@ -541,3 +556,58 @@ int nvmet_auth_ctrl_sesskey(struct nvmet_req *req,
return ret;
}
+
+void nvmet_auth_insert_psk(struct nvmet_sq *sq)
+{
+ int hash_len = nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(sq->ctrl->shash_id);
+ u8 *psk, *digest, *tls_psk;
+ size_t psk_len;
+ int ret;
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS
+ struct key *tls_key = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ ret = nvme_auth_generate_psk(sq->ctrl->shash_id,
+ sq->dhchap_skey,
+ sq->dhchap_skey_len,
+ sq->dhchap_c1, sq->dhchap_c2,
+ hash_len, &psk, &psk_len);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_warn("%s: ctrl %d qid %d failed to generate PSK, error %d\n",
+ __func__, sq->ctrl->cntlid, sq->qid, ret);
+ return;
+ }
+ ret = nvme_auth_generate_digest(sq->ctrl->shash_id, psk, psk_len,
+ sq->ctrl->subsysnqn,
+ sq->ctrl->hostnqn, &digest);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_warn("%s: ctrl %d qid %d failed to generate digest, error %d\n",
+ __func__, sq->ctrl->cntlid, sq->qid, ret);
+ goto out_free_psk;
+ }
+ ret = nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(sq->ctrl->shash_id, psk, psk_len,
+ digest, &tls_psk);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_warn("%s: ctrl %d qid %d failed to derive TLS PSK, error %d\n",
+ __func__, sq->ctrl->cntlid, sq->qid, ret);
+ goto out_free_digest;
+ }
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS
+ tls_key = nvme_tls_psk_refresh(NULL, sq->ctrl->hostnqn, sq->ctrl->subsysnqn,
+ sq->ctrl->shash_id, tls_psk, psk_len, digest);
+ if (IS_ERR(tls_key)) {
+ pr_warn("%s: ctrl %d qid %d failed to refresh key, error %ld\n",
+ __func__, sq->ctrl->cntlid, sq->qid, PTR_ERR(tls_key));
+ tls_key = NULL;
+ kfree_sensitive(tls_psk);
+ }
+ if (sq->ctrl->tls_key)
+ key_put(sq->ctrl->tls_key);
+ sq->ctrl->tls_key = tls_key;
+#endif
+
+out_free_digest:
+ kfree_sensitive(digest);
+out_free_psk:
+ kfree_sensitive(psk);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
index 3f2857c17d95..cf4b38c0e7bd 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
@@ -43,8 +43,26 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.halen,
data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.dhlen);
req->sq->dhchap_tid = le16_to_cpu(data->t_id);
- if (data->sc_c)
- return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_CONCAT_MISMATCH;
+ if (data->sc_c != NVME_AUTH_SECP_NOSC) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS))
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_CONCAT_MISMATCH;
+ /* Secure concatenation can only be enabled on the admin queue */
+ if (req->sq->qid)
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_CONCAT_MISMATCH;
+ switch (data->sc_c) {
+ case NVME_AUTH_SECP_NEWTLSPSK:
+ if (nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(req->sq))
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_CONCAT_MISMATCH;
+ break;
+ case NVME_AUTH_SECP_REPLACETLSPSK:
+ if (!nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(req->sq))
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_CONCAT_MISMATCH;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_CONCAT_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ ctrl->concat = true;
+ }
if (data->napd != 1)
return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE;
@@ -103,6 +121,13 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(fallback_dhgid));
ctrl->dh_gid = fallback_dhgid;
}
+ if (ctrl->dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHGROUP_NULL &&
+ ctrl->concat) {
+ pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: NULL DH group invalid "
+ "for secure channel concatenation\n", __func__,
+ ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid);
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_CONCAT_MISMATCH;
+ }
pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: selected DH group %s (%d)\n",
__func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid,
nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(ctrl->dh_gid), ctrl->dh_gid);
@@ -154,6 +179,12 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
kfree(response);
pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d host authenticated\n",
__func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid);
+ if (!data->cvalid && ctrl->concat) {
+ pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d invalid challenge\n",
+ __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid);
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED;
+ }
+ req->sq->dhchap_s2 = le32_to_cpu(data->seqnum);
if (data->cvalid) {
req->sq->dhchap_c2 = kmemdup(data->rval + data->hl, data->hl,
GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -163,11 +194,15 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d)
pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d challenge %*ph\n",
__func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid, data->hl,
req->sq->dhchap_c2);
- } else {
+ }
+ if (req->sq->dhchap_s2 == 0) {
+ if (ctrl->concat)
+ nvmet_auth_insert_psk(req->sq);
req->sq->authenticated = true;
+ kfree(req->sq->dhchap_c2);
req->sq->dhchap_c2 = NULL;
- }
- req->sq->dhchap_s2 = le32_to_cpu(data->seqnum);
+ } else if (!data->cvalid)
+ req->sq->authenticated = true;
return 0;
}
@@ -241,7 +276,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req)
pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d reset negotiation\n",
__func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid);
if (!req->sq->qid) {
- dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl);
+ dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl, req);
if (dhchap_status) {
pr_err("ctrl %d qid 0 failed to setup re-authentication\n",
ctrl->cntlid);
@@ -298,6 +333,8 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req)
}
goto done_kfree;
case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS2:
+ if (ctrl->concat)
+ nvmet_auth_insert_psk(req->sq);
req->sq->authenticated = true;
pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d ctrl authenticated\n",
__func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid);
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
index c4b2eddd5666..9a1256deee51 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd.c
@@ -199,10 +199,26 @@ static u16 nvmet_install_queue(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvmet_req *req)
return ret;
}
-static u32 nvmet_connect_result(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
+static u32 nvmet_connect_result(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvmet_req *req)
{
+ bool needs_auth = nvmet_has_auth(ctrl, req);
+ key_serial_t keyid = nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(req->sq);
+
+ /* Do not authenticate I/O queues for secure concatenation */
+ if (ctrl->concat && req->sq->qid)
+ needs_auth = false;
+
+ if (keyid)
+ pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d should %sauthenticate, tls psk %08x\n",
+ __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid,
+ needs_auth ? "" : "not ", keyid);
+ else
+ pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d should %sauthenticate%s\n",
+ __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid,
+ needs_auth ? "" : "not ",
+ ctrl->concat ? ", secure concatenation" : "");
return (u32)ctrl->cntlid |
- (nvmet_has_auth(ctrl) ? NVME_CONNECT_AUTHREQ_ATR : 0);
+ (needs_auth ? NVME_CONNECT_AUTHREQ_ATR : 0);
}
static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
@@ -251,7 +267,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
uuid_copy(&ctrl->hostid, &d->hostid);
- dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl);
+ dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl, req);
if (dhchap_status) {
pr_err("Failed to setup authentication, dhchap status %u\n",
dhchap_status);
@@ -269,12 +285,13 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
goto out;
}
- pr_info("creating %s controller %d for subsystem %s for NQN %s%s%s.\n",
+ pr_info("creating %s controller %d for subsystem %s for NQN %s%s%s%s.\n",
nvmet_is_disc_subsys(ctrl->subsys) ? "discovery" : "nvm",
ctrl->cntlid, ctrl->subsys->subsysnqn, ctrl->hostnqn,
- ctrl->pi_support ? " T10-PI is enabled" : "",
- nvmet_has_auth(ctrl) ? " with DH-HMAC-CHAP" : "");
- req->cqe->result.u32 = cpu_to_le32(nvmet_connect_result(ctrl));
+ ctrl->pi_support ? ", T10-PI" : "",
+ nvmet_has_auth(ctrl, req) ? ", DH-HMAC-CHAP" : "",
+ nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(req->sq) ? ", TLS" : "");
+ req->cqe->result.u32 = cpu_to_le32(nvmet_connect_result(ctrl, req));
out:
kfree(d);
complete:
@@ -330,7 +347,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_io_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
goto out_ctrl_put;
pr_debug("adding queue %d to ctrl %d.\n", qid, ctrl->cntlid);
- req->cqe->result.u32 = cpu_to_le32(nvmet_connect_result(ctrl));
+ req->cqe->result.u32 = cpu_to_le32(nvmet_connect_result(ctrl, req));
out:
kfree(d);
complete:
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h b/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h
index 190f55e6d753..c2e17201c757 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ struct nvmet_sq {
u32 dhchap_s2;
u8 *dhchap_skey;
int dhchap_skey_len;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS
+ struct key *tls_key;
#endif
struct completion free_done;
struct completion confirm_done;
@@ -237,6 +240,7 @@ struct nvmet_ctrl {
u64 err_counter;
struct nvme_error_slot slots[NVMET_ERROR_LOG_SLOTS];
bool pi_support;
+ bool concat;
#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_AUTH
struct nvme_dhchap_key *host_key;
struct nvme_dhchap_key *ctrl_key;
@@ -246,6 +250,9 @@ struct nvmet_ctrl {
u8 *dh_key;
size_t dh_keysize;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS
+ struct key *tls_key;
+#endif
};
struct nvmet_subsys {
@@ -716,13 +723,29 @@ static inline void nvmet_req_bio_put(struct nvmet_req *req, struct bio *bio)
bio_put(bio);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS
+static inline key_serial_t nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(struct nvmet_sq *sq)
+{
+ return sq->tls_key ? key_serial(sq->tls_key) : 0;
+}
+static inline void nvmet_sq_put_tls_key(struct nvmet_sq *sq)
+{
+ if (sq->tls_key) {
+ key_put(sq->tls_key);
+ sq->tls_key = NULL;
+ }
+}
+#else
+static inline key_serial_t nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(struct nvmet_sq *sq) { return 0; }
+static inline void nvmet_sq_put_tls_key(struct nvmet_sq *sq) {}
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_AUTH
void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req);
void nvmet_execute_auth_receive(struct nvmet_req *req);
int nvmet_auth_set_key(struct nvmet_host *host, const char *secret,
bool set_ctrl);
int nvmet_auth_set_host_hash(struct nvmet_host *host, const char *hash);
-u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl);
+u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvmet_req *req);
void nvmet_auth_sq_init(struct nvmet_sq *sq);
void nvmet_destroy_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl);
void nvmet_auth_sq_free(struct nvmet_sq *sq);
@@ -732,16 +755,18 @@ int nvmet_auth_host_hash(struct nvmet_req *req, u8 *response,
unsigned int hash_len);
int nvmet_auth_ctrl_hash(struct nvmet_req *req, u8 *response,
unsigned int hash_len);
-static inline bool nvmet_has_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
+static inline bool nvmet_has_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvmet_req *req)
{
- return ctrl->host_key != NULL;
+ return ctrl->host_key != NULL && !nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(req->sq);
}
int nvmet_auth_ctrl_exponential(struct nvmet_req *req,
u8 *buf, int buf_size);
int nvmet_auth_ctrl_sesskey(struct nvmet_req *req,
u8 *buf, int buf_size);
+void nvmet_auth_insert_psk(struct nvmet_sq *sq);
#else
-static inline u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
+static inline u8 nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvmet_req *req)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -754,11 +779,12 @@ static inline bool nvmet_check_auth_status(struct nvmet_req *req)
{
return true;
}
-static inline bool nvmet_has_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
+static inline bool nvmet_has_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvmet_req *req)
{
return false;
}
static inline const char *nvmet_dhchap_dhgroup_name(u8 dhgid) { return NULL; }
+static inline void nvmet_auth_insert_psk(struct nvmet_sq *sq) {};
#endif
-
#endif /* _NVMET_H */
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
index fa59a7996efa..6d8d150a75c6 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c
@@ -1072,10 +1072,11 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_done_recv_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
if (unlikely(!nvmet_req_init(req, &queue->nvme_cq,
&queue->nvme_sq, &nvmet_tcp_ops))) {
- pr_err("failed cmd %p id %d opcode %d, data_len: %d\n",
+ pr_err("failed cmd %p id %d opcode %d, data_len: %d, status: %04x\n",
req->cmd, req->cmd->common.command_id,
req->cmd->common.opcode,
- le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->common.dptr.sgl.length));
+ le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->common.dptr.sgl.length),
+ le16_to_cpu(req->cqe->status));
nvmet_tcp_handle_req_failure(queue, queue->cmd, req);
return 0;
@@ -1601,6 +1602,7 @@ static void nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work(struct work_struct *w)
/* stop accepting incoming data */
queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_ERR;
+ nvmet_sq_put_tls_key(&queue->nvme_sq);
nvmet_tcp_uninit_data_in_cmds(queue);
nvmet_sq_destroy(&queue->nvme_sq);
cancel_work_sync(&queue->io_work);
@@ -1806,6 +1808,23 @@ static void nvmet_tcp_tls_handshake_done(void *data, int status,
spin_unlock_bh(&queue->state_lock);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&queue->tls_handshake_tmo_work);
+
+ if (!status) {
+ struct key *tls_key = nvme_tls_key_lookup(peerid);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(tls_key)) {
+ pr_warn("%s: queue %d failed to lookup key %x\n",
+ __func__, queue->idx, peerid);
+ spin_lock_bh(&queue->state_lock);
+ queue->state = NVMET_TCP_Q_FAILED;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&queue->state_lock);
+ status = PTR_ERR(tls_key);
+ } else {
+ pr_debug("%s: queue %d using TLS PSK %x\n",
+ __func__, queue->idx, peerid);
+ queue->nvme_sq.tls_key = tls_key;
+ }
+ }
if (status)
nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue(queue);
else
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-24 11:46 ` Sagi Grimberg
2025-01-08 16:33 ` Keith Busch
1 sibling, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Sagi Grimberg @ 2024-12-24 11:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Reinecke, Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers, linux-crypto
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-24 11:46 ` Sagi Grimberg
@ 2025-01-08 16:33 ` Keith Busch
2025-01-09 7:33 ` Hannes Reinecke
1 sibling, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Keith Busch @ 2025-01-08 16:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Reinecke
Cc: Christoph Hellwig, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto
On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 12:02:37PM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
> Evaluate the SC_C flag during DH-CHAP-HMAC negotiation and insert
> the generated PSK once negotiation has finished.
...
> @@ -251,7 +267,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
>
> uuid_copy(&ctrl->hostid, &d->hostid);
>
> - dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl);
> + dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl, req);
> if (dhchap_status) {
> pr_err("Failed to setup authentication, dhchap status %u\n",
> dhchap_status);
> @@ -269,12 +285,13 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
> goto out;
> }
This one had some merge conflicts after applying the pci endpoint
series from Damien. I tried to resolve it, the result is here:
https://git.infradead.org/?p=nvme.git;a=commitdiff;h=11cb42c0f4f4450b325e38c8f0f7d77f5e1a0eb0
The main conflict was from moving the nvmet_setup_auth() call from
nvmet_execute_admin_connect() to nvmet_alloc_ctrl().
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
2025-01-08 16:33 ` Keith Busch
@ 2025-01-09 7:33 ` Hannes Reinecke
2025-01-12 22:38 ` Keith Busch
0 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2025-01-09 7:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Keith Busch, Hannes Reinecke
Cc: Christoph Hellwig, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto
On 1/8/25 17:33, Keith Busch wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 12:02:37PM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
>> Evaluate the SC_C flag during DH-CHAP-HMAC negotiation and insert
>> the generated PSK once negotiation has finished.
>
> ...
>
>> @@ -251,7 +267,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
>>
>> uuid_copy(&ctrl->hostid, &d->hostid);
>>
>> - dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl);
>> + dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl, req);
>> if (dhchap_status) {
>> pr_err("Failed to setup authentication, dhchap status %u\n",
>> dhchap_status);
>> @@ -269,12 +285,13 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
>> goto out;
>> }
>
> This one had some merge conflicts after applying the pci endpoint
> series from Damien. I tried to resolve it, the result is here:
>
> https://git.infradead.org/?p=nvme.git;a=commitdiff;h=11cb42c0f4f4450b325e38c8f0f7d77f5e1a0eb0
>
> The main conflict was from moving the nvmet_setup_auth() call from
> nvmet_execute_admin_connect() to nvmet_alloc_ctrl().
I'll give it a spin and check how it holds up.
Cheers,
Hannes
--
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect
hare@suse.de +49 911 74053 688
SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg
HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
2025-01-09 7:33 ` Hannes Reinecke
@ 2025-01-12 22:38 ` Keith Busch
2025-01-13 9:34 ` Hannes Reinecke
0 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Keith Busch @ 2025-01-12 22:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Reinecke
Cc: Hannes Reinecke, Christoph Hellwig, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme,
Eric Biggers, linux-crypto
On Thu, Jan 09, 2025 at 08:33:51AM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
> On 1/8/25 17:33, Keith Busch wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 12:02:37PM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
> > > Evaluate the SC_C flag during DH-CHAP-HMAC negotiation and insert
> > > the generated PSK once negotiation has finished.
> >
> > ...
> >
> > > @@ -251,7 +267,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
> > > uuid_copy(&ctrl->hostid, &d->hostid);
> > > - dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl);
> > > + dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl, req);
> > > if (dhchap_status) {
> > > pr_err("Failed to setup authentication, dhchap status %u\n",
> > > dhchap_status);
> > > @@ -269,12 +285,13 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
> > > goto out;
> > > }
> >
> > This one had some merge conflicts after applying the pci endpoint
> > series from Damien. I tried to resolve it, the result is here:
> >
> > https://git.infradead.org/?p=nvme.git;a=commitdiff;h=11cb42c0f4f4450b325e38c8f0f7d77f5e1a0eb0
> >
> > The main conflict was from moving the nvmet_setup_auth() call from
> > nvmet_execute_admin_connect() to nvmet_alloc_ctrl().
>
> I'll give it a spin and check how it holds up.
Sorry, I had to drop this from 6.14 for now. The build bot tagged us
with the following error. It looks easy enough to fix but I can't do it
over the weekened before the first merge window pull :)
tree/branch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux-block.git for-next
branch HEAD: f28201922a357663d4a2a258e024481e19269c2c Merge branch 'for-6.14/block' into for-next
Error/Warning (recently discovered and may have been fixed):
https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202501120730.Nix2qru3-lkp@intel.com
auth.c:(.text+0x986): undefined reference to `nvme_tls_psk_refresh'
csky-linux-ld: auth.c:(.text+0xa00): undefined reference to `nvme_tls_psk_refresh'
Error/Warning ids grouped by kconfigs:
recent_errors
`-- csky-randconfig-001-20250112
|-- auth.c:(.text):undefined-reference-to-nvme_tls_psk_refresh
`-- csky-linux-ld:auth.c:(.text):undefined-reference-to-nvme_tls_psk_refresh
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
2025-01-12 22:38 ` Keith Busch
@ 2025-01-13 9:34 ` Hannes Reinecke
2025-01-13 15:51 ` Keith Busch
0 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2025-01-13 9:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Keith Busch
Cc: Hannes Reinecke, Christoph Hellwig, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme,
Eric Biggers, linux-crypto
On 1/12/25 23:38, Keith Busch wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 09, 2025 at 08:33:51AM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
>> On 1/8/25 17:33, Keith Busch wrote:
>>> On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 12:02:37PM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
>>>> Evaluate the SC_C flag during DH-CHAP-HMAC negotiation and insert
>>>> the generated PSK once negotiation has finished.
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
>>>> @@ -251,7 +267,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
>>>> uuid_copy(&ctrl->hostid, &d->hostid);
>>>> - dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl);
>>>> + dhchap_status = nvmet_setup_auth(ctrl, req);
>>>> if (dhchap_status) {
>>>> pr_err("Failed to setup authentication, dhchap status %u\n",
>>>> dhchap_status);
>>>> @@ -269,12 +285,13 @@ static void nvmet_execute_admin_connect(struct nvmet_req *req)
>>>> goto out;
>>>> }
>>>
>>> This one had some merge conflicts after applying the pci endpoint
>>> series from Damien. I tried to resolve it, the result is here:
>>>
>>> https://git.infradead.org/?p=nvme.git;a=commitdiff;h=11cb42c0f4f4450b325e38c8f0f7d77f5e1a0eb0
>>>
>>> The main conflict was from moving the nvmet_setup_auth() call from
>>> nvmet_execute_admin_connect() to nvmet_alloc_ctrl().
>>
>> I'll give it a spin and check how it holds up.
>
> Sorry, I had to drop this from 6.14 for now. The build bot tagged us
> with the following error. It looks easy enough to fix but I can't do it
> over the weekened before the first merge window pull :)
>
> tree/branch: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux-block.git for-next
> branch HEAD: f28201922a357663d4a2a258e024481e19269c2c Merge branch 'for-6.14/block' into for-next
>
> Error/Warning (recently discovered and may have been fixed):
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202501120730.Nix2qru3-lkp@intel.com
>
> auth.c:(.text+0x986): undefined reference to `nvme_tls_psk_refresh'
> csky-linux-ld: auth.c:(.text+0xa00): undefined reference to `nvme_tls_psk_refresh'
>
> Error/Warning ids grouped by kconfigs:
>
> recent_errors
> `-- csky-randconfig-001-20250112
> |-- auth.c:(.text):undefined-reference-to-nvme_tls_psk_refresh
> `-- csky-linux-ld:auth.c:(.text):undefined-reference-to-nvme_tls_psk_refresh
Don't you also love kbuild robot ...
Fix is quite easy:
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
index 486afe598184..10e453b2436e 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ config NVME_HOST_AUTH
bool "NVMe over Fabrics In-Band Authentication in host side"
depends on NVME_CORE
select NVME_AUTH
- select NVME_KEYRING if NVME_TCP_TLS
+ select NVME_KEYRING
help
This provides support for NVMe over Fabrics In-Band
Authentication in
host side.
which obviously needs to be folded into patch 'nvme-tcp: request
secure channel concatenation' (the cited patch is a red herring;
it only exposes the issue, but the issue got introduced with the
patch to nvme-tcp).
Can you fold it in or shall I resubmit?
Cheers,
Hannes
--
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect
hare@suse.de +49 911 74053 688
SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg
HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
2025-01-13 9:34 ` Hannes Reinecke
@ 2025-01-13 15:51 ` Keith Busch
2025-01-13 16:00 ` Hannes Reinecke
0 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Keith Busch @ 2025-01-13 15:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Reinecke
Cc: Hannes Reinecke, Christoph Hellwig, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme,
Eric Biggers, linux-crypto
On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 10:34:48AM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
> On 1/12/25 23:38, Keith Busch wrote:
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
> index 486afe598184..10e453b2436e 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
> @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ config NVME_HOST_AUTH
> bool "NVMe over Fabrics In-Band Authentication in host side"
> depends on NVME_CORE
> select NVME_AUTH
> - select NVME_KEYRING if NVME_TCP_TLS
> + select NVME_KEYRING
> help
> This provides support for NVMe over Fabrics In-Band Authentication in
> host side.
>
>
> which obviously needs to be folded into patch 'nvme-tcp: request
> secure channel concatenation' (the cited patch is a red herring;
> it only exposes the issue, but the issue got introduced with the
> patch to nvme-tcp).
>
> Can you fold it in or shall I resubmit?
Sure, I can fold it in.
Were you okay with my merge conflict resolution on this patch too?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
2025-01-13 15:51 ` Keith Busch
@ 2025-01-13 16:00 ` Hannes Reinecke
0 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2025-01-13 16:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Keith Busch
Cc: Hannes Reinecke, Christoph Hellwig, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme,
Eric Biggers, linux-crypto
On 1/13/25 16:51, Keith Busch wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 10:34:48AM +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
>> On 1/12/25 23:38, Keith Busch wrote:
>> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
>> index 486afe598184..10e453b2436e 100644
>> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
>> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
>> @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ config NVME_HOST_AUTH
>> bool "NVMe over Fabrics In-Band Authentication in host side"
>> depends on NVME_CORE
>> select NVME_AUTH
>> - select NVME_KEYRING if NVME_TCP_TLS
>> + select NVME_KEYRING
>> help
>> This provides support for NVMe over Fabrics In-Band Authentication in
>> host side.
>>
>>
>> which obviously needs to be folded into patch 'nvme-tcp: request
>> secure channel concatenation' (the cited patch is a red herring;
>> it only exposes the issue, but the issue got introduced with the
>> patch to nvme-tcp).
>>
>> Can you fold it in or shall I resubmit?
>
> Sure, I can fold it in.
>
> Were you okay with my merge conflict resolution on this patch too?
Yeah, go for it.
At worst I'll need to fix it up later on :-)
Cheers,
Hannes
--
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect
hare@suse.de +49 911 74053 688
SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg
HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 10/10] nvmet: add tls_concat and tls_key debugfs entries
2024-12-03 11:02 [PATCHv13 00/10] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2024-12-03 11:02 ` [PATCH 09/10] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
@ 2024-12-03 11:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2024-12-24 11:46 ` Sagi Grimberg
10 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2024-12-03 11:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Keith Busch, Sagi Grimberg, linux-nvme, Eric Biggers,
linux-crypto, Hannes Reinecke
Add debugfs entries to display the 'concat' and 'tls_key' controller
attributes.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
---
drivers/nvme/target/debugfs.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/debugfs.c b/drivers/nvme/target/debugfs.c
index 220c7391fc19..e4300eb95101 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/debugfs.c
@@ -132,6 +132,27 @@ static int nvmet_ctrl_host_traddr_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
}
NVMET_DEBUGFS_ATTR(nvmet_ctrl_host_traddr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS
+static int nvmet_ctrl_tls_key_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
+{
+ struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = m->private;
+ key_serial_t keyid = nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(ctrl->sqs[0]);
+
+ seq_printf(m, "%08x\n", keyid);
+ return 0;
+}
+NVMET_DEBUGFS_ATTR(nvmet_ctrl_tls_key);
+
+static int nvmet_ctrl_tls_concat_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
+{
+ struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = m->private;
+
+ seq_printf(m, "%d\n", ctrl->concat);
+ return 0;
+}
+NVMET_DEBUGFS_ATTR(nvmet_ctrl_tls_concat);
+#endif
+
int nvmet_debugfs_ctrl_setup(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
{
char name[32];
@@ -157,6 +178,12 @@ int nvmet_debugfs_ctrl_setup(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)
&nvmet_ctrl_state_fops);
debugfs_create_file("host_traddr", S_IRUSR, ctrl->debugfs_dir, ctrl,
&nvmet_ctrl_host_traddr_fops);
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_TCP_TLS
+ debugfs_create_file("tls_concat", S_IRUSR, ctrl->debugfs_dir, ctrl,
+ &nvmet_ctrl_tls_concat_fops);
+ debugfs_create_file("tls_key", S_IRUSR, ctrl->debugfs_dir, ctrl,
+ &nvmet_ctrl_tls_key_fops);
+#endif
return 0;
}
--
2.35.3
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