From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1A5C43090C2 for ; Tue, 31 Mar 2026 01:12:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774919564; cv=none; b=oYnMMGWnkCshGt+EFOosbcnmx2TwDXWEXxgG81xwvTgyDNWrrDROs8qA64f6yfUVKAmCDpiLN0Q52Gw78HC6rrR9EtpD35iuXETUll8ehxo0CerDm/eRFIHE/m7JhIA54yeqNwTCGOiz38iMnflBOX3lcb0EJRGbERkcrmJ+EeA= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774919564; c=relaxed/simple; bh=iCfC32gPCOq3jfIEnZRFSUBxARxVZ4ChIy/597rHi84=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=eFdLwRy+476BiaM+4Eyaz1mhoD7KZQDzkUw5gUUzSmtidPRicGHKZ5hmJKyfT+u4tgjWhqMFWdL43vE2ohrA4vcAdpzH2HFI0jyLMBSrBbyYa1tFtYMuctyfkG5rv6A29bDNIa6BrtmlYIIUWkxIR2mxmbCDDTU199zK8Csim7w= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=WaZ2UQdK; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="WaZ2UQdK" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9165FC4CEF7; Tue, 31 Mar 2026 01:12:43 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1774919563; bh=iCfC32gPCOq3jfIEnZRFSUBxARxVZ4ChIy/597rHi84=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=WaZ2UQdK/SNt4rlJZJ2QJQnScNiPJJZPTE6s4sEv2QaN+SXcJiHKlIDYpbrgpaMzM WB9Us2Ejcc4+WWb+NDeusT/wSYGNDZbyakla24p2ZADDJ5sB5kDUE50oxQYqX3K28F 3vHcPNNFvoblgKyP4QKYYDW9BMUiRmvJ6ntWQytwShEWOA8zxJQ6ziF8HloS0igUsZ /v8VIww1IEHPKHj3nGfcRiL+xxkNWTz6y2XenMNkMbiVpW6bU9UN0BCzPGT9OVE5sx 7pBxRvKg7zNZjHbSczCTKJ438sprrcCZvHkCyyjxN0/eXpEEQ536d5UmymmQjQvDFW ql+h1lqba+mag== Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 18:11:33 -0700 From: Eric Biggers To: Ryan Appel Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, wireguard@lists.zx2c4.com, "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: Re: Kernel ML-KEM implementation plans Message-ID: <20260331011133.GB5190@sol> References: <20260331001358.GA5190@sol> <7507DE2E-1507-4D03-B6EF-9C139BBF34F8@gmail.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <7507DE2E-1507-4D03-B6EF-9C139BBF34F8@gmail.com> On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 07:44:55PM -0500, Ryan Appel wrote: > WireGuard was my big implementation user. Any more details on this? Googling for research papers shows that there have indeed been several proposals for quantum-resistant WireGuard. But some use algorithms other than ML-KEM. Others don't modify the kernel code but rather do the key establishment in userspace. I haven't looked into the details, but it also sounds like it's not as simple as swapping out the algorithm, either. I think step 1 is work out some plan with the WireGuard folks. Which may or may not turn out to involve in-kernel ML-KEM. > I also know that VMware uses the kernel crypto space for many of its > crypto operations. I do not know when they will want ML-KEM and if > they will want it only within BoringCrypto or OpenSSL, but if there is > need for it in the market before it can be developed then that makes > sense. That code isn't upstream though, right? So even if hypothetically they (will?) need ML-KEM in the kernel (for what?), that doesn't count for upstream purposes. - Eric