From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
To: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey
Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 10:18:12 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7c456e18-0fff-4d06-a94d-66807b9777ad@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <anQ9UdZqmj39hfgD@kwain>
On 06/08/2026 10.10, Antoine Tenart wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 05, 2026 at 01:57:47PM +0200, Thomas Huth wrote:
>> From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>>
>> The crypto_authenc_keys structure only contains pointers to keys,
>> but not the key data itself. So explicitly clearing the structure
>> at the end of safexcel_aead_setkey() is not really necessary.
>>
>> On the other hand, the crypto_aes_ctx might contain sensitive information,
>> so this structure should be cleaned up at the end instead. Do this
>> now via the new __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) marker.
>
> Looking at other crypto drivers it seems zeroing the key pointers was
> explicitly added (sometimes later) and my impression is a good chunk of
> the users are zeroing it. I don't know whether removing that is fine or
> not, my limited understanding is that provides in-depth defense against
> leaking were the key reside in memory. Would love to see an explicit
> statement from someone with that knowledge.
It has been suggested by Eric here (unless I got him wrong):
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20260804185402.GD2904385@google.com/
... I should have maybe added that link to this patch description ...
> (On the other hand mixing gotos and __cleanup is not advised but is that
> an issue here? Or if zeroing crypto_authenc_keys is actually important
> can we use __cleanup too?).
>
>> --- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c
>> @@ -407,17 +407,17 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
>> struct safexcel_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>> struct safexcel_crypto_priv *priv = ctx->base.priv;
>> struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
>> - struct crypto_aes_ctx aes;
>> - int err = -EINVAL, i;
>> + struct crypto_aes_ctx aes __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx);
>> + int err, i;
>> const char *alg;
>
>> @@ -430,25 +430,25 @@ static int safexcel_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *ctfm, const u8 *key,
>> case SAFEXCEL_DES:
>> err = verify_aead_des_key(ctfm, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
>> if (unlikely(err))
>> - goto badkey;
>> + return err;
>> break;
>> case SAFEXCEL_3DES:
>> err = verify_aead_des3_key(ctfm, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
>> if (unlikely(err))
>> - goto badkey;
>> + return err;
>> break;
>> case SAFEXCEL_AES:
>> err = aes_expandkey(&aes, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
>> if (unlikely(err))
>> - goto badkey;
>> + return err;
>> break;
>> case SAFEXCEL_SM4:
>> if (unlikely(keys.enckeylen != SM4_KEY_SIZE))
>> - goto badkey;
>> + return err;
>
> 'err' is uninitialized here. You can use '-EINVAL' instead.
Oops, good catch, thanks! I will fix it in the next version (assuming that
removing the memzero_explicit is ok and we'll keep this patch...)
Thomas
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-06 8:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-05 11:57 [PATCH v3 00/10] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 01/10] crypto: Provide a wrapper " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 02/10] crypto: aspeed - clear the crypto_aes_ctx when done Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 03/10] crypto: inside-secure/eip93 " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 04/10] crypto: padlock-aes " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 05/10] crypto: sa2ul " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 06/10] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 07/10] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 08/10] crypto: qat - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey Thomas Huth
2026-08-06 8:10 ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-06 8:18 ` Thomas Huth [this message]
2026-08-06 12:37 ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-05 11:57 ` [PATCH v3 10/10] crypto: safexcel - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-06 8:17 ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-05 20:22 ` [PATCH v3 00/10] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Eric Biggers
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