Linux cryptographic layer development
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From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
To: Thara Gopinath <thara.gopinath@gmail.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Stanimir Varbanov <svarbanov@mm-sol.com>,
	Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>,
	Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, brgl@kernel.org,
	Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 8/8] crypto: qce - Use fallback for CCM with a fragmented payload
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 17:49:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260617-qce-fix-self-tests-v3-8-ecc2b4dedcfd@oss.qualcomm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260617-qce-fix-self-tests-v3-0-ecc2b4dedcfd@oss.qualcomm.com>

The crypto engine reliably processes CCM only when the message payload
is a single contiguous buffer. The associated data is already linearized
into a bounce buffer before being submitted, but when the payload itself
is split across multiple scatterlist entries the engine stalls waiting
for input and the request fails with a hardware operation error. This
was uncovered by the crypto self-tests, which feed the algorithms
randomly fragmented buffers.

Detect a payload that spans more than one scatterlist entry (in either
the source or the destination, skipping past the associated data) and
route the request to the software fallback.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9363efb4181c ("crypto: qce - Add support for AEAD algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
index 4fa018204cb628c112f64c45ff6c7407df73b945..9ff8fe2a7efcd2734e4ff029744961a7b1101013 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -498,7 +498,8 @@ static int qce_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int encrypt)
 	struct qce_aead_reqctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx_dma(req);
 	struct qce_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
 	struct qce_alg_template *tmpl = to_aead_tmpl(tfm);
-	unsigned int blocksize = crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm);
+	unsigned int blocksize = crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm), authsize;
+	struct scatterlist __sg[2], *msg_sg;
 
 	rctx->flags  = tmpl->alg_flags;
 	rctx->flags |= encrypt ? QCE_ENCRYPT : QCE_DECRYPT;
@@ -522,6 +523,27 @@ static int qce_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int encrypt)
 	if (IS_CCM(rctx->flags) && !IS_ALIGNED(rctx->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
 		ctx->need_fallback = true;
 
+	/*
+	 * The CE reliably processes CCM only when the message payload is a
+	 * single contiguous buffer. The associated data is linearized into a
+	 * bounce buffer before being handed to the engine, but a fragmented
+	 * payload makes the engine stall waiting for input, so route those
+	 * requests to the fallback.
+	 */
+	if (IS_CCM(rctx->flags) && rctx->cryptlen) {
+		authsize = ctx->authsize;
+
+		msg_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(__sg, req->src, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg_nents_for_len(msg_sg, rctx->cryptlen +
+				     (encrypt ? 0 : authsize)) > 1)
+			ctx->need_fallback = true;
+
+		msg_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(__sg, req->dst, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg_nents_for_len(msg_sg, rctx->cryptlen +
+				     (encrypt ? authsize : 0)) > 1)
+			ctx->need_fallback = true;
+	}
+
 	/* If fallback is needed, schedule and exit */
 	if (ctx->need_fallback) {
 		/* Reset need_fallback in case the same ctx is used for another transaction */

-- 
2.47.3


      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-17 15:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-17 15:49 [PATCH v3 0/8] crypto: qce - Fix crypto self-test failures Bartosz Golaszewski
2026-06-17 15:49 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms Bartosz Golaszewski
2026-06-17 16:05   ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-17 15:49 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] crypto: qce - Fix HMAC self-test failures for empty messages Bartosz Golaszewski
2026-06-17 15:49 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] crypto: qce - Reject empty messages for AES-XTS Bartosz Golaszewski
2026-06-17 15:49 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] crypto: qce - Fix CTR-AES for partial block requests Bartosz Golaszewski
2026-06-17 15:49 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] crypto: qce - Use a fallback for AES-CTR with a partial final block Bartosz Golaszewski
2026-06-17 15:49 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] crypto: qce - Fix xts-aes-qce for weak keys Bartosz Golaszewski
2026-06-17 15:49 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] crypto: qce - Use a fallback for CCM with a partial final block Bartosz Golaszewski
2026-06-17 15:49 ` Bartosz Golaszewski [this message]

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