From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>,
Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
"Tycho Andersen (AMD)" <tycho@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 2/7] x86/sev: Create snp_prepare()
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2026 10:12:56 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260324161301.1353976-3-tycho@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho@kernel.org>
From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" <tycho@kernel.org>
In preparation for delayed SNP initialization, create a function
snp_prepare() that does the necessary architecture setup.
Export this function for the ccp module to allow it to do the setup as
necessary.
Also move {mfd,snp}_enable out of the __init section, since these will be
called later.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 0e6c0940100f..2140e26dec6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -661,6 +661,7 @@ static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int pages)
{
__snp_leak_pages(pfn, pages, true);
}
+void snp_prepare(void);
#else
static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; }
@@ -677,6 +678,7 @@ static inline void __snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages, bool dump_rmp)
static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {}
+static inline void snp_prepare(void) {}
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 025606969823..6f4c3f6e2082 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages;
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt
-static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg)
+static void mfd_enable(void *arg)
{
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
return;
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg)
msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT);
}
-static __init void snp_enable(void *arg)
+static void snp_enable(void *arg)
{
u64 val;
@@ -503,6 +503,30 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void)
return true;
}
+void snp_prepare(void)
+{
+ u64 val;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
+ * kexec boot.
+ */
+ rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+ if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
+ return;
+
+ clear_rmp();
+
+ /*
+ * MtrrFixDramModEn is not shared between threads on a core,
+ * therefore it must be set on all CPUs prior to enabling SNP.
+ */
+ on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
+
+ on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_prepare, "ccp");
+
/*
* Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as
* described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP
@@ -510,8 +534,6 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void)
*/
int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
{
- u64 val;
-
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)))
return -ENOSYS;
@@ -521,22 +543,8 @@ int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
if (!setup_rmptable())
return -ENOSYS;
- /*
- * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
- * kexec boot.
- */
- rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
- if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
- goto skip_enable;
-
- clear_rmp();
-
- /* MtrrFixDramModEn must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */
- on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
-
- on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
+ snp_prepare();
-skip_enable:
/*
* Setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to 'true' to ensure that SNP panic
* notifier is invoked to do SNP IOMMU shutdown before kdump.
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-24 16:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-24 16:12 [PATCH v4 0/7] Move SNP initialization to the CCP driver Tycho Andersen
2026-03-24 16:12 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] x86/sev: Create a function to clear/zero the RMP Tycho Andersen
2026-03-24 16:12 ` Tycho Andersen [this message]
2026-03-24 16:12 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] x86/sev: Create snp_shutdown() Tycho Andersen
2026-03-24 16:12 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move SNP init to ccp driver Tycho Andersen
2026-03-24 16:12 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move HSAVE_PA setup to arch/x86/ Tycho Andersen
2026-03-24 16:13 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] crypto/ccp: Implement SNP x86 shutdown Tycho Andersen
2026-03-24 16:13 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] crypto/ccp: Update HV_FIXED page states to allow freeing of memory Tycho Andersen
2026-03-25 9:07 ` [PATCH v4 0/7] Move SNP initialization to the CCP driver Borislav Petkov
2026-03-25 15:25 ` Tycho Andersen
2026-03-28 11:38 ` Borislav Petkov
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