From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F0DB110FD for ; Sun, 5 Oct 2025 03:17:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=18.9.28.11 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1759634245; cv=none; b=B5nyieZZV5dPCLC1OpXHLF14/b0YnauQnRuDdAr10LMKoRbybN/uXjRxdSudcFCK3HOZZnpPSWD8MkPfDpkBGBdlslu3B3pLcCSJu2FoHZ3UlfJdXQ5aRm2knl+J+9Yb8l1nRLUaZJekJi2G7rPA4LSLyXmq3e37s1RkApuY3iM= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1759634245; c=relaxed/simple; bh=gewsRF5ybnzMS01DuafVvG3C56lVjhjs5t2coFVlKpE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=jTNvoRjDGEnvKrq4TuzocaqTT4NXPihC55BdpKbW3d1jZmy9VBGiv4pjQaco7Tj47XbncY3zYRwrVGLshptqu7jDKNi94SWYWq9o7B0NG/O+D0w2OQEHPJgAW8eeh+RbSEUS2AJ9j1kOliMHuJZK9n5O70Eu5enydz7zb7c+HBc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=mit.edu; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=mit.edu; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=mit.edu header.i=@mit.edu header.b=qFo4T//Q; arc=none smtp.client-ip=18.9.28.11 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=mit.edu Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=mit.edu Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=mit.edu header.i=@mit.edu header.b="qFo4T//Q" Received: from trampoline.thunk.org (pool-173-48-123-201.bstnma.fios.verizon.net [173.48.123.201]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 5953GDfE020952 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Sat, 4 Oct 2025 23:16:14 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mit.edu; s=outgoing; t=1759634178; bh=Nd3hwLZWz6hu8v9RgP/aEKnQfUiHUdu9Dg9Y0Hff0CQ=; h=Date:From:Subject:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=qFo4T//QR/XA0/AnAP0c5h/FRzlDBhCVJFj7Fa/VZAF18uZuCYerRN6E/ymgplYnt ZeF+ubaD4mQfNMGBl77HdqD5l3u8DtnyI3uIFq+p6dAFMsPl/MWpUjd5NNP9pYusL4 OTFbugT+49XjbaUkOt0iOCfUNzuVyOU5OrW7AejAVfR+PNTqCD0tPEs7zak2+qmNx7 NhG9Sau6XQoI7lJkU1ekdzeIMoIZghQv+bwdl3dzWQjT2eiVTfLfbVYA8xoLJHaHG9 xFsJncSK/e/1ekAR+JjRLpJwtJoJ15TT2FxLcWpBnjQTbq48GfZenjJ8Bac6rPMHTA mM+kSgkK8mGKw== Received: by trampoline.thunk.org (Postfix, from userid 15806) id 0DD1E2E00D9; Sat, 04 Oct 2025 23:16:13 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sat, 4 Oct 2025 23:16:13 -0400 From: "Theodore Ts'o" To: Eric Biggers Cc: Jon Kohler , Vegard Nossum , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , "linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" , Stephan Mueller , Marcus Meissner , Jarod Wilson , Neil Horman , John Haxby Subject: Re: 6.17 Regression: loading trusted.ko with fips=1 fails due to crypto/testmgr.c: desupport SHA-1 for FIPS 140 Message-ID: <20251005031613.GE386127@mit.edu> References: <20250521125519.2839581-1-vegard.nossum@oracle.com> <26F8FCC9-B448-4A89-81DF-6BAADA03E174@nutanix.com> <20251004232451.GA68695@quark> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20251004232451.GA68695@quark> On Sat, Oct 04, 2025 at 04:24:51PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > But for future reference, if the people doing FIPS certifications of the > whole kernel actually determine that a particular kernel feature(s) that > use SHA-1 *must* be disabled when fips_enabled=1, then of course they'll > need to do that properly by submitting a tested and well-justified patch > for each feature that carefully disables the correct functionality. There's a hidden philosopical question here, which is whether "FIPS certification of the whole kernel" is actually a good thing. Personally, I don't think it is, but if booting with fips=1 neuters a whole bunch of kernel features, and that is considered "working as intended", to the extent that it discourages the use of FIPS mode, maybe it's not such a bad thing. :-) But with that said, I suspect one of the things that distributions might find useful is per-kernel subsystem fips enablement. (e.g., dm_crypt.fips=1 which might make a whole bunch of existing users' file systems become useless, precepitating a whole bunch of angry inquiries to the distrobution's help desk, but maybe a particular user only needs ipsec.fips=1) - Ted