From: Leonid Ravich <lravich@amazon.com>
To: <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <dm-devel@lists.linux.dev>
Cc: <linux-block@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <davem@davemloft.net>,
<ebiggers@kernel.org>, <snitzer@kernel.org>,
<mpatocka@redhat.com>, <axboe@kernel.dk>
Subject: [PATCH v5 3/5] crypto: testmgr - test dun() dispatch
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 08:34:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260630083431.2772-4-lravich@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260630083431.2772-1-lravich@amazon.com>
For every ivsize-16 skcipher, wrap it in both a dun(<inner>,le) and a
dun(<inner>,be) instance and cross-check each batched output against an
independent N x single-DU reference run directly on the inner tfm (both
keyed with one random key, the reference counter walked in the matching
endianness), over a deliberately fragmented scatterlist whose entries do
not align to the data-unit size. The two must produce byte-identical
ciphertext; the batched ciphertext is then round-tripped and the caller
IV checked unchanged. Testing both endiannesses exercises the be path
independently of any in-tree consumer. Algorithms with no dun wrapper
(ivsize != 16) are skipped; a genuine mismatch returns -EBADMSG.
Signed-off-by: Leonid Ravich <lravich@amazon.com>
---
crypto/testmgr.c | 289 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 289 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 4d86efae65b2..cd9246f432de 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -3211,6 +3211,291 @@ static int test_skcipher(int enc, const struct cipher_test_suite *suite,
return 0;
}
+/* Upper bound on the IVs the dun() template accepts (16: xts; 32: Adiantum). */
+#define TEST_MDU_MAX_IVSIZE 32
+
+/*
+ * Increment an @ivsize-byte IV as a wide counter. Byte-wise with carry --
+ * deliberately independent of crypto/dun.c's per-limb walk, so the two only
+ * agree if the carry is right. LE: byte 0 least significant; BE: last byte.
+ */
+static void test_mdu_iv_inc(u8 *iv, unsigned int ivsize, bool big_endian)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (big_endian) {
+ for (i = ivsize - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ if (++iv[i])
+ break;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)ivsize; i++)
+ if (++iv[i])
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Seed @iv so the low 64-bit limb is all-ones but its least-significant byte:
+ * the 2nd increment wraps the limb and carries into the next. LE limb is
+ * bytes [0,8); BE limb is the last 8 bytes. Bytes outside keep their value.
+ */
+static void test_mdu_iv_boundary(u8 *iv, unsigned int ivsize, bool big_endian)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (big_endian) {
+ for (i = ivsize - 8; i < ivsize; i++)
+ iv[i] = 0xff;
+ iv[ivsize - 1] = 0xfe;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ iv[i] = 0xff;
+ iv[0] = 0xfe;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Encrypt one du_size block with a plain single-DU request (the reference). */
+static int test_mdu_ref_encrypt(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in,
+ u8 *out, unsigned int du_size, const u8 *iv,
+ unsigned int ivsize)
+{
+ struct skcipher_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist sg_in;
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+ u8 ivbuf[TEST_MDU_MAX_IVSIZE];
+ int err;
+
+ req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(ivbuf, iv, ivsize);
+ memcpy(out, in, du_size);
+ sg_init_one(&sg_in, out, du_size);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg_in, &sg_in, du_size, ivbuf);
+ err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+ skcipher_request_free(req);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build an SG over @buf with du_size-unaligned entries, so the splitter's
+ * per-DU views cross SG entries and exercise the scatter_walk cursor.
+ */
+static void test_mdu_sg_fragment(struct scatterlist *sg, unsigned int nents,
+ u8 *buf, unsigned int total)
+{
+ unsigned int chunk = total / nents;
+ unsigned int off = 0, i;
+
+ sg_init_table(sg, nents);
+ for (i = 0; i < nents; i++) {
+ unsigned int len = (i == nents - 1) ? total - off : chunk;
+
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[i], buf + off, len);
+ off += len;
+ }
+}
+
+#define TEST_MDU_NR_UNITS 4
+#define TEST_MDU_NR_FRAGS 5
+/*
+ * Verify batched dispatch on @mdu (a dun(<inner>,<endian>) tfm) is byte-equal
+ * to an independent N x single-DU reference on @inner with @big_endian-walked
+ * IVs, over a fragmented SG, then round-trips. Both tfms must share a key.
+ * @iv_orig is the ivsize-byte starting IV (the caller varies it to exercise
+ * both a random IV and one seeded to cross a carry boundary).
+ */
+static int test_skcipher_multi_du_one(struct crypto_skcipher *mdu,
+ struct crypto_skcipher *inner,
+ unsigned int du_size, bool big_endian,
+ const u8 *iv_orig)
+{
+ const char *driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(mdu);
+ const unsigned int total = du_size * TEST_MDU_NR_UNITS;
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(mdu);
+ struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
+ struct scatterlist sg[TEST_MDU_NR_FRAGS];
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+ u8 iv_work[TEST_MDU_MAX_IVSIZE], iv_ref[TEST_MDU_MAX_IVSIZE];
+ u8 *plain = NULL, *buf = NULL, *ref = NULL;
+ unsigned int u;
+ int err;
+
+ plain = kmalloc(total, GFP_KERNEL);
+ buf = kmalloc(total, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ref = kmalloc(total, GFP_KERNEL);
+ req = skcipher_request_alloc(mdu, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!plain || !buf || !ref || !req) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ get_random_bytes(plain, total);
+
+ /* Reference: per-DU single requests on the inner tfm, counter-walked IVs. */
+ memcpy(iv_ref, iv_orig, ivsize);
+ for (u = 0; u < TEST_MDU_NR_UNITS; u++) {
+ err = test_mdu_ref_encrypt(inner, plain + u * du_size,
+ ref + u * du_size, du_size, iv_ref,
+ ivsize);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s multi-DU ref encrypt failed (du=%u): %d\n",
+ driver, du_size, err);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ test_mdu_iv_inc(iv_ref, ivsize, big_endian);
+ }
+
+ /* Batched: one request over a fragmented SG. */
+ memcpy(buf, plain, total);
+ memcpy(iv_work, iv_orig, ivsize);
+ test_mdu_sg_fragment(sg, TEST_MDU_NR_FRAGS, buf, total);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, total, iv_work);
+ skcipher_request_set_data_unit_size(req, du_size);
+ err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s multi-DU encrypt failed (du=%u): %d\n",
+ driver, du_size, err);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (memcmp(buf, ref, total) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s multi-DU ciphertext differs from single-DU reference (du=%u)\n",
+ driver, du_size);
+ err = -EBADMSG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* req->iv must be unchanged after multi-DU dispatch. */
+ if (memcmp(iv_work, iv_orig, ivsize) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s multi-DU encrypt mutated caller IV (du=%u)\n",
+ driver, du_size);
+ err = -EBADMSG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Round-trip the batched ciphertext back to plaintext. */
+ test_mdu_sg_fragment(sg, TEST_MDU_NR_FRAGS, buf, total);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, total, iv_work);
+ skcipher_request_set_data_unit_size(req, du_size);
+ err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s multi-DU decrypt failed (du=%u): %d\n",
+ driver, du_size, err);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (memcmp(buf, plain, total) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s multi-DU round-trip mismatch (du=%u)\n",
+ driver, du_size);
+ err = -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+out:
+ skcipher_request_free(req);
+ kfree(ref);
+ kfree(buf);
+ kfree(plain);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cross-check the dun(<inner>,@endian) wrapper against @tfm over all du sizes.
+ * Returns 0 on success or skip (no wrapper / rejected key); -EBADMSG on a real
+ * mismatch.
+ */
+static int test_skcipher_multi_du_endian(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
+ const char *alg_name,
+ const char *endian, bool big_endian,
+ const u8 *keybuf, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ static const unsigned int du_sizes[] = { 512, 1024, 2048, 4096 };
+ char mdu_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_skcipher *mdu;
+ unsigned int ivsize;
+ u8 iv[TEST_MDU_MAX_IVSIZE];
+ unsigned int j;
+ int err;
+
+ if (snprintf(mdu_name, sizeof(mdu_name), "dun(%s,%s)", alg_name,
+ endian) >= (int)sizeof(mdu_name))
+ return 0;
+
+ mdu = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mdu_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(mdu)) {
+ /* No dun wrapper (ivsize not a multiple of 8, or too wide): skip. */
+ if (PTR_ERR(mdu) == -ENOENT || PTR_ERR(mdu) == -EINVAL)
+ return 0;
+ return PTR_ERR(mdu);
+ }
+
+ ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(mdu);
+ if (ivsize > TEST_MDU_MAX_IVSIZE) {
+ err = 0; /* wider than we have buffers for: skip */
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(mdu, keybuf, keylen);
+ if (err) {
+ err = 0; /* weak/rejected key (e.g. XTS equal halves): skip */
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(du_sizes); j++) {
+ /* A random starting IV. */
+ get_random_bytes(iv, ivsize);
+ err = test_skcipher_multi_du_one(mdu, tfm, du_sizes[j],
+ big_endian, iv);
+ if (err)
+ break;
+ /* And one seeded to carry across a 64-bit limb / byte run. */
+ get_random_bytes(iv, ivsize);
+ test_mdu_iv_boundary(iv, ivsize, big_endian);
+ err = test_skcipher_multi_du_one(mdu, tfm, du_sizes[j],
+ big_endian, iv);
+ if (err)
+ break;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+out:
+ crypto_free_skcipher(mdu);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cross-check dun() dispatch against a single-DU reference, in both le and be,
+ * for every ivsize the template accepts (16: xts; 32: Adiantum).
+ */
+static int test_skcipher_multi_du(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+ const char *alg_name = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+ u8 keybuf[128];
+ unsigned int keylen;
+ int err;
+
+ /* Key the inner tfm; each dun() wrapper is keyed identically below. */
+ keylen = crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm);
+ if (keylen > sizeof(keybuf))
+ return 0; /* unusually large key; skip rather than overflow */
+ get_random_bytes(keybuf, keylen);
+ err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, keybuf, keylen);
+ if (err)
+ return 0; /* weak/rejected key (e.g. XTS equal halves): skip */
+
+ err = test_skcipher_multi_du_endian(tfm, alg_name, "le", false,
+ keybuf, keylen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ return test_skcipher_multi_du_endian(tfm, alg_name, "be", true,
+ keybuf, keylen);
+}
+
static int alg_test_skcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
@@ -3259,6 +3544,10 @@ static int alg_test_skcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
if (err)
goto out;
+ err = test_skcipher_multi_du(tfm);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
err = test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(desc->generic_driver, req, tsgls);
out:
free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls);
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-30 8:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-30 8:34 [PATCH v5 0/5] crypto: skcipher - multi-data-unit dispatch as a template Leonid Ravich
2026-06-30 8:34 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] crypto: skcipher - add per-request data_unit_size Leonid Ravich
2026-06-30 8:34 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] crypto: dun - data-unit-number dispatch template Leonid Ravich
2026-06-30 8:34 ` Leonid Ravich [this message]
2026-06-30 8:34 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] dm crypt: batch a bio segment's sectors via dun() Leonid Ravich
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