Linux cryptographic layer development
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>
To: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] crypto: add algif_akcipher user space API
Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 08:30:23 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4460438.43jVvca0Xd@positron.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <EDD4B1A0-DA39-4A72-B445-F21D1C364228@holtmann.org>

Am Freitag, 11. August 2017, 07:13:30 CEST schrieb Marcel Holtmann:

Hi Marcel,

> > 
> > The last round of reviews for AF_ALG akcipher left off at an impasse
> > around a year ago: the consensus was that hardware key support was
> > needed, but that requirement was in conflict with the "always have a
> > software fallback" rule for the crypto subsystem. For example, a private
> > key securely generated by and stored in a TPM could not be copied out for
> > use by a software algorithm. Has anything come about to resolve this
> > impasse?
> > 
> > There were some patches around to add keyring support by associating a key
> > ID with an akcipher socket, but that approach ran in to a mismatch
> > between the proposed keyring API for the verify operation and the
> > semantics of AF_ALG verify.
> > 
> > AF_ALG is best suited for crypto use cases where a socket is set up once
> > and there are lots of reads and writes to justify the setup cost. With
> > asymmetric crypto, the setup cost is high when you might only use the
> > socket for a brief time to do one verify or encrypt operation.
> > 
> > Given the efficiency and hardware key issues, AF_ALG seems to be
> > mismatched with asymmetric crypto. Have you looked at the proposed
> > keyctl() support for crypto operations?
> we have also seen hardware now where the private key will never leave the
> crypto hardware. They public and private key is only generated for key
> exchange purposes and later on discarded again. Asymmetric ciphers are
> really not a good fit for AF_ALG and they should be solely supported via
> keyctl.

Thanks for the reminder. I have looked at that but I am unsure about whether 
this one covers asym crypto appropriately, too.

The issue is that some hardware may only offer accelerators without a full 
blown RSA siggen/ver logic (that pulls in PKCS or OAEP or others). How do you 
propose to cover raw primitives with keyctl?

Ciao
Stephan

  reply	other threads:[~2017-08-11  6:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-08-10  6:39 [PATCH v8 0/4] crypto: add algif_akcipher user space API Stephan Müller
2017-08-10  6:39 ` [PATCH v8 1/4] crypto: AF_ALG -- add sign/verify API Stephan Müller
2017-08-10 12:49   ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-08-10 13:03     ` Stephan Mueller
2017-08-10 13:59       ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-08-10 14:06         ` Stephan Müller
2017-08-10  6:39 ` [PATCH v8 2/4] crypto: AF_ALG -- add setpubkey setsockopt call Stephan Müller
2017-08-10  6:40 ` [PATCH v8 3/4] crypto: AF_ALG -- add asymmetric cipher Stephan Müller
2017-08-11 12:51   ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-08-19 13:53     ` Stephan Müller
2017-08-21  8:55       ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-08-21  9:23         ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-08-21  9:39           ` Stephan Mueller
2017-08-10  6:40 ` [PATCH v8 4/4] crypto: algif_akcipher - enable compilation Stephan Müller
2017-08-11 12:56   ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-08-11 13:03     ` Stephan Mueller
2017-08-11  0:48 ` [PATCH v8 0/4] crypto: add algif_akcipher user space API Mat Martineau
2017-08-11  5:13   ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-08-11  6:30     ` Stephan Müller [this message]
2017-08-11 16:02       ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-08-14  6:24         ` Stephan Mueller
2017-08-14  6:42           ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-08-11  7:18   ` Stephan Mueller
2017-08-11 16:05     ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-08-13  8:52       ` Gilad Ben-Yossef
2017-08-14  6:01         ` Stephan Mueller
2017-08-17 13:17       ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-08-30  6:15         ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-08-30  7:21           ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-08-30  8:17             ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-08-30 12:36               ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-08-11 10:18   ` Andrew Zaborowski
2017-08-11 19:43     ` Mat Martineau
2017-08-14  6:03       ` Stephan Mueller
2017-08-14  6:26         ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-08-14  7:23           ` Stephan Mueller
2017-08-14  9:26             ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-10-02 14:15 ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-10-03  0:09   ` Mat Martineau

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=4460438.43jVvca0Xd@positron.chronox.de \
    --to=smueller@chronox.de \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=marcel@holtmann.org \
    --cc=mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox