From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Yuzhuo Jing <yuzhuo@google.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] crypto: Fix sha1 compile error
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 21:53:23 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250614045323.GF1284@sol> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250614000828.311722-1-yuzhuo@google.com>
On Fri, Jun 13, 2025 at 05:08:26PM -0700, Yuzhuo Jing wrote:
> This is a followup patch series for an ongoing patch series to reuse
> kernel tree sha1 utils in perf tools and remove libcrypto dependency.
> This mirrors the fixes made in perf back to the kernel tree so we can
> use tools/perf/check-headers.sh to monitor future changes.
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aC9lXhPFcs5fkHWH@x1/t/#u
>
> This series contains two patches: one fixing signed and unsigned integer
> comparisons and another fixing function type mismatches.
>
> Yuzhuo Jing (2):
> crypto: Fix sha1 signed integer comparison compile error
> crypto: Fix sha1 signed pointer comparison compile error
>
> crypto/sha1_generic.c | 2 +-
> include/crypto/sha1_base.h | 4 ++--
> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
I don't like these signedness inconsistencies in the code either, and I'll be
fixing these (among many other issues) when I refactor SHA-1 to have a proper
lib/crypto/ API similar to what I'm currently doing with SHA-2. That being
said, the kernel doesn't have these warnings enabled, and especially in its
current state this code isn't really designed to be copied into a userspace
program.
So I feel that the premise of this patchset, and more importantly also the one
you linked to above for tools/perf/, is a bit misguided.
I've sent an alternative patchset for you to consider:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250614044133.660848-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/. It
adds a minimal SHA-1 implementation, including a test, to tools/perf/util/. The
SHA-1 implementation is less than 100 lines anyway.
The effort it would take to "share" the kernel's code here is just not worth it,
IMO. Especially when I have some significant refactoring planned on the kernel
side which would make the tools/perf copy diverge anyway.
- Eric
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-14 4:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-14 0:08 [PATCH v1 0/2] crypto: Fix sha1 compile error Yuzhuo Jing
2025-06-14 0:08 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] crypto: Fix sha1 signed integer comparison " Yuzhuo Jing
2025-06-14 0:08 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] crypto: Fix sha1 signed pointer " Yuzhuo Jing
2025-06-14 4:53 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
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