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From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: elver@google.com, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com>,
	 "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	 Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>,
	Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	 Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	 Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>,  Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Joel Fernandes <joelagnelf@nvidia.com>,
	 Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	 Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	 Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
	Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
	 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	 Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	 Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@kernel.org>,
	 Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@gmail.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	 Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	 kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	 linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-sparse@vger.kernel.org,  llvm@lists.linux.dev,
	rcu@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 28/35] kcov: Enable capability analysis
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2025 15:59:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250918140451.1289454-29-elver@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250918140451.1289454-1-elver@google.com>

Enable capability analysis for the KCOV subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
v2:
* Remove disable/enable_capability_analysis() around headers.
---
 kernel/Makefile |  2 ++
 kernel/kcov.c   | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index c60623448235..2a2a10c6a197 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
 KCSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
 UBSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
 KMSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
+
+CAPABILITY_ANALYSIS_kcov.o := y
 CFLAGS_kcov.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-conserve-stack) -fno-stack-protector
 
 obj-y += sched/
diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
index 1d85597057e1..1897c8ca6209 100644
--- a/kernel/kcov.c
+++ b/kernel/kcov.c
@@ -55,13 +55,13 @@ struct kcov {
 	refcount_t		refcount;
 	/* The lock protects mode, size, area and t. */
 	spinlock_t		lock;
-	enum kcov_mode		mode;
+	enum kcov_mode		mode __guarded_by(&lock);
 	/* Size of arena (in long's). */
-	unsigned int		size;
+	unsigned int		size __guarded_by(&lock);
 	/* Coverage buffer shared with user space. */
-	void			*area;
+	void			*area __guarded_by(&lock);
 	/* Task for which we collect coverage, or NULL. */
-	struct task_struct	*t;
+	struct task_struct	*t __guarded_by(&lock);
 	/* Collecting coverage from remote (background) threads. */
 	bool			remote;
 	/* Size of remote area (in long's). */
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ void kcov_task_init(struct task_struct *t)
 }
 
 static void kcov_reset(struct kcov *kcov)
+	__must_hold(&kcov->lock)
 {
 	kcov->t = NULL;
 	kcov->mode = KCOV_MODE_INIT;
@@ -400,6 +401,7 @@ static void kcov_reset(struct kcov *kcov)
 }
 
 static void kcov_remote_reset(struct kcov *kcov)
+	__must_hold(&kcov->lock)
 {
 	int bkt;
 	struct kcov_remote *remote;
@@ -419,6 +421,7 @@ static void kcov_remote_reset(struct kcov *kcov)
 }
 
 static void kcov_disable(struct task_struct *t, struct kcov *kcov)
+	__must_hold(&kcov->lock)
 {
 	kcov_task_reset(t);
 	if (kcov->remote)
@@ -435,8 +438,11 @@ static void kcov_get(struct kcov *kcov)
 static void kcov_put(struct kcov *kcov)
 {
 	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&kcov->refcount)) {
-		kcov_remote_reset(kcov);
-		vfree(kcov->area);
+		/* Capability-safety: no references left, object being destroyed. */
+		capability_unsafe(
+			kcov_remote_reset(kcov);
+			vfree(kcov->area);
+		);
 		kfree(kcov);
 	}
 }
@@ -491,6 +497,7 @@ static int kcov_mmap(struct file *filep, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	unsigned long size, off;
 	struct page *page;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	unsigned long *area;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&kcov->lock, flags);
 	size = kcov->size * sizeof(unsigned long);
@@ -499,10 +506,11 @@ static int kcov_mmap(struct file *filep, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		res = -EINVAL;
 		goto exit;
 	}
+	area = kcov->area;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kcov->lock, flags);
 	vm_flags_set(vma, VM_DONTEXPAND);
 	for (off = 0; off < size; off += PAGE_SIZE) {
-		page = vmalloc_to_page(kcov->area + off);
+		page = vmalloc_to_page(area + off);
 		res = vm_insert_page(vma, vma->vm_start + off, page);
 		if (res) {
 			pr_warn_once("kcov: vm_insert_page() failed\n");
@@ -522,10 +530,10 @@ static int kcov_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep)
 	kcov = kzalloc(sizeof(*kcov), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!kcov)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	spin_lock_init(&kcov->lock);
 	kcov->mode = KCOV_MODE_DISABLED;
 	kcov->sequence = 1;
 	refcount_set(&kcov->refcount, 1);
-	spin_lock_init(&kcov->lock);
 	filep->private_data = kcov;
 	return nonseekable_open(inode, filep);
 }
@@ -556,6 +564,7 @@ static int kcov_get_mode(unsigned long arg)
  * vmalloc fault handling path is instrumented.
  */
 static void kcov_fault_in_area(struct kcov *kcov)
+	__must_hold(&kcov->lock)
 {
 	unsigned long stride = PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long);
 	unsigned long *area = kcov->area;
@@ -584,6 +593,7 @@ static inline bool kcov_check_handle(u64 handle, bool common_valid,
 
 static int kcov_ioctl_locked(struct kcov *kcov, unsigned int cmd,
 			     unsigned long arg)
+	__must_hold(&kcov->lock)
 {
 	struct task_struct *t;
 	unsigned long flags, unused;
@@ -814,6 +824,7 @@ static inline bool kcov_mode_enabled(unsigned int mode)
 }
 
 static void kcov_remote_softirq_start(struct task_struct *t)
+	__must_hold(&kcov_percpu_data.lock)
 {
 	struct kcov_percpu_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&kcov_percpu_data);
 	unsigned int mode;
@@ -831,6 +842,7 @@ static void kcov_remote_softirq_start(struct task_struct *t)
 }
 
 static void kcov_remote_softirq_stop(struct task_struct *t)
+	__must_hold(&kcov_percpu_data.lock)
 {
 	struct kcov_percpu_data *data = this_cpu_ptr(&kcov_percpu_data);
 
@@ -896,10 +908,12 @@ void kcov_remote_start(u64 handle)
 	/* Put in kcov_remote_stop(). */
 	kcov_get(kcov);
 	/*
-	 * Read kcov fields before unlock to prevent races with
-	 * KCOV_DISABLE / kcov_remote_reset().
+	 * Read kcov fields before unlocking kcov_remote_lock to prevent races
+	 * with KCOV_DISABLE and kcov_remote_reset(); cannot acquire kcov->lock
+	 * here, because it might lead to deadlock given kcov_remote_lock is
+	 * acquired _after_ kcov->lock elsewhere.
 	 */
-	mode = kcov->mode;
+	mode = capability_unsafe(kcov->mode);
 	sequence = kcov->sequence;
 	if (in_task()) {
 		size = kcov->remote_size;
-- 
2.51.0.384.g4c02a37b29-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-09-18 14:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-18 13:59 [PATCH v3 00/35] Compiler-Based Capability- and Locking-Analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 01/35] compiler_types: Move lock checking attributes to compiler-capability-analysis.h Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 02/35] compiler-capability-analysis: Add infrastructure for Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 15:58   ` Ian Rogers
2025-09-18 16:03     ` Bart Van Assche
2025-09-18 16:14       ` Steven Rostedt
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 03/35] compiler-capability-analysis: Add test stub Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 04/35] Documentation: Add documentation for Compiler-Based Capability Analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 05/35] checkpatch: Warn about capability_unsafe() without comment Marco Elver
2025-09-18 20:36   ` Joe Perches
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 06/35] cleanup: Basic compatibility with capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 07/35] lockdep: Annotate lockdep assertions for " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 08/35] locking/rwlock, spinlock: Support Clang's " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 09/35] compiler-capability-analysis: Change __cond_acquires to take return value Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 10/35] locking/mutex: Support Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 11/35] locking/seqlock: " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 12/35] bit_spinlock: Include missing <asm/processor.h> Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 13/35] bit_spinlock: Support Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 14/35] rcu: " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 15/35] srcu: " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 16/35] kref: Add capability-analysis annotations Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 17/35] locking/rwsem: Support Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 18/35] locking/local_lock: Include missing headers Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 19/35] locking/local_lock: Support Clang's capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 20/35] locking/ww_mutex: " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 21/35] debugfs: Make debugfs_cancellation a capability struct Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 22/35] compiler-capability-analysis: Remove Sparse support Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 23/35] compiler-capability-analysis: Remove __cond_lock() function-like helper Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 24/35] compiler-capability-analysis: Introduce header suppressions Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 25/35] compiler: Let data_race() imply disabled capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 26/35] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Capability Analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 27/35] kfence: Enable capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` Marco Elver [this message]
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 29/35] kcsan: " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 30/35] stackdepot: " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 31/35] rhashtable: " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 32/35] printk: Move locking annotation to printk.c Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 33/35] security/tomoyo: Enable capability analysis Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 34/35] crypto: " Marco Elver
2025-09-18 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 35/35] sched: Enable capability analysis for core.c and fair.c Marco Elver
2025-09-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v3 00/35] Compiler-Based Capability- and Locking-Analysis Christoph Hellwig
2025-09-18 14:30   ` Marco Elver
2025-09-18 14:38     ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-09-18 17:45   ` Nathan Chancellor
2025-09-18 19:40     ` Nathan Chancellor
2025-09-19 14:08     ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-09-19 14:09       ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-09-22  9:33         ` Marco Elver
2025-09-22 17:11           ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-09-23 19:49           ` Nathan Chancellor
2025-09-19 17:20       ` Bart Van Assche
2025-09-22 17:12         ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-09-20 10:23       ` Marco Elver
2025-09-20 12:44         ` Marco Elver
2025-09-18 15:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-09-18 21:26   ` Marco Elver
2025-09-18 21:47     ` Linus Torvalds
2025-09-19  9:10       ` Marco Elver
2025-11-13 14:30         ` Marco Elver
2025-11-14  4:38           ` Nathan Chancellor
2025-11-14 13:22             ` Marco Elver
2025-09-18 16:21 ` Ian Rogers
2025-09-18 19:41 ` [syzbot ci] " syzbot ci
2025-09-19  7:05   ` Marco Elver

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