From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>,
Xiao Liang <shaw.leon@gmail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/2] Eliminate the no-SIMD en/decryption fallbacks on x86
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 21:13:23 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250220051325.340691-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
The patchset can also be retrieved from:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git x86-softirq-fpu-fix-v1
This patchset fixes a longstanding issue where kernel-mode FPU (i.e.,
SIMD) was not reliably usable in softirqs in x86, which was creating the
need for a fallback. The fallback was really bad for performance, and
it even hurt performance for users that never encountered the edge case
where kernel-mode FPU was not usable.
This patchset aligns x86 with other architectures such as arm, arm64,
and riscv by making kernel-mode FPU work in softirqs reliably. There
are a few possible ways to achieve that, and for now I just went with
the simplest way; see patch 1 for details.
Patch 2 eliminates all uses of the "crypto SIMD helper" from x86, as
patch 1 makes it unnecessary. For the RFC it is just one big patch;
I'll probably split patch 2 up if this progresses past RFC status.
Performance results have been positive. All en/decryption is now
slightly faster on x86, as it no longer take a detour through
crypto/simd.c. I get a 7% or 23% improvement for AES-XTS, for example.
I also benchmarked bidirectional IPsec, which has been claimed to often
hit the edge case where kernel-mode FPU was previously not usable in
softirq context. Ultimately, I was not actually able to reproduce that
edge case being reached unless I reduced the number of CPUs to 1, in
which case it then started being occasionally reached. Regardless, even
without that case being reached, IPsec throughput still improved by 2%.
In situations where that case was being reached, or where users required
a synchronous algorithm, a much larger improvement should be seen.
Eric Biggers (2):
x86/fpu: make kernel-mode FPU reliably usable in softirqs
crypto: x86 - stop using the SIMD helper
arch/x86/crypto/Kconfig | 14 --
arch/x86/crypto/aegis128-aesni-glue.c | 13 +-
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 168 ++++++++-------------
arch/x86/crypto/aria_aesni_avx2_glue.c | 22 +--
arch/x86/crypto/aria_aesni_avx_glue.c | 20 +--
arch/x86/crypto/aria_gfni_avx512_glue.c | 22 +--
arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx2_glue.c | 21 +--
arch/x86/crypto/camellia_aesni_avx_glue.c | 21 +--
arch/x86/crypto/cast5_avx_glue.c | 21 +--
arch/x86/crypto/cast6_avx_glue.c | 20 +--
arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx2_glue.c | 21 +--
arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx_glue.c | 21 +--
arch/x86/crypto/serpent_sse2_glue.c | 21 +--
arch/x86/crypto/sm4_aesni_avx2_glue.c | 30 ++--
arch/x86/crypto/sm4_aesni_avx_glue.c | 30 ++--
arch/x86/crypto/twofish_avx_glue.c | 21 +--
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 17 +--
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 37 ++---
18 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 360 deletions(-)
base-commit: 0ad2507d5d93f39619fc42372c347d6006b64319
prerequisite-patch-id: ec1feea7e6f4d03e4e4c64c492197b89c957611a
--
2.48.1
next reply other threads:[~2025-02-20 5:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-20 5:13 Eric Biggers [this message]
2025-02-20 5:13 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86/fpu: make kernel-mode FPU reliably usable in softirqs Eric Biggers
2025-02-21 7:38 ` Xiao Liang
2025-02-21 19:31 ` Eric Biggers
2025-02-25 22:21 ` David Laight
2025-02-25 22:59 ` Eric Biggers
2025-02-26 17:09 ` Dave Hansen
2025-02-28 3:59 ` Eric Biggers
2025-02-28 12:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-02-20 5:13 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] crypto: x86 - stop using the SIMD helper Eric Biggers
2025-02-21 3:53 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] Eliminate the no-SIMD en/decryption fallbacks on x86 Herbert Xu
2025-02-24 18:57 ` Eric Biggers
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20250220051325.340691-1-ebiggers@kernel.org \
--to=ebiggers@kernel.org \
--cc=Jason@zx2c4.com \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=greearb@candelatech.com \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=shaw.leon@gmail.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).