From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1.3 4/4] keys: add new key-type encrypted
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2010 21:23:33 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <27900.1289597013@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1289595738.2731.80.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > Why do you allow the master key to be supplied by a user-defined key rather
> > than requiring a trusted-key unconditionally?
>
> This is for systems without a TPM. The logic needs to exist, whether it
> is here or in EVM. By doing it here, a user could provide a passphrase
> in the initramfs, which is used to decrypt the encrypted key.
I thought that might be the case. In which case, it might be better to allow
someone to add a trusted key, supplying both encrypted and unencrypted
versions of the data so that the TPM need not be consulted. You might want to
mark such a key so that it can be seen when it is dumped.
But if you're going to use a user-defined key, you really need to prefix the
description with something suitable.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-11-12 21:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-11-10 15:51 [PATCH v1.3 0/4] keys: trusted and encrypted keys Mimi Zohar
2010-11-10 15:51 ` [PATCH v1.3 1/4] lib: hex2bin converts ascii hexadecimal string to binary Mimi Zohar
2010-11-11 19:48 ` David Howells
2010-11-11 22:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-11-10 15:51 ` [PATCH v1.3 2/4] key: add tpm_send command Mimi Zohar
2010-11-11 19:48 ` David Howells
2010-11-11 22:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-11-12 14:11 ` David Howells
2010-11-12 14:48 ` David Safford
2010-11-12 21:24 ` Rajiv Andrade
2010-11-12 22:06 ` David Safford
2010-11-12 22:11 ` David Howells
2010-11-17 13:12 ` Rajiv Andrade
2010-11-10 15:51 ` [PATCH v1.3 3/4] keys: add new trusted key-type Mimi Zohar
2010-11-11 21:57 ` David Howells
2010-11-12 12:58 ` David Safford
2010-11-12 16:52 ` David Howells
2010-11-12 17:39 ` David Safford
2010-11-12 18:36 ` David Howells
2010-11-10 15:51 ` [PATCH v1.3 4/4] keys: add new key-type encrypted Mimi Zohar
2010-11-12 19:45 ` David Howells
2010-11-12 21:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-11-12 21:23 ` David Howells [this message]
2010-11-14 0:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-11-15 16:18 ` David Howells
2010-11-15 19:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-11-16 14:08 ` David Howells
2010-11-16 14:38 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-11-16 17:50 ` David Howells
2010-11-16 18:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-11-16 18:58 ` David Howells
2010-11-16 20:43 ` Mimi Zohar
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