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To: "Kalra, Ashish" , tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com, peterz@infradead.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, ardb@kernel.org Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, aik@amd.com, Michael.Roth@amd.com, KPrateek.Nayak@amd.com, Tycho.Andersen@amd.com, Nathan.Fontenot@amd.com, jackyli@google.com, pgonda@google.com, rientjes@google.com, jacobhxu@google.com, xin@zytor.com, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, babu.moger@amd.com, dyoung@redhat.com, nikunj@amd.com, john.allen@amd.com, darwi@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev References: <9c77e206-442d-4891-bb29-295bc8bffe20@intel.com> <65986f9e-59e8-4f1c-aaa7-1edf45af24d8@amd.com> <31b42ba3-dd0c-42e7-ad1e-800c5cd2bcf8@intel.com> From: Dave Hansen Content-Language: en-US Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzUVEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gKEludGVsIFdvcmsgQWRkcmVzcykgPGRhdmUuaGFuc2VuQGludGVs LmNvbT7CwXgEEwECACIFAlQ+9J0CGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEGg1 lTBwyZKwLZUP/0dnbhDc229u2u6WtK1s1cSd9WsflGXGagkR6liJ4um3XCfYWDHvIdkHYC1t MNcVHFBwmQkawxsYvgO8kXT3SaFZe4ISfB4K4CL2qp4JO+nJdlFUbZI7cz/Td9z8nHjMcWYF IQuTsWOLs/LBMTs+ANumibtw6UkiGVD3dfHJAOPNApjVr+M0P/lVmTeP8w0uVcd2syiaU5jB aht9CYATn+ytFGWZnBEEQFnqcibIaOrmoBLu2b3fKJEd8Jp7NHDSIdrvrMjYynmc6sZKUqH2 I1qOevaa8jUg7wlLJAWGfIqnu85kkqrVOkbNbk4TPub7VOqA6qG5GCNEIv6ZY7HLYd/vAkVY E8Plzq/NwLAuOWxvGrOl7OPuwVeR4hBDfcrNb990MFPpjGgACzAZyjdmYoMu8j3/MAEW4P0z F5+EYJAOZ+z212y1pchNNauehORXgjrNKsZwxwKpPY9qb84E3O9KYpwfATsqOoQ6tTgr+1BR CCwP712H+E9U5HJ0iibN/CDZFVPL1bRerHziuwuQuvE0qWg0+0SChFe9oq0KAwEkVs6ZDMB2 P16MieEEQ6StQRlvy2YBv80L1TMl3T90Bo1UUn6ARXEpcbFE0/aORH/jEXcRteb+vuik5UGY 5TsyLYdPur3TXm7XDBdmmyQVJjnJKYK9AQxj95KlXLVO38lczsFNBFRjzmoBEACyAxbvUEhd GDGNg0JhDdezyTdN8C9BFsdxyTLnSH31NRiyp1QtuxvcqGZjb2trDVuCbIzRrgMZLVgo3upr MIOx1CXEgmn23Zhh0EpdVHM8IKx9Z7V0r+rrpRWFE8/wQZngKYVi49PGoZj50ZEifEJ5qn/H Nsp2+Y+bTUjDdgWMATg9DiFMyv8fvoqgNsNyrrZTnSgoLzdxr89FGHZCoSoAK8gfgFHuO54B lI8QOfPDG9WDPJ66HCodjTlBEr/Cwq6GruxS5i2Y33YVqxvFvDa1tUtl+iJ2SWKS9kCai2DR 3BwVONJEYSDQaven/EHMlY1q8Vln3lGPsS11vSUK3QcNJjmrgYxH5KsVsf6PNRj9mp8Z1kIG qjRx08+nnyStWC0gZH6NrYyS9rpqH3j+hA2WcI7De51L4Rv9pFwzp161mvtc6eC/GxaiUGuH BNAVP0PY0fqvIC68p3rLIAW3f97uv4ce2RSQ7LbsPsimOeCo/5vgS6YQsj83E+AipPr09Caj 0hloj+hFoqiticNpmsxdWKoOsV0PftcQvBCCYuhKbZV9s5hjt9qn8CE86A5g5KqDf83Fxqm/ vXKgHNFHE5zgXGZnrmaf6resQzbvJHO0Fb0CcIohzrpPaL3YepcLDoCCgElGMGQjdCcSQ+Ci FCRl0Bvyj1YZUql+ZkptgGjikQARAQABwsFfBBgBAgAJBQJUY85qAhsMAAoJEGg1lTBwyZKw l4IQAIKHs/9po4spZDFyfDjunimEhVHqlUt7ggR1Hsl/tkvTSze8pI1P6dGp2XW6AnH1iayn yRcoyT0ZJ+Zmm4xAH1zqKjWplzqdb/dO28qk0bPso8+1oPO8oDhLm1+tY+cOvufXkBTm+whm +AyNTjaCRt6aSMnA/QHVGSJ8grrTJCoACVNhnXg/R0g90g8iV8Q+IBZyDkG0tBThaDdw1B2l asInUTeb9EiVfL/Zjdg5VWiF9LL7iS+9hTeVdR09vThQ/DhVbCNxVk+DtyBHsjOKifrVsYep WpRGBIAu3bK8eXtyvrw1igWTNs2wazJ71+0z2jMzbclKAyRHKU9JdN6Hkkgr2nPb561yjcB8 sIq1pFXKyO+nKy6SZYxOvHxCcjk2fkw6UmPU6/j/nQlj2lfOAgNVKuDLothIxzi8pndB8Jju KktE5HJqUUMXePkAYIxEQ0mMc8Po7tuXdejgPMwgP7x65xtfEqI0RuzbUioFltsp1jUaRwQZ MTsCeQDdjpgHsj+P2ZDeEKCbma4m6Ez/YWs4+zDm1X8uZDkZcfQlD9NldbKDJEXLIjYWo1PH hYepSffIWPyvBMBTW2W5FRjJ4vLRrJSUoEfJuPQ3vW9Y73foyo/qFoURHO48AinGPZ7PC7TF vUaNOTjKedrqHkaOcqB185ahG2had0xnFsDPlx5y In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 2/18/26 09:03, Kalra, Ashish wrote: >> They are known not to contain any SEV-SNP guest memory at the >> moment snp_rmptable_init() finishes, no? > Yes, but RMP checks are still performed and they affect performance. > > Testing a bit in the per‑CPU RMPOPT table to avoid RMP checks > significantly improves performance. Sorry, Ashish, I don't think I'm explaining myself very well. Let me try again, please. First, my goal here is to ensure that the system has a whole has good performance, with minimal kernel code, and in the most common configurations. I would wager that the most common SEV-SNP configuration in the whole world is a system that has booted, enabled SEV-SNP, and has never run an SEV-SNP guest. If it's not *the* most common, it's certainly going to be common enough to care about deeply. Do you agree? If you agree, I hope we can also agree that a "SNP enabled but never ran a guest" state is deserving of good performance with minimal kernel code. My assumption (which is maybe a bad one) is that there is a natural point when SEV-SNP is enabled on the system when the system as a whole can easily assert that no SEV-SNP guest has ever run. I'm assuming that there is *a* point where, for instance, the RMP table gets atomically flipped from being unprotected to being protected. At that point, its state *must* be known. It must also be naturally obvious that no guest has had a chance to run at this point. If that point can be leveraged, and the RMPOPT optimization can be applied at SEV-SNP enabled time, then an important SEV-SNP configuration would be optimized by default and with zero or little kernel code needed to drive it. To me, that seems like a valuable goal. Do you agree?