From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] crypto: hw_random - Add new Exynos RNG driver Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 21:41:59 +0100 Message-ID: <4248691.8fGIDmasva@tauon.atsec.com> References: <20170324182606.23339-1-krzk@kernel.org> <20170324182606.23339-2-krzk@kernel.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Cc: Kukjin Kim , Javier Martinez Canillas , Matt Mackall , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz , Arnd Bergmann , Olof Johansson To: Krzysztof Kozlowski Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20170324182606.23339-2-krzk@kernel.org> Sender: linux-samsung-soc-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org Am Freitag, 24. März 2017, 19:26:04 CET schrieb Krzysztof Kozlowski: Hi Krzysztof, > +static unsigned int exynos_rng_copy_random(struct exynos_rng_dev *rng, > + u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen) > +{ > + unsigned int cnt = 0; > + int i, j; > + u32 val; > + > + for (j = 0; j < EXYNOS_RNG_SEED_REGS; j++) { > + val = exynos_rng_readl(rng, EXYNOS_RNG_OUT(j)); > + > + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { > + dst[cnt] = val & 0xff; > + val >>= 8; > + if (++cnt >= dlen) > + return cnt; > + } > + rng->seed_save[j] = val; Just to clarify: is this call right? Shouldn't that be removed? Any RNG that is given to a caller is tainted and should not serve as seed. > + } > + > + /* > + * Engine filled all output registers, so read the remaining registers > + * for storing data as future seed. > + */ > + for (; j < EXYNOS_RNG_SEED_REGS; j++) > + rng->seed_save[j] = exynos_rng_readl(rng, EXYNOS_RNG_OUT(j)); With this call, I guess the questioned line above could go away, right? Ciao Stephan