[PATCH v5 0/7] Move SNP initialization to the CCP driver

[PATCH v5 0/7] Move SNP initialization to the CCP driver

[Tycho Andersen]

From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" <tycho@kernel.org>

The sole change is to add a cpus_read_lock/unlock() to snp_prepare().

v4 is here: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho@kernel.org/

Thanks,

Tycho

Tom Lendacky (2):
  x86/sev: Create a function to clear/zero the RMP
  crypto/ccp: Update HV_FIXED page states to allow freeing of memory

Tycho Andersen (AMD) (5):
  x86/sev: Create snp_prepare()
  x86/sev: Create snp_shutdown()
  x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move SNP init to ccp driver
  x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move HSAVE_PA setup to arch/x86/
  crypto/ccp: Implement SNP x86 shutdown

 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h   |   4 ++
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c      | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c |  62 ++++++++++---------
 include/linux/psp-sev.h      |   5 +-
 4 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)


base-commit: 2ca26dad836fb4cd18694ef85af7a71d2878b239
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v5 1/7] x86/sev: Create a function to clear/zero the RMP

[Tycho Andersen]

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

In preparation for delayed SNP initialization and disablement on shutdown,
create a function, clear_rmp(), that clears the RMP bookkeeping area
and the RMP entries.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index e35fac0a8a3d..025606969823 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -242,6 +242,32 @@ void __init snp_fixup_e820_tables(void)
 	}
 }
 
+static void clear_rmp(void)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	u64 val;
+
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+		return;
+
+	/* Clearing the RMP while SNP is enabled will cause an exception */
+	rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN))
+		return;
+
+	memset(rmp_bookkeeping, 0, RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rst_max_index; i++) {
+		struct rmp_segment_desc *desc;
+
+		desc = rmp_segment_table[i];
+		if (!desc)
+			continue;
+
+		memset(desc->rmp_entry, 0, desc->size);
+	}
+}
+
 static bool __init alloc_rmp_segment_desc(u64 segment_pa, u64 segment_size, u64 pa)
 {
 	u64 rst_index, rmp_segment_size_max;
@@ -484,7 +510,6 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void)
  */
 int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
 {
-	unsigned int i;
 	u64 val;
 
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)))
@@ -504,19 +529,7 @@ int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
 	if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
 		goto skip_enable;
 
-	/* Zero out the RMP bookkeeping area */
-	memset(rmp_bookkeeping, 0, RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ);
-
-	/* Zero out the RMP entries */
-	for (i = 0; i < rst_max_index; i++) {
-		struct rmp_segment_desc *desc;
-
-		desc = rmp_segment_table[i];
-		if (!desc)
-			continue;
-
-		memset(desc->rmp_entry, 0, desc->size);
-	}
+	clear_rmp();
 
 	/* MtrrFixDramModEn must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */
 	on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v5 2/7] x86/sev: Create snp_prepare()

[Tycho Andersen]

From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" <tycho@kernel.org>

In preparation for delayed SNP initialization, create a function
snp_prepare() that does the necessary architecture setup.
Export this function for the ccp module to allow it to do the setup as
necessary.

Introduce a cpu_read_lock/unlock() wrapper around the MFDM and SNP enable.
While CPU hotplug is not supported, this makes sure that the bit setting
happens on the same set of CPUs in both cases. This improvement was
suggested by Sashiko:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org

Also move {mfd,snp}_enable out of the __init section, since these will be
called later.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c    | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 0e6c0940100f..2140e26dec6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -661,6 +661,7 @@ static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int pages)
 {
 	__snp_leak_pages(pfn, pages, true);
 }
+void snp_prepare(void);
 #else
 static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
 static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; }
@@ -677,6 +678,7 @@ static inline void __snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages, bool dump_rmp)
 static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
 static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
 static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {}
+static inline void snp_prepare(void) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 025606969823..ccec52952573 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages;
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SEV-SNP: " fmt
 
-static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg)
+static void mfd_enable(void *arg)
 {
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
 		return;
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg)
 	msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT);
 }
 
-static __init void snp_enable(void *arg)
+static void snp_enable(void *arg)
 {
 	u64 val;
 
@@ -503,6 +503,33 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
+void snp_prepare(void)
+{
+	u64 val;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
+	 * kexec boot.
+	 */
+	rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+	if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
+		return;
+
+	clear_rmp();
+
+	cpus_read_lock();
+
+	/*
+	 * MtrrFixDramModEn is not shared between threads on a core,
+	 * therefore it must be set on all CPUs prior to enabling SNP.
+	 */
+	on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
+	on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
+
+	cpus_read_unlock();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_prepare, "ccp");
+
 /*
  * Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as
  * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP
@@ -510,8 +537,6 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void)
  */
 int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
 {
-	u64 val;
-
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)))
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
@@ -521,22 +546,8 @@ int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
 	if (!setup_rmptable())
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
-	/*
-	 * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
-	 * kexec boot.
-	 */
-	rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
-	if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
-		goto skip_enable;
-
-	clear_rmp();
-
-	/* MtrrFixDramModEn must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */
-	on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
-
-	on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
+	snp_prepare();
 
-skip_enable:
 	/*
 	 * Setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to 'true' to ensure that SNP panic
 	 * notifier is invoked to do SNP IOMMU shutdown before kdump.
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v5 3/7] x86/sev: Create snp_shutdown()

[Tycho Andersen]

From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" <tycho@kernel.org>

After SNP_SHUTDOWN, two things should be done:

1. clear the RMP table
2. disable MFDM to prevent the FW_WARN in k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en() in
   the event of a kexec

Create and export to the CCP driver a function that does them.

Also change the MFDM helper to allow for disabling the bit, since the SNP
x86 shutdown path needs to disable MFDM. The comment for
k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en() notes, the "BIOS" is supposed clear it, or
the kernel in the case of module unload and shutdown followed by kexec.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c    | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 2140e26dec6c..09e605c85de4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int pages)
 	__snp_leak_pages(pfn, pages, true);
 }
 void snp_prepare(void);
+void snp_shutdown(void);
 #else
 static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
 static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; }
@@ -679,6 +680,7 @@ static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
 static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
 static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {}
 static inline void snp_prepare(void) {}
+static inline void snp_shutdown(void) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index ccec52952573..3b2273dca196 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -132,12 +132,15 @@ static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages;
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SEV-SNP: " fmt
 
-static void mfd_enable(void *arg)
+static void mfd_reconfigure(void *arg)
 {
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
 		return;
 
-	msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT);
+	if (arg)
+		msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT);
+	else
+		msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT);
 }
 
 static void snp_enable(void *arg)
@@ -523,13 +526,26 @@ void snp_prepare(void)
 	 * MtrrFixDramModEn is not shared between threads on a core,
 	 * therefore it must be set on all CPUs prior to enabling SNP.
 	 */
-	on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
+	on_each_cpu(mfd_reconfigure, (void *)1, 1);
 	on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
 
 	cpus_read_unlock();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_prepare, "ccp");
 
+void snp_shutdown(void)
+{
+	u64 syscfg;
+
+	rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, syscfg);
+	if (syscfg & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
+		return;
+
+	clear_rmp();
+	on_each_cpu(mfd_reconfigure, NULL, 1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
+
 /*
  * Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as
  * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v5 4/7] x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move SNP init to ccp driver

[Tycho Andersen]

From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" <tycho@kernel.org>

Use the new snp_prepare() to initialize SNP from the ccp driver instead of
at boot time. This means that SNP is not enabled unless it is really going
to be used (i.e. kvm_amd loads the ccp driver automatically).

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c      | 2 --
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 3b2273dca196..423fe77cc70f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -562,8 +562,6 @@ int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
 	if (!setup_rmptable())
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
-	snp_prepare();
-
 	/*
 	 * Setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to 'true' to ensure that SNP panic
 	 * notifier is invoked to do SNP IOMMU shutdown before kdump.
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index aebf4dad545e..4915b0125e8d 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -1373,6 +1373,8 @@ static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error, unsigned int max_snp_asid)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
+	snp_prepare();
+
 	/* SNP_INIT requires MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA to be cleared on all CPUs. */
 	on_each_cpu(snp_set_hsave_pa, NULL, 1);
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v5 5/7] x86/sev, crypto/ccp: Move HSAVE_PA setup to arch/x86/

[Tycho Andersen]

From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" <tycho@kernel.org>

Now that there is snp_prepare() that indicates when the CCP driver wants to
prepare the architecture for SNP_INIT(_EX), move this architecture-specific
bit of code to a more sensible place.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c      | 7 +++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 8 --------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 423fe77cc70f..e658f84acea1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -506,6 +506,11 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static void clear_hsave_pa(void *arg)
+{
+	wrmsrq(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, 0);
+}
+
 void snp_prepare(void)
 {
 	u64 val;
@@ -529,6 +534,8 @@ void snp_prepare(void)
 	on_each_cpu(mfd_reconfigure, (void *)1, 1);
 	on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
 
+	/* SNP_INIT requires MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA to be cleared on all CPUs. */
+	on_each_cpu(clear_hsave_pa, NULL, 1);
 	cpus_read_unlock();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_prepare, "ccp");
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 4915b0125e8d..47cb8fca4e6c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -1076,11 +1076,6 @@ static inline int __sev_do_init_locked(int *psp_ret)
 		return __sev_init_locked(psp_ret);
 }
 
-static void snp_set_hsave_pa(void *arg)
-{
-	wrmsrq(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, 0);
-}
-
 /* Hypervisor Fixed pages API interface */
 static void snp_hv_fixed_pages_state_update(struct sev_device *sev,
 					    enum snp_hv_fixed_pages_state page_state)
@@ -1375,9 +1370,6 @@ static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error, unsigned int max_snp_asid)
 
 	snp_prepare();
 
-	/* SNP_INIT requires MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA to be cleared on all CPUs. */
-	on_each_cpu(snp_set_hsave_pa, NULL, 1);
-
 	/*
 	 * Starting in SNP firmware v1.52, the SNP_INIT_EX command takes a list
 	 * of system physical address ranges to convert into HV-fixed page
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v5 6/7] crypto/ccp: Implement SNP x86 shutdown

[Tycho Andersen]

From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" <tycho@kernel.org>

The SEV firmware has support to disable SNP during an SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX
command. Verify that this support is available and set the flag so that SNP
is disabled when it is not being used. In cases where SNP is disabled, skip
the call to amd_iommu_snp_disable(), as all of the IOMMU pages have already
been made shared. Also skip the panic case, since snp_shutdown() does
IPIs.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 include/linux/psp-sev.h      |  5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 47cb8fca4e6c..366303ff6466 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -2039,6 +2039,8 @@ static int __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(int *error, bool panic)
 	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
 	data.len = sizeof(data);
 	data.iommu_snp_shutdown = 1;
+	if (sev->snp_feat_info_0.ecx & SNP_X86_SHUTDOWN_SUPPORTED)
+		data.x86_snp_shutdown = 1;
 
 	/*
 	 * If invoked during panic handling, local interrupts are disabled
@@ -2072,23 +2074,28 @@ static int __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(int *error, bool panic)
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX with IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN set to 1 disables SNP
-	 * enforcement by the IOMMU and also transitions all pages
-	 * associated with the IOMMU to the Reclaim state.
-	 * Firmware was transitioning the IOMMU pages to Hypervisor state
-	 * before version 1.53. But, accounting for the number of assigned
-	 * 4kB pages in a 2M page was done incorrectly by not transitioning
-	 * to the Reclaim state. This resulted in RMP #PF when later accessing
-	 * the 2M page containing those pages during kexec boot. Hence, the
-	 * firmware now transitions these pages to Reclaim state and hypervisor
-	 * needs to transition these pages to shared state. SNP Firmware
-	 * version 1.53 and above are needed for kexec boot.
-	 */
-	ret = amd_iommu_snp_disable();
-	if (ret) {
-		dev_err(sev->dev, "SNP IOMMU shutdown failed\n");
-		return ret;
+	if (data.x86_snp_shutdown) {
+		if (!panic)
+			snp_shutdown();
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX with IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN set to 1 disables SNP
+		 * enforcement by the IOMMU and also transitions all pages
+		 * associated with the IOMMU to the Reclaim state.
+		 * Firmware was transitioning the IOMMU pages to Hypervisor state
+		 * before version 1.53. But, accounting for the number of assigned
+		 * 4kB pages in a 2M page was done incorrectly by not transitioning
+		 * to the Reclaim state. This resulted in RMP #PF when later accessing
+		 * the 2M page containing those pages during kexec boot. Hence, the
+		 * firmware now transitions these pages to Reclaim state and hypervisor
+		 * needs to transition these pages to shared state. SNP Firmware
+		 * version 1.53 and above are needed for kexec boot.
+		 */
+		ret = amd_iommu_snp_disable();
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_err(sev->dev, "SNP IOMMU shutdown failed\n");
+			return ret;
+		}
 	}
 
 	snp_leak_hv_fixed_pages();
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
index 69ffa4b4d1fa..d5099a2baca5 100644
--- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -829,12 +829,14 @@ struct sev_data_range_list {
  *
  * @len: length of the command buffer read by the PSP
  * @iommu_snp_shutdown: Disable enforcement of SNP in the IOMMU
+ * @x86_snp_shutdown: Disable SNP on all cores
  * @rsvd1: reserved
  */
 struct sev_data_snp_shutdown_ex {
 	u32 len;
 	u32 iommu_snp_shutdown:1;
-	u32 rsvd1:31;
+	u32 x86_snp_shutdown:1;
+	u32 rsvd1:30;
 } __packed;
 
 /**
@@ -891,6 +893,7 @@ struct snp_feature_info {
 } __packed;
 
 /* Feature bits in ECX */
+#define SNP_X86_SHUTDOWN_SUPPORTED		BIT(1)
 #define SNP_RAPL_DISABLE_SUPPORTED		BIT(2)
 #define SNP_CIPHER_TEXT_HIDING_SUPPORTED	BIT(3)
 #define SNP_AES_256_XTS_POLICY_SUPPORTED	BIT(4)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH v5 7/7] crypto/ccp: Update HV_FIXED page states to allow freeing of memory

[Tycho Andersen]

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

After SNP is disabled, any pages allocated as HV_FIXED can now be freed.
Update the page state of these pages and the snp_leak_hv_fixed_pages()
function to free pages on SNP_SHUTDOWN.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 366303ff6466..939fa8aa155c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ static void snp_add_hv_fixed_pages(struct sev_device *sev, struct sev_data_range
 
 static void snp_leak_hv_fixed_pages(void)
 {
-	struct snp_hv_fixed_pages_entry *entry;
+	struct snp_hv_fixed_pages_entry *entry, *nentry;
 
 	/* List is protected by sev_cmd_mutex */
 	lockdep_assert_held(&sev_cmd_mutex);
@@ -1227,10 +1227,16 @@ static void snp_leak_hv_fixed_pages(void)
 	if (list_empty(&snp_hv_fixed_pages))
 		return;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(entry, &snp_hv_fixed_pages, list)
-		if (entry->page_state == HV_FIXED)
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, nentry, &snp_hv_fixed_pages, list) {
+		if (entry->free && entry->page_state != HV_FIXED)
+			__free_pages(entry->page, entry->order);
+		else
 			__snp_leak_pages(page_to_pfn(entry->page),
 					 1 << entry->order, false);
+
+		list_del(&entry->list);
+		kfree(entry);
+	}
 }
 
 bool sev_is_snp_ciphertext_hiding_supported(void)
@@ -2077,6 +2083,7 @@ static int __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(int *error, bool panic)
 	if (data.x86_snp_shutdown) {
 		if (!panic)
 			snp_shutdown();
+		snp_hv_fixed_pages_state_update(sev, ALLOCATED);
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX with IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN set to 1 disables SNP
-- 
2.53.0