* [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys
[not found] <20260405231224.4008298-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
@ 2026-04-05 23:12 ` Stefan Berger
2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2026-04-05 23:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity, linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, zohar, roberto.sassu, ebiggers, Stefan Berger,
David Howells, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, keyrings,
linux-crypto
Remove the check for the hash_algo since ML-DSA is only used in pure mode
and there is no relevance of a hash_algo for the input data.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 09a0b83d5d77..df6918a77ab8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -147,11 +147,6 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa87") == 0) {
if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!hash_algo)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (strcmp(hash_algo, "none") != 0 &&
- strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0)
- return -EINVAL;
} else {
/* Unknown public key algorithm */
return -ENOPKG;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
@ 2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2026-04-06 16:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, zohar,
roberto.sassu, David Howells, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin,
keyrings, linux-crypto
On Sun, Apr 05, 2026 at 07:12:22PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> Remove the check for the hash_algo since ML-DSA is only used in pure mode
> and there is no relevance of a hash_algo for the input data.
>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win>
> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 5 -----
> 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 09a0b83d5d77..df6918a77ab8 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -147,11 +147,6 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
> strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa87") == 0) {
> if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - if (!hash_algo)
> - return -EINVAL;
> - if (strcmp(hash_algo, "none") != 0 &&
> - strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0)
> - return -EINVAL;
Does this broaden which hash algorithms are accepted for CMS signatures
that use ML-DSA and contain signed attributes?
- Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers
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