From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Aleksander Jan Bajkowski <olek2@wp.pl>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: crypto4xx - Remove insecure and unused rng_alg
Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 12:26:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260530192630.GB6807@quark> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5c74c261-53cf-4185-a8a0-7554bc9fe5f7@wp.pl>
On Sat, May 30, 2026 at 05:05:19PM +0200, Aleksander Jan Bajkowski wrote:
> Hi Eric,
>
> On 30/05/2026 00:04, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > Remove crypto4xx_rng, as it is insecure and unused:
> >
> > - It has only a 64-bit security strength, which is highly inadequate.
> > This can be seen by the fact that crypto4xx_hw_init() seeds it with
> > only 64 bits of entropy, and the fact that the original commit
> > mentions that it implements ANSI X9.17 Annex C.
>
> In addition to a seed, the PRNG also uses ring oscillators as sources of
> entropy. The entropy should be higher than 64b. This is the Rambus EIP-73d
> IP core. The same IP core is built into eip93 (EIP-73a), eip97 (EIP-73d),
> and eip197 (EIP-73d). You can find the documentation online. The complete
> "container" is actually Rambus EIP-94, and one of its parts is EIP-73d.
Just because it may have another source of entropy doesn't mean its
security strength is higher than 64 bits.
I cannot find any documentation other than
https://datasheet.octopart.com/PPC460EX-SUB800T-AMCC-datasheet-11553412.pdf
which says "ANSI X9.17 Annex C compliant using a DES algorithm".
DES actually has a 56-bit key, so maybe I was over-generous.
And according to https://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/hac/about/chap5.pdf ANSI
X9.17 has only a 64-bit state anyway. So even if we assume the
datasheet is incorrect and the algorithm is actually 3DES which has a
longer key, the state is likely still 64-bit.
So it isn't looking good. And since it's an undocumented proprietary
design it shouldn't be given the benefit of the doubt either.
> This PRNG is also used internally for Generation IV with IPSEC offload. The
> IPSEC offload implementation for eip93 was recently submitted to upstream.
> I am not sure whether eip94 shares some of the logic for IPSEC offload and
> it will be possible to use some of the code.
That's not related to this patch.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-30 19:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-29 22:04 [PATCH] crypto: crypto4xx - Remove insecure and unused rng_alg Eric Biggers
2026-05-30 10:20 ` Christian Lamparter
2026-05-30 19:12 ` Eric Biggers
2026-05-30 15:05 ` Aleksander Jan Bajkowski
2026-05-30 19:26 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2026-05-31 10:15 ` Aleksander Jan Bajkowski
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