From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 99897C433EF for ; Sun, 6 Feb 2022 16:08:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236254AbiBFQIa (ORCPT ); Sun, 6 Feb 2022 11:08:30 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36018 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231915AbiBFQIa (ORCPT ); Sun, 6 Feb 2022 11:08:30 -0500 X-Greylist: delayed 178 seconds by postgrey-1.37 at lindbergh.monkeyblade.net; Sun, 06 Feb 2022 08:08:28 PST Received: from mo4-p00-ob.smtp.rzone.de (mo4-p00-ob.smtp.rzone.de [85.215.255.23]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F1476C06173B for ; Sun, 6 Feb 2022 08:08:28 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1644163343; s=strato-dkim-0002; d=chronox.de; h=References:In-Reply-To:Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Cc:Date: From:Subject:Sender; bh=ajoLvXOqNUsQDqmDZKsWT4JQr84dpEvj/4vqEVhVNZQ=; b=FFwpIsca12VqssxpQD5wcww02Xywkw82X+hgU1cY+IvKW9QgfDtvD0UJqYUN7RoD0s Db5vozmgtt9diDru2HA4LqUdCGDTbtElqKxR+mT4pWlsiPULAcAl+vRrbJPf3Y7AN3Re UYAFfLgNpQp0rALhgaqq352iUYMhCo5ZV+S6Vr4EsmAKxptfKFuW9RAjPZyHlhp78fUl qB6HoBigNqCyhdYdgmyv4x72Slvy7nOJo+KDCebYMO+C/WBUj4ZhGQ5JhmlghCGy+XxQ 0g5Xvg2jNrVrXr6Y3gdMSTxaILHioKilwd1LE2ctFprQ/sqCgl5Us64glgKYhzYLbH5p oFbA== Authentication-Results: strato.com; dkim=none X-RZG-AUTH: ":P2ERcEykfu11Y98lp/T7+hdri+uKZK8TKWEqNyiHySGSa9k9xmwdNnzGHXvcOeibdLc=" X-RZG-CLASS-ID: mo00 Received: from tauon.chronox.de by smtp.strato.de (RZmta 47.39.0 DYNA|AUTH) with ESMTPSA id z28df7y16G2MNjO (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate); Sun, 6 Feb 2022 17:02:22 +0100 (CET) From: Stephan Mueller To: Eric Biggers , Herbert Xu Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, simo@redhat.com, Nicolai Stange Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Common entropy source and DRNG management Date: Sun, 06 Feb 2022 17:02:21 +0100 Message-ID: <2092435.IRzVExRRsL@tauon.chronox.de> In-Reply-To: References: <2486550.t9SDvczpPo@positron.chronox.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Am Samstag, 5. Februar 2022, 04:50:48 CET schrieb Herbert Xu: Hi Herbert, > On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 10:51:00AM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > The extraction of the entropy source and DRNG management into its own > > > component separates out the security sensitive implementation currently > > > found in multiple locations following the strategy found in the crypto > > > API where each moving part is separated and encapsulated. > > > > > > The current implementation of the ESDM allows an easy addition of new > > > entropy sources which are properly encapsulated in self-contained code > > > allowing self- contained entropy analyses to be performed for each. > > > These entropy sources would provide their seed data completely separate > > > from other entropy sources to the DRNG preventing any mutual > > > entanglement and thus challenges in the entropy assessment. I have > > > additional entropy sources already available that I would like to > > > contribute at a later stage. These entropy sources can be enabled, > > > disabled or its entropy rate set as needed by vendors depending on > > > their entropy source analysis. Proper default values would be used for > > > the common case where a vendor does not want to perform its own > > > analysis or a distro which want to provide a common kernel binary for > > > many users.> > > What is the actual point of this? The NIST DRBGs are already seeded from > > random.c, which is sufficient by itself but doesn't play well with > > certifications, and from Jitterentropy which the certification side is > > happy with. And the NIST DRBGs are only present for certification > > purposes anyway; all real users use random.c instead. So what problem > > still needs to be solved? > Indeed. Stephan, could you please explain exactly what additional > seeding sources are needed over the current jitter+/dev/random sources > (and why). Or even better, add those seeding sources that we must have > in your patch series so that they can be evaluated together. > > As it stands this patch series seems to be adding a lot of code without > any uses. Thank you for the clarification. I will provide that information. > > Thanks, Ciao Stephan