* [PATCH 1/6] lib/crypto: chacha: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-22 19:42 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 2/6] lib/crypto: curve25519: " Eric Biggers
` (8 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-22 19:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook, Eric Biggers
Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
parameters of the chacha library functions. This causes clang to warn
when a too-small array of known size is passed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
include/crypto/chacha.h | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h
index 38e26dff27b0..1cc301a48469 100644
--- a/include/crypto/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
@@ -36,22 +36,22 @@
struct chacha_state {
u32 x[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
};
void chacha_block_generic(struct chacha_state *state,
- u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int nrounds);
+ u8 out[at_least CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int nrounds);
static inline void chacha20_block(struct chacha_state *state,
- u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+ u8 out[at_least CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
{
chacha_block_generic(state, out, 20);
}
void hchacha_block_generic(const struct chacha_state *state,
- u32 out[HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS], int nrounds);
+ u32 out[at_least HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS], int nrounds);
void hchacha_block(const struct chacha_state *state,
- u32 out[HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS], int nrounds);
+ u32 out[at_least HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS], int nrounds);
enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ static inline void chacha_init_consts(struct chacha_state *state)
state->x[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
state->x[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
}
static inline void chacha_init(struct chacha_state *state,
- const u32 key[CHACHA_KEY_WORDS],
- const u8 iv[CHACHA_IV_SIZE])
+ const u32 key[at_least CHACHA_KEY_WORDS],
+ const u8 iv[at_least CHACHA_IV_SIZE])
{
chacha_init_consts(state);
state->x[4] = key[0];
state->x[5] = key[1];
state->x[6] = key[2];
--
2.51.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH 2/6] lib/crypto: curve25519: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 1/6] lib/crypto: chacha: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-22 19:42 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 3/6] lib/crypto: md5: " Eric Biggers
` (7 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-22 19:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook, Eric Biggers
Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
parameters of the curve25519 library functions. This causes clang to
warn when a too-small array of known size is passed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
include/crypto/curve25519.h | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/curve25519.h b/include/crypto/curve25519.h
index db63a5577c00..2362b48f8741 100644
--- a/include/crypto/curve25519.h
+++ b/include/crypto/curve25519.h
@@ -11,28 +11,32 @@
enum curve25519_lengths {
CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE = 32
};
-void curve25519_generic(u8 out[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
- const u8 scalar[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
- const u8 point[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE]);
+void curve25519_generic(u8 out[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 scalar[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 point[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE]);
-bool __must_check curve25519(u8 mypublic[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
- const u8 secret[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
- const u8 basepoint[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE]);
+bool __must_check
+curve25519(u8 mypublic[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 secret[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 basepoint[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE]);
-bool __must_check curve25519_generate_public(u8 pub[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
- const u8 secret[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE]);
+bool __must_check
+curve25519_generate_public(u8 pub[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE],
+ const u8 secret[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE]);
-static inline void curve25519_clamp_secret(u8 secret[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE])
+static inline void
+curve25519_clamp_secret(u8 secret[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE])
{
secret[0] &= 248;
secret[31] = (secret[31] & 127) | 64;
}
-static inline void curve25519_generate_secret(u8 secret[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE])
+static inline void
+curve25519_generate_secret(u8 secret[at_least CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE])
{
get_random_bytes_wait(secret, CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE);
curve25519_clamp_secret(secret);
}
--
2.51.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3/6] lib/crypto: md5: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 1/6] lib/crypto: chacha: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params Eric Biggers
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 2/6] lib/crypto: curve25519: " Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-22 19:42 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 4/6] lib/crypto: poly1305: " Eric Biggers
` (6 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-22 19:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook, Eric Biggers
Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
parameters of the md5 library functions. This causes clang to warn when
a too-small array of known size is passed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
include/crypto/md5.h | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/md5.h b/include/crypto/md5.h
index c9aa5c3abc53..c47aedfe67ec 100644
--- a/include/crypto/md5.h
+++ b/include/crypto/md5.h
@@ -74,21 +74,21 @@ void md5_update(struct md5_ctx *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len);
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void md5_final(struct md5_ctx *ctx, u8 out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void md5_final(struct md5_ctx *ctx, u8 out[at_least MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* md5() - Compute MD5 message digest in one shot
* @data: the message data
* @len: the data length in bytes
* @out: (output) the resulting MD5 message digest
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void md5(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void md5(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[at_least MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* struct hmac_md5_key - Prepared key for HMAC-MD5
* @istate: private
* @ostate: private
@@ -171,11 +171,11 @@ static inline void hmac_md5_update(struct hmac_md5_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void hmac_md5_final(struct hmac_md5_ctx *ctx, u8 out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void hmac_md5_final(struct hmac_md5_ctx *ctx, u8 out[at_least MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_md5() - Compute HMAC-MD5 in one shot, using a prepared key
* @key: the prepared HMAC key
* @data: the message data
@@ -185,11 +185,12 @@ void hmac_md5_final(struct hmac_md5_ctx *ctx, u8 out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
* If you're using the key only once, consider using hmac_md5_usingrawkey().
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_md5(const struct hmac_md5_key *key,
- const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 out[at_least MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_md5_usingrawkey() - Compute HMAC-MD5 in one shot, using a raw key
* @raw_key: the raw HMAC-MD5 key
* @raw_key_len: the key length in bytes. All key lengths are supported.
@@ -202,8 +203,8 @@ void hmac_md5(const struct hmac_md5_key *key,
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_md5_usingrawkey(const u8 *raw_key, size_t raw_key_len,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
- u8 out[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ u8 out[at_least MD5_DIGEST_SIZE]);
#endif /* _CRYPTO_MD5_H */
--
2.51.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4/6] lib/crypto: poly1305: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 3/6] lib/crypto: md5: " Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-22 19:42 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 5/6] lib/crypto: sha1: " Eric Biggers
` (5 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-22 19:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook, Eric Biggers
Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
parameters of the poly1305 library functions. This causes clang to warn
when a too-small array of known size is passed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
include/crypto/poly1305.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/poly1305.h b/include/crypto/poly1305.h
index d4daeec8da19..190beb427c6d 100644
--- a/include/crypto/poly1305.h
+++ b/include/crypto/poly1305.h
@@ -57,11 +57,11 @@ struct poly1305_desc_ctx {
u32 s[4];
struct poly1305_block_state state;
};
void poly1305_init(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
- const u8 key[POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]);
+ const u8 key[at_least POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]);
void poly1305_update(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
const u8 *src, unsigned int nbytes);
void poly1305_final(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, u8 *digest);
#endif
--
2.51.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5/6] lib/crypto: sha1: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 4/6] lib/crypto: poly1305: " Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-22 19:42 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 6/6] lib/crypto: sha2: " Eric Biggers
` (4 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-22 19:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook, Eric Biggers
Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
parameters of the sha1 library functions. This causes clang to warn
when a too-small array of known size is passed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
include/crypto/sha1.h | 12 +++++++-----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/sha1.h b/include/crypto/sha1.h
index 162a529ec841..27f08b972931 100644
--- a/include/crypto/sha1.h
+++ b/include/crypto/sha1.h
@@ -82,21 +82,21 @@ void sha1_update(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, const u8 *data, size_t len);
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha1_final(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha1_final(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, u8 out[at_least SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* sha1() - Compute SHA-1 message digest in one shot
* @data: the message data
* @len: the data length in bytes
* @out: (output) the resulting SHA-1 message digest
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha1(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha1(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[at_least SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* struct hmac_sha1_key - Prepared key for HMAC-SHA1
* @istate: private
* @ostate: private
@@ -179,11 +179,12 @@ static inline void hmac_sha1_update(struct hmac_sha1_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void hmac_sha1_final(struct hmac_sha1_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void hmac_sha1_final(struct hmac_sha1_ctx *ctx,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha1() - Compute HMAC-SHA1 in one shot, using a prepared key
* @key: the prepared HMAC key
* @data: the message data
@@ -193,11 +194,12 @@ void hmac_sha1_final(struct hmac_sha1_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
* If you're using the key only once, consider using hmac_sha1_usingrawkey().
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha1(const struct hmac_sha1_key *key,
- const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 out[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha1_usingrawkey() - Compute HMAC-SHA1 in one shot, using a raw key
* @raw_key: the raw HMAC-SHA1 key
* @raw_key_len: the key length in bytes. All key lengths are supported.
@@ -210,8 +212,8 @@ void hmac_sha1(const struct hmac_sha1_key *key,
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha1_usingrawkey(const u8 *raw_key, size_t raw_key_len,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
- u8 out[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ u8 out[at_least SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
#endif /* _CRYPTO_SHA1_H */
--
2.51.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6/6] lib/crypto: sha2: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 5/6] lib/crypto: sha1: " Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-22 19:42 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-22 21:00 ` [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Jason A. Donenfeld
` (3 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-22 19:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook, Eric Biggers
Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
parameters of the sha2 library functions. This causes clang to warn
when a too-small array of known size is passed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
include/crypto/sha2.h | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/sha2.h b/include/crypto/sha2.h
index e5dafb935cc8..7bb8fe169daf 100644
--- a/include/crypto/sha2.h
+++ b/include/crypto/sha2.h
@@ -188,21 +188,21 @@ static inline void sha224_update(struct sha224_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha224_final(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha224_final(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, u8 out[at_least SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* sha224() - Compute SHA-224 message digest in one shot
* @data: the message data
* @len: the data length in bytes
* @out: (output) the resulting SHA-224 message digest
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha224(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha224(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[at_least SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* struct hmac_sha224_key - Prepared key for HMAC-SHA224
* @key: private
*/
@@ -285,11 +285,12 @@ static inline void hmac_sha224_update(struct hmac_sha224_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void hmac_sha224_final(struct hmac_sha224_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void hmac_sha224_final(struct hmac_sha224_ctx *ctx,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha224() - Compute HMAC-SHA224 in one shot, using a prepared key
* @key: the prepared HMAC key
* @data: the message data
@@ -299,11 +300,12 @@ void hmac_sha224_final(struct hmac_sha224_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
* If you're using the key only once, consider using hmac_sha224_usingrawkey().
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha224(const struct hmac_sha224_key *key,
- const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 out[SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha224_usingrawkey() - Compute HMAC-SHA224 in one shot, using a raw key
* @raw_key: the raw HMAC-SHA224 key
* @raw_key_len: the key length in bytes. All key lengths are supported.
@@ -316,11 +318,11 @@ void hmac_sha224(const struct hmac_sha224_key *key,
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha224_usingrawkey(const u8 *raw_key, size_t raw_key_len,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
- u8 out[SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ u8 out[at_least SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* struct sha256_ctx - Context for hashing a message with SHA-256
* @ctx: private
*/
@@ -361,21 +363,21 @@ static inline void sha256_update(struct sha256_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha256_final(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha256_final(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, u8 out[at_least SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* sha256() - Compute SHA-256 message digest in one shot
* @data: the message data
* @len: the data length in bytes
* @out: (output) the resulting SHA-256 message digest
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha256(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha256(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[at_least SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* sha256_finup_2x() - Compute two SHA-256 digests from a common initial
* context. On some CPUs, this is faster than sequentially
* computing each digest.
@@ -388,12 +390,13 @@ void sha256(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
* @out2: (output) the second SHA-256 message digest
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void sha256_finup_2x(const struct sha256_ctx *ctx, const u8 *data1,
- const u8 *data2, size_t len, u8 out1[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE],
- u8 out2[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ const u8 *data2, size_t len,
+ u8 out1[at_least SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE],
+ u8 out2[at_least SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* sha256_finup_2x_is_optimized() - Check if sha256_finup_2x() is using a real
* interleaved implementation, as opposed to a
* sequential fallback
@@ -486,11 +489,12 @@ static inline void hmac_sha256_update(struct hmac_sha256_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void hmac_sha256_final(struct hmac_sha256_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void hmac_sha256_final(struct hmac_sha256_ctx *ctx,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha256() - Compute HMAC-SHA256 in one shot, using a prepared key
* @key: the prepared HMAC key
* @data: the message data
@@ -500,11 +504,12 @@ void hmac_sha256_final(struct hmac_sha256_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
* If you're using the key only once, consider using hmac_sha256_usingrawkey().
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha256(const struct hmac_sha256_key *key,
- const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 out[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha256_usingrawkey() - Compute HMAC-SHA256 in one shot, using a raw key
* @raw_key: the raw HMAC-SHA256 key
* @raw_key_len: the key length in bytes. All key lengths are supported.
@@ -517,11 +522,11 @@ void hmac_sha256(const struct hmac_sha256_key *key,
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha256_usingrawkey(const u8 *raw_key, size_t raw_key_len,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
- u8 out[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ u8 out[at_least SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/* State for the SHA-512 (and SHA-384) compression function */
struct sha512_block_state {
u64 h[8];
};
@@ -596,21 +601,21 @@ static inline void sha384_update(struct sha384_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha384_final(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha384_final(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, u8 out[at_least SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* sha384() - Compute SHA-384 message digest in one shot
* @data: the message data
* @len: the data length in bytes
* @out: (output) the resulting SHA-384 message digest
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha384(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha384(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[at_least SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* struct hmac_sha384_key - Prepared key for HMAC-SHA384
* @key: private
*/
@@ -693,11 +698,12 @@ static inline void hmac_sha384_update(struct hmac_sha384_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void hmac_sha384_final(struct hmac_sha384_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void hmac_sha384_final(struct hmac_sha384_ctx *ctx,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha384() - Compute HMAC-SHA384 in one shot, using a prepared key
* @key: the prepared HMAC key
* @data: the message data
@@ -707,11 +713,12 @@ void hmac_sha384_final(struct hmac_sha384_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
* If you're using the key only once, consider using hmac_sha384_usingrawkey().
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha384(const struct hmac_sha384_key *key,
- const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 out[SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha384_usingrawkey() - Compute HMAC-SHA384 in one shot, using a raw key
* @raw_key: the raw HMAC-SHA384 key
* @raw_key_len: the key length in bytes. All key lengths are supported.
@@ -724,11 +731,11 @@ void hmac_sha384(const struct hmac_sha384_key *key,
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha384_usingrawkey(const u8 *raw_key, size_t raw_key_len,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
- u8 out[SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ u8 out[at_least SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* struct sha512_ctx - Context for hashing a message with SHA-512
* @ctx: private
*/
@@ -769,21 +776,21 @@ static inline void sha512_update(struct sha512_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha512_final(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha512_final(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, u8 out[at_least SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* sha512() - Compute SHA-512 message digest in one shot
* @data: the message data
* @len: the data length in bytes
* @out: (output) the resulting SHA-512 message digest
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void sha512(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void sha512(const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 out[at_least SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* struct hmac_sha512_key - Prepared key for HMAC-SHA512
* @key: private
*/
@@ -866,11 +873,12 @@ static inline void hmac_sha512_update(struct hmac_sha512_ctx *ctx,
*
* After finishing, this zeroizes @ctx. So the caller does not need to do it.
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
-void hmac_sha512_final(struct hmac_sha512_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+void hmac_sha512_final(struct hmac_sha512_ctx *ctx,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha512() - Compute HMAC-SHA512 in one shot, using a prepared key
* @key: the prepared HMAC key
* @data: the message data
@@ -880,11 +888,12 @@ void hmac_sha512_final(struct hmac_sha512_ctx *ctx, u8 out[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
* If you're using the key only once, consider using hmac_sha512_usingrawkey().
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha512(const struct hmac_sha512_key *key,
- const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 out[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 out[at_least SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
/**
* hmac_sha512_usingrawkey() - Compute HMAC-SHA512 in one shot, using a raw key
* @raw_key: the raw HMAC-SHA512 key
* @raw_key_len: the key length in bytes. All key lengths are supported.
@@ -897,8 +906,8 @@ void hmac_sha512(const struct hmac_sha512_key *key,
*
* Context: Any context.
*/
void hmac_sha512_usingrawkey(const u8 *raw_key, size_t raw_key_len,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
- u8 out[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ u8 out[at_least SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]);
#endif /* _CRYPTO_SHA2_H */
--
2.51.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2025-11-22 19:42 ` [PATCH 6/6] lib/crypto: sha2: " Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-22 21:00 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-23 4:00 ` Eric Biggers
` (2 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2025-11-22 21:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2025-11-22 21:00 ` [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Jason A. Donenfeld
@ 2025-11-23 4:00 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-23 5:16 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-23 8:31 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-23 20:31 ` Eric Biggers
9 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-23 4:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook, Linus Torvalds
On Sat, Nov 22, 2025 at 11:42:00AM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> This series depends on the 'at_least' macro added by
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251122025510.1625066-4-Jason@zx2c4.com
> It can also be retrieved from
>
> git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git more-at-least-decorations-v1
>
> Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
> parameters of more of the crypto library functions. This causes clang
> to generate a warning if a too-small array of known size is passed.
>
> Eric Biggers (6):
> lib/crypto: chacha: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
> lib/crypto: curve25519: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array
> params
> lib/crypto: md5: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
> lib/crypto: poly1305: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array
> params
> lib/crypto: sha1: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
> lib/crypto: sha2: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
>
> include/crypto/chacha.h | 12 ++++-----
> include/crypto/curve25519.h | 24 ++++++++++-------
> include/crypto/md5.h | 11 ++++----
> include/crypto/poly1305.h | 2 +-
> include/crypto/sha1.h | 12 +++++----
> include/crypto/sha2.h | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
It turns out this causes a build error when <crypto/poly1305.h>,
<crypto/sha1.h>, or <crypto/sha2.h> is included before
<linux/compiler.h>.
Jason's patch to <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h> is okay, because that one
indirectly includes <linux/compiler.h> by chance.
I thought <linux/compiler.h> already got included in everything via the
-include compiler flag. But it's actually <linux/compiler_types.h>
which works that way, not <linux/compiler.h> which is a regular header.
We can make these crypto headers include <linux/compiler.h>. But before
we do that, should we perhaps consider putting the definition of
'at_least' in <linux/compiler_types.h> instead of in <linux/compiler.h>,
so that it becomes always available? This is basically a core language
feature. Maybe it belongs next to the definition of __counted_by, which
is another definition related to array bounds?
- Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-23 4:00 ` Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-23 5:16 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-23 5:17 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2025-11-23 5:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook, Linus Torvalds
On Sat, Nov 22, 2025 at 08:00:37PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> We can make these crypto headers include <linux/compiler.h>. But before
> we do that, should we perhaps consider putting the definition of
> 'at_least' in <linux/compiler_types.h> instead of in <linux/compiler.h>,
> so that it becomes always available? This is basically a core language
> feature. Maybe it belongs next to the definition of __counted_by, which
> is another definition related to array bounds?
This is indeed exactly what should be done. Do you want me to make a v4
and you can rebase -next, or do you want to just fix this up on top?
Jason
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-23 5:16 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
@ 2025-11-23 5:17 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-23 5:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jason A. Donenfeld
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook, Linus Torvalds
On Sun, Nov 23, 2025 at 06:16:05AM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 22, 2025 at 08:00:37PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > We can make these crypto headers include <linux/compiler.h>. But before
> > we do that, should we perhaps consider putting the definition of
> > 'at_least' in <linux/compiler_types.h> instead of in <linux/compiler.h>,
> > so that it becomes always available? This is basically a core language
> > feature. Maybe it belongs next to the definition of __counted_by, which
> > is another definition related to array bounds?
>
> This is indeed exactly what should be done. Do you want me to make a v4
> and you can rebase -next, or do you want to just fix this up on top?
>
> Jason
Sending out v4 would be good. Thanks.
- Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2025-11-23 4:00 ` Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-23 8:31 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-23 20:35 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-23 20:31 ` Eric Biggers
9 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2025-11-23 8:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook
On Sat, 22 Nov 2025 at 20:42, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> This series depends on the 'at_least' macro added by
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251122025510.1625066-4-Jason@zx2c4.com
> It can also be retrieved from
>
> git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git more-at-least-decorations-v1
>
> Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
> parameters of more of the crypto library functions. This causes clang
> to generate a warning if a too-small array of known size is passed.
>
FTR GCC does so too.
> Eric Biggers (6):
> lib/crypto: chacha: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
> lib/crypto: curve25519: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array
> params
> lib/crypto: md5: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
> lib/crypto: poly1305: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array
> params
> lib/crypto: sha1: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
> lib/crypto: sha2: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> include/crypto/chacha.h | 12 ++++-----
> include/crypto/curve25519.h | 24 ++++++++++-------
> include/crypto/md5.h | 11 ++++----
> include/crypto/poly1305.h | 2 +-
> include/crypto/sha1.h | 12 +++++----
> include/crypto/sha2.h | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> 6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
>
>
> base-commit: 86d930bb1c19ec798fd432c5b8f25912373c98b2
> --
> 2.51.2
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-23 8:31 ` Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2025-11-23 20:35 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-23 20:38 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-23 20:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook
On Sun, Nov 23, 2025 at 09:31:19AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Sat, 22 Nov 2025 at 20:42, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > This series depends on the 'at_least' macro added by
> > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251122025510.1625066-4-Jason@zx2c4.com
> > It can also be retrieved from
> >
> > git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git more-at-least-decorations-v1
> >
> > Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
> > parameters of more of the crypto library functions. This causes clang
> > to generate a warning if a too-small array of known size is passed.
> >
>
> FTR GCC does so too.
See https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20251115021430.GA2148@sol/
Unfortunately gcc puts these warnings under -Wstringop-overflow which
the kernel disables, so we don't see them. clang works, though.
- Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-23 20:35 ` Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-23 20:38 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-23 20:54 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Jason A. Donenfeld @ 2025-11-23 20:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook
On Sun, Nov 23, 2025 at 9:37 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Nov 23, 2025 at 09:31:19AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Sat, 22 Nov 2025 at 20:42, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > This series depends on the 'at_least' macro added by
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251122025510.1625066-4-Jason@zx2c4.com
> > > It can also be retrieved from
> > >
> > > git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git more-at-least-decorations-v1
> > >
> > > Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
> > > parameters of more of the crypto library functions. This causes clang
> > > to generate a warning if a too-small array of known size is passed.
> > >
> >
> > FTR GCC does so too.
>
> See https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20251115021430.GA2148@sol/
> Unfortunately gcc puts these warnings under -Wstringop-overflow which
> the kernel disables, so we don't see them. clang works, though.
Is that disabling new? Look at the commit message in my chapoly
patch... The warning shown there happened from a real live kernel
build.
Jason
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-23 20:38 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
@ 2025-11-23 20:54 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-24 19:17 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-23 20:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jason A. Donenfeld
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook
On Sun, Nov 23, 2025 at 09:38:49PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 23, 2025 at 9:37 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Sun, Nov 23, 2025 at 09:31:19AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > On Sat, 22 Nov 2025 at 20:42, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > This series depends on the 'at_least' macro added by
> > > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251122025510.1625066-4-Jason@zx2c4.com
> > > > It can also be retrieved from
> > > >
> > > > git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git more-at-least-decorations-v1
> > > >
> > > > Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
> > > > parameters of more of the crypto library functions. This causes clang
> > > > to generate a warning if a too-small array of known size is passed.
> > > >
> > >
> > > FTR GCC does so too.
> >
> > See https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20251115021430.GA2148@sol/
> > Unfortunately gcc puts these warnings under -Wstringop-overflow which
> > the kernel disables, so we don't see them. clang works, though.
>
> Is that disabling new?
No.
> Look at the commit message in my chapoly patch... The warning shown
> there happened from a real live kernel build.
Oh, there's actually a difference between const and non-const
parameters. A const parameter gives -Wstringop-overread, while a
non-const one gives -Wstringop-overflow. Only the latter is disabled.
- Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-23 20:54 ` Eric Biggers
@ 2025-11-24 19:17 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2025-11-24 19:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-crypto, linux-kernel,
Herbert Xu, linux-hardening
On Sun, Nov 23, 2025 at 12:54:31PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Oh, there's actually a difference between const and non-const
> parameters. A const parameter gives -Wstringop-overread, while a
> non-const one gives -Wstringop-overflow. Only the latter is disabled.
FWIW, I'm hoping we can make the last bit of progress needed to get
-Warray-bounds and -Wstringop-overflow enabled globally after this
patch helps us track down any stragglers:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20251121184342.it.626-kees@kernel.org/
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations
2025-11-22 19:42 [PATCH 0/6] lib/crypto: More at_least decorations Eric Biggers
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2025-11-23 8:31 ` Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2025-11-23 20:31 ` Eric Biggers
9 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2025-11-23 20:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Cc: linux-kernel, Ard Biesheuvel, Jason A . Donenfeld, Herbert Xu,
linux-hardening, Kees Cook
On Sat, Nov 22, 2025 at 11:42:00AM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> This series depends on the 'at_least' macro added by
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251122025510.1625066-4-Jason@zx2c4.com
> It can also be retrieved from
>
> git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git more-at-least-decorations-v1
>
> Add the at_least (i.e. 'static') decoration to the fixed-size array
> parameters of more of the crypto library functions. This causes clang
> to generate a warning if a too-small array of known size is passed.
>
> Eric Biggers (6):
> lib/crypto: chacha: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
> lib/crypto: curve25519: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array
> params
> lib/crypto: md5: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
> lib/crypto: poly1305: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array
> params
> lib/crypto: sha1: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
> lib/crypto: sha2: Add at_least decoration to fixed-size array params
>
Applied this series to
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git/log/?h=libcrypto-next
The build errors should be gone now, since I rebased it on top of
Jason's v4 patch
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20251123054819.2371989-3-Jason@zx2c4.com/).
- Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread