Linux cryptographic layer development
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From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] crypto: RSA padding transform
Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2015 17:07:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2868809.KTUGSjxIxs@tauon.atsec.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55ED9B0C.3020905@intel.com>

Am Montag, 7. September 2015, 07:11:24 schrieb Tadeusz Struk:

Hi Tadeusz,

>On 09/06/2015 01:34 AM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>> +static int pkcs1pad_setkey(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
>>> 
>>> > +		unsigned int keylen)
>> 
>> Albeit I have nothing to say against the code, but shouldn't we first get
>> the split of the setkey function implemented? The conversion work will
>> increase more and more we merge code that uses that API that was decided
>> to be revamped.
>> 
>> Tadeusz, what do you think?
>
>It would make it easier for me if this could wait until the split is done.

Sure, I will wait with posting of my new version of AF_ALG until that dust 
settled.
>
>>> +		akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, NULL, 0, 0);
>>> 
>>> > +		if (crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req) != -EOVERFLOW)
>>> > +			err = -EINVAL;
>> 
>> I had a chat with Tadesusz already on this code which I need for the
>> algif_akcipher code too (and there I need this check more often as user
>> space may simply change the key under my feet). I feel that it is a waste
>> of CPU cycles to set up a fake encryption request just to get the data
>> length which is based on the used key.
>> 
>> The value we obtain here is simply a check of the key length. Thus, I would
>> think that we should have a separate akcipher API call for this instead of
>> requiring the caller to allocate a fake request context.
>> 
>> Tadeusz, are you working on that code or shall I have a look?
>
>I wasn't planning to add this, but yes, I think it's a good idea.
>I'll add it.

Thanks a lot. I would think that the API call really is just a one-liner 
returning the size of the key.


Ciao
Stephan

  reply	other threads:[~2015-09-07 15:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-09-05 23:00 [RFC PATCH] crypto: RSA padding transform Andrew Zaborowski
2015-09-06  8:34 ` Stephan Mueller
2015-09-06 14:33   ` Andrzej Zaborowski
2015-09-06 21:17     ` Stephan Mueller
2015-09-07 14:42       ` Andrzej Zaborowski
2015-09-07 15:10         ` Stephan Mueller
2015-09-07 14:31     ` Tadeusz Struk
2015-09-07 17:54       ` Stephan Mueller
2015-09-08 16:09         ` Andrzej Zaborowski
2015-10-30  8:35           ` Marcel Holtmann
2015-09-08  1:07       ` Herbert Xu
2015-09-07 14:11   ` Tadeusz Struk
2015-09-07 15:07     ` Stephan Mueller [this message]
2015-09-07 14:06 ` Tadeusz Struk
2015-09-07 14:38   ` Andrzej Zaborowski

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