From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2] crypto: stdrng - Mitigate FIPS RNG failures
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 19:37:11 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261106193711.3844890-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
If the kernel is booted with fips=1 and jitterentropy fails its health
check, crypto_stdrng_get_bytes() can return an error and leave its
output buffer uninitialized.
While the fallibility of the FIPS RNG is by design, leaving the output
buffer uninitialized lacks practical defense-in-depth, as callers can
forget to check the error code. For example, the TPM2 driver didn't
check the error code from ECDH private key generation
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261025211119.138277-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/).
Thus, fips=1 mode (ironically) caused a vulnerability.
Mitigate such bugs by filling the buffer with get_random_bytes_wait() in
case of failure. This helps in practice. (For FIPS certifiability it
makes no difference, as no "approved" entropy is claimed on failure.)
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
v2: Resending this because Sashiko failed to apply it earlier, despite
my use of prerequisite-patch-id. Its prerequisites are merged now,
so Sashiko should review it now. I also added Jarkko's Reviewed-by.
This applies to cryptodev/master 82e91fe19fb8
crypto/drbg.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index faa39045bdc6b..f3fed6ded5b5f 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -561,10 +561,20 @@ int __crypto_stdrng_get_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
err = crypto_get_default_rng();
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto out;
err = crypto_drbg_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, buf, len, NULL, 0);
crypto_put_default_rng();
+
+out:
+ /*
+ * On failure, fill the buffer using the normal Linux RNG rather than
+ * leave it uninitialized. This provides practical defense-in-depth for
+ * callers that forget to check the error code. (It makes no difference
+ * for FIPS certifications; no entropy is claimed on failure anyway.)
+ */
+ if (err)
+ get_random_bytes_wait(buf, len);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__crypto_stdrng_get_bytes);
base-commit: 82e91fe19fb838f235f7c8829afc1eb389c93bdf
--
2.56.0.455.g6c5a503b38-goog
reply other threads:[~2026-11-06 19:37 UTC|newest]
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