From: Xu Zaibo <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
To: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
Cc: <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <davem@davemloft.net>,
<qianweili@huawei.com>, <tanghui20@huawei.com>,
<forest.zhouchang@huawei.com>, <linuxarm@huawei.com>,
<zhangwei375@huawei.com>, <shenyang39@huawei.com>,
<yekai13@huawei.com>, <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - Add pbuffer mode for SEC driver
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 11:16:52 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <80ab5da7-eceb-920e-dc36-1d411ad57a09@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200224140154.00005967@Huawei.com>
Hi,
On 2020/2/24 22:01, Jonathan Cameron wrote:
> On Thu, 20 Feb 2020 17:04:55 +0800
> Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com> wrote:
>
>> From: liulongfang <liulongfang@huawei.com>
>>
>> In the scenario of SMMU translation, the SEC performance of short messages
>> (<512Bytes) cannot meet our expectations. To avoid this, we reserve the
>> plat buffer (PBUF) memory for small packets when creating TFM.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: liulongfang <liulongfang@huawei.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>
> Hi liulongfang,
>
> This patch might have been easier to review done in two parts.
> First part would do the refactor to place c_ivin etc in the sec_alg_res.
> That should be really simple to review. Second part then adds the
> pbuf alternative to existing code.
Okay, we will split it.
> I'm not sure putting the boolean saying if we are using pbuf or not in
> the context makes sense. Seems liable to introduce race conditions.
> Should that not be tied to the request?
I think it makes no sense, we will update here.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jonathan
>
>> ---
>> drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h | 6 +
>> drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c | 244 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>> 2 files changed, 213 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h
>> index eab0d22..8e2e34b 100644
>> --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h
>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec.h
>> @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
>>
>> /* Algorithm resource per hardware SEC queue */
>> struct sec_alg_res {
>> + u8 *pbuf;
>> + dma_addr_t pbuf_dma;
>> u8 *c_ivin;
>> dma_addr_t c_ivin_dma;
>> u8 *out_mac;
>> @@ -23,6 +25,8 @@ struct sec_cipher_req {
>> dma_addr_t c_in_dma;
>> struct hisi_acc_hw_sgl *c_out;
>> dma_addr_t c_out_dma;
>> + u8 *c_ivin;
>> + dma_addr_t c_ivin_dma;
>> struct skcipher_request *sk_req;
>> u32 c_len;
>> bool encrypt;
>> @@ -128,6 +132,8 @@ struct sec_ctx {
>> atomic_t dec_qcyclic;
>>
>> enum sec_alg_type alg_type;
>> + bool pbuf_supported;
>> + bool use_pbuf;
>> struct sec_cipher_ctx c_ctx;
>> struct sec_auth_ctx a_ctx;
>> };
>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c
>> index a2cfcc9..022d4bf6 100644
>> --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c
>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c
>> @@ -46,7 +46,21 @@
>> #define SEC_CIPHER_AUTH 0xfe
>> #define SEC_AUTH_CIPHER 0x1
>> #define SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN 64
>> +#define SEC_MAX_AAD_LEN 65535
>> #define SEC_TOTAL_MAC_SZ (SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN * QM_Q_DEPTH)
>> +
>> +#define SEC_PBUF_SZ 512
>> +#define SEC_PBUF_IV_OFFSET SEC_PBUF_SZ
>> +#define SEC_PBUF_MAC_OFFSET (SEC_PBUF_SZ + SEC_IV_SIZE)
>> +#define SEC_PBUF_PKG (SEC_PBUF_SZ + SEC_IV_SIZE + \
>> + SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN * 2)
> 512 + 24 + 128
>
> So we get 6 per 4kiB page?
Yes, we tried to hold 6 per 4 KB page.
>
>> +#define SEC_PBUF_NUM (PAGE_SIZE / SEC_PBUF_PKG)
>> +#define SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM (QM_Q_DEPTH / SEC_PBUF_NUM)
>> +#define SEC_PBUF_LEFT_SZ (SEC_PBUF_PKG * (QM_Q_DEPTH - \
>> + SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM * SEC_PBUF_NUM))
>> +#define SEC_TOTAL_PBUF_SZ (PAGE_SIZE * SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM + \
>> + SEC_PBUF_LEFT_SZ)
>> +
>> #define SEC_SQE_LEN_RATE 4
>> #define SEC_SQE_CFLAG 2
>> #define SEC_SQE_AEAD_FLAG 3
>> @@ -110,12 +124,12 @@ static void sec_free_req_id(struct sec_req *req)
>> mutex_unlock(&qp_ctx->req_lock);
>> }
>>
>> -static int sec_aead_verify(struct sec_req *req, struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx)
>> +static int sec_aead_verify(struct sec_req *req)
>> {
>> struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req;
>> struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(aead_req);
>> - u8 *mac_out = qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].out_mac;
>> size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
>> + u8 *mac_out = req->aead_req.out_mac;
> This change looks unrelated to the rest of the patch.
> Good cleanup but not part of adding pbuffer as far as I can tell.
With Pbuf, 'aead_req' will hold the operational 'out_mac' address from
'res'.
With only SGL buffer, the 'out_mac' of 'aead_req' is only from 'out_mac'
of 'res'.
So, should update here.
>
>> u8 *mac = mac_out + SEC_MAX_MAC_LEN;
>> struct scatterlist *sgl = aead_req->src;
>> size_t sz;
>> @@ -163,7 +177,7 @@ static void sec_req_cb(struct hisi_qp *qp, void *resp)
>> }
>>
>> if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD && !req->c_req.encrypt)
>> - err = sec_aead_verify(req, qp_ctx);
>> + err = sec_aead_verify(req);
>>
>> atomic64_inc(&ctx->sec->debug.dfx.recv_cnt);
>>
>> @@ -245,6 +259,50 @@ static void sec_free_mac_resource(struct device *dev, struct sec_alg_res *res)
>> res->out_mac, res->out_mac_dma);
>> }
>>
>> +static void sec_free_pbuf_resource(struct device *dev, struct sec_alg_res *res)
>> +{
>> + if (res->pbuf)
>> + dma_free_coherent(dev, SEC_TOTAL_PBUF_SZ,
>> + res->pbuf, res->pbuf_dma);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * To improve performance, pbuffer is used for
>> + * small packets (< 576Bytes) as IOMMU translation using.
>> + */
>> +static int sec_alloc_pbuf_resource(struct device *dev, struct sec_alg_res *res)
>> +{
>> + int pbuf_page_offset;
>> + int i, j, k;
>> +
>> + res->pbuf = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, SEC_TOTAL_PBUF_SZ,
>> + &res->pbuf_dma, GFP_KERNEL);
> Would it make more sense perhaps to do this as a DMA pool and have
> it expand on demand?
Since there exist all kinds of buffer length, I think dma_alloc_coherent
may be better?
>
>> + if (!res->pbuf)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * SEC_PBUF_PKG contains data pbuf, iv and
>> + * out_mac : <SEC_PBUF|SEC_IV|SEC_MAC>
>> + * Every PAGE contains six SEC_PBUF_PKG
>> + * The sec_qp_ctx contains QM_Q_DEPTH numbers of SEC_PBUF_PKG
>> + * So we need SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM numbers of PAGE
>> + * for the SEC_TOTAL_PBUF_SZ
>> + */
>> + for (i = 0; i <= SEC_PBUF_PAGE_NUM; i++) {
>> + pbuf_page_offset = PAGE_SIZE * i;
>> + for (j = 0; j < SEC_PBUF_NUM; j++) {
>> + k = i * SEC_PBUF_NUM + j;
>> + if (k == QM_Q_DEPTH)
>> + break;
>> + res[k].pbuf = res->pbuf +
>> + j * SEC_PBUF_PKG + pbuf_page_offset;
>> + res[k].pbuf_dma = res->pbuf_dma +
>> + j * SEC_PBUF_PKG + pbuf_page_offset;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> static int sec_alg_resource_alloc(struct sec_ctx *ctx,
>> struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx)
>> {
>> @@ -259,11 +317,17 @@ static int sec_alg_resource_alloc(struct sec_ctx *ctx,
>> if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) {
>> ret = sec_alloc_mac_resource(dev, res);
>> if (ret)
>> - goto get_fail;
>> + goto alloc_fail;
>> + }
>> + if (ctx->pbuf_supported) {
>> + ret = sec_alloc_pbuf_resource(dev, res);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + dev_err(dev, "fail to alloc pbuf dma resource!\n");
>> + goto alloc_fail;
>> + }
>> }
>> -
>> return 0;
>> -get_fail:
>> +alloc_fail:
>> sec_free_civ_resource(dev, res);
>>
>> return ret;
>> @@ -278,6 +342,8 @@ static void sec_alg_resource_free(struct sec_ctx *ctx,
>>
>> if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD)
>> sec_free_mac_resource(dev, qp_ctx->res);
>> + if (ctx->pbuf_supported)
>> + sec_free_pbuf_resource(dev, qp_ctx->res);
>> }
>>
>> static int sec_create_qp_ctx(struct hisi_qm *qm, struct sec_ctx *ctx,
>> @@ -368,6 +434,12 @@ static int sec_ctx_base_init(struct sec_ctx *ctx)
>> ctx->sec = sec;
>> ctx->hlf_q_num = sec->ctx_q_num >> 1;
>>
>> + if (ctx->sec->iommu_used)
>> + ctx->pbuf_supported = true;
>> + else
>> + ctx->pbuf_supported = false;
> ctx->pbuf_supported = ctx->sec->iommu_used;
yes, nice idea.
>
>> + ctx->use_pbuf = false;
>> +
>> /* Half of queue depth is taken as fake requests limit in the queue. */
>> ctx->fake_req_limit = QM_Q_DEPTH >> 1;
>> ctx->qp_ctx = kcalloc(sec->ctx_q_num, sizeof(struct sec_qp_ctx),
>> @@ -447,7 +519,6 @@ static int sec_skcipher_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
>> struct sec_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
>> int ret;
>>
>> - ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
>> ctx->alg_type = SEC_SKCIPHER;
>> crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct sec_req));
>> ctx->c_ctx.ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
>> @@ -591,11 +662,94 @@ GEN_SEC_SETKEY_FUNC(3des_cbc, SEC_CALG_3DES, SEC_CMODE_CBC)
>> GEN_SEC_SETKEY_FUNC(sm4_xts, SEC_CALG_SM4, SEC_CMODE_XTS)
>> GEN_SEC_SETKEY_FUNC(sm4_cbc, SEC_CALG_SM4, SEC_CMODE_CBC)
>>
>> -static int sec_cipher_map(struct device *dev, struct sec_req *req,
>> +static int sec_cipher_pbuf_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req,
>> + struct scatterlist *src)
>> +{
>> + struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req;
>> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
>> + struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx;
>> + struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx);
>> + int copy_size, pbuf_length;
>> + int req_id = req->req_id;
>> +
>> + if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD)
>> + copy_size = aead_req->cryptlen + aead_req->assoclen;
>> + else
>> + copy_size = c_req->c_len;
>> +
>> + pbuf_length = sg_copy_to_buffer(src, sg_nents(src),
>> + qp_ctx->res[req_id].pbuf,
>> + copy_size);
>> +
>> + if (unlikely(pbuf_length != copy_size)) {
>> + dev_err(dev, "copy src data to pbuf error!\n");
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + }
>> +
>> + c_req->c_in_dma = qp_ctx->res[req_id].pbuf_dma;
>> +
>> + if (!c_req->c_in_dma) {
>> + dev_err(dev, "fail to set pbuffer address!\n");
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + }
>> +
>> + c_req->c_out_dma = c_req->c_in_dma;
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sec_cipher_pbuf_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req,
>> + struct scatterlist *dst)
>> +{
>> + struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req;
>> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
>> + struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx;
>> + struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx);
>> + int copy_size, pbuf_length;
>> + int req_id = req->req_id;
>> +
>> + if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD)
>> + copy_size = c_req->c_len + aead_req->assoclen;
>> + else
>> + copy_size = c_req->c_len;
>> +
>> + pbuf_length = sg_copy_from_buffer(dst, sg_nents(dst),
>> + qp_ctx->res[req_id].pbuf,
>> + copy_size);
>> +
>> + if (unlikely(pbuf_length != copy_size))
>> + dev_err(dev, "copy pbuf data to dst error!\n");
>> +
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int sec_cipher_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req,
>> struct scatterlist *src, struct scatterlist *dst)
>> {
>> struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
>> + struct sec_aead_req *a_req = &req->aead_req;
>> struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx;
>> + struct sec_alg_res *res = &qp_ctx->res[req->req_id];
>> + struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx);
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + if (ctx->use_pbuf) {
>> + ret = sec_cipher_pbuf_map(ctx, req, src);
>> + c_req->c_ivin = res->pbuf + SEC_PBUF_IV_OFFSET;
>> + c_req->c_ivin_dma = res->pbuf_dma + SEC_PBUF_IV_OFFSET;
>> + if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) {
>> + a_req->out_mac = res->pbuf + SEC_PBUF_MAC_OFFSET;
>> + a_req->out_mac_dma = res->pbuf_dma +
>> + SEC_PBUF_MAC_OFFSET;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> + c_req->c_ivin = res->c_ivin;
>> + c_req->c_ivin_dma = res->c_ivin_dma;
>> + if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD) {
>> + a_req->out_mac = res->out_mac;
>> + a_req->out_mac_dma = res->out_mac_dma;
>> + }
>>
>> c_req->c_in = hisi_acc_sg_buf_map_to_hw_sgl(dev, src,
>> qp_ctx->c_in_pool,
>> @@ -626,29 +780,34 @@ static int sec_cipher_map(struct device *dev, struct sec_req *req,
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> -static void sec_cipher_unmap(struct device *dev, struct sec_cipher_req *req,
>> +static void sec_cipher_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req,
>> struct scatterlist *src, struct scatterlist *dst)
>> {
>> - if (dst != src)
>> - hisi_acc_sg_buf_unmap(dev, src, req->c_in);
>> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
>> + struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx);
>>
>> - hisi_acc_sg_buf_unmap(dev, dst, req->c_out);
>> + if (ctx->use_pbuf) {
> Are we sure this flag can't have changed?
I thinks this is a bug, we will update it.
>> + sec_cipher_pbuf_unmap(ctx, req, dst);
>> + } else {
>> + if (dst != src)
>> + hisi_acc_sg_buf_unmap(dev, src, c_req->c_in);
>> +
>> + hisi_acc_sg_buf_unmap(dev, dst, c_req->c_out);
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> static int sec_skcipher_sgl_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> {
>> struct skcipher_request *sq = req->c_req.sk_req;
>>
>> - return sec_cipher_map(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), req, sq->src, sq->dst);
>> + return sec_cipher_map(ctx, req, sq->src, sq->dst);
>> }
>>
>> static void sec_skcipher_sgl_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> {
>> - struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx);
>> - struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
>> - struct skcipher_request *sk_req = c_req->sk_req;
>> + struct skcipher_request *sq = req->c_req.sk_req;
>>
>> - sec_cipher_unmap(dev, c_req, sk_req->src, sk_req->dst);
>> + sec_cipher_unmap(ctx, req, sq->src, sq->dst);
>> }
>>
>> static int sec_aead_aes_set_key(struct sec_cipher_ctx *c_ctx,
>> @@ -759,16 +918,14 @@ static int sec_aead_sgl_map(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> {
>> struct aead_request *aq = req->aead_req.aead_req;
>>
>> - return sec_cipher_map(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), req, aq->src, aq->dst);
>> + return sec_cipher_map(ctx, req, aq->src, aq->dst);
>> }
>>
>> static void sec_aead_sgl_unmap(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> {
>> - struct device *dev = SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx);
>> - struct sec_cipher_req *cq = &req->c_req;
>> struct aead_request *aq = req->aead_req.aead_req;
>>
>> - sec_cipher_unmap(dev, cq, aq->src, aq->dst);
>> + sec_cipher_unmap(ctx, req, aq->src, aq->dst);
>> }
>>
>> static int sec_request_transfer(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> @@ -801,9 +958,9 @@ static void sec_request_untransfer(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> static void sec_skcipher_copy_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> {
>> struct skcipher_request *sk_req = req->c_req.sk_req;
>> - u8 *c_ivin = req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin;
>> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
>>
>> - memcpy(c_ivin, sk_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
>> + memcpy(c_req->c_ivin, sk_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
>> }
>>
>> static int sec_skcipher_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> @@ -818,8 +975,7 @@ static int sec_skcipher_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> memset(sec_sqe, 0, sizeof(struct sec_sqe));
>>
>> sec_sqe->type2.c_key_addr = cpu_to_le64(c_ctx->c_key_dma);
>> - sec_sqe->type2.c_ivin_addr =
>> - cpu_to_le64(req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin_dma);
>> + sec_sqe->type2.c_ivin_addr = cpu_to_le64(c_req->c_ivin_dma);
>> sec_sqe->type2.data_src_addr = cpu_to_le64(c_req->c_in_dma);
>> sec_sqe->type2.data_dst_addr = cpu_to_le64(c_req->c_out_dma);
>>
>> @@ -836,7 +992,10 @@ static int sec_skcipher_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> cipher = SEC_CIPHER_DEC << SEC_CIPHER_OFFSET;
>> sec_sqe->type_cipher_auth = bd_type | cipher;
>>
>> - sa_type = SEC_SGL << SEC_SRC_SGL_OFFSET;
>> + if (ctx->use_pbuf)
>> + sa_type = SEC_PBUF << SEC_SRC_SGL_OFFSET;
>> + else
>> + sa_type = SEC_SGL << SEC_SRC_SGL_OFFSET;
>> scene = SEC_COMM_SCENE << SEC_SCENE_OFFSET;
>> if (c_req->c_in_dma != c_req->c_out_dma)
>> de = 0x1 << SEC_DE_OFFSET;
>> @@ -844,7 +1003,10 @@ static int sec_skcipher_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> sec_sqe->sds_sa_type = (de | scene | sa_type);
>>
>> /* Just set DST address type */
>> - da_type = SEC_SGL << SEC_DST_SGL_OFFSET;
>> + if (ctx->use_pbuf)
>> + da_type = SEC_PBUF << SEC_DST_SGL_OFFSET;
>> + else
>> + da_type = SEC_SGL << SEC_DST_SGL_OFFSET;
>> sec_sqe->sdm_addr_type |= da_type;
>>
>> sec_sqe->type2.clen_ivhlen |= cpu_to_le32(c_req->c_len);
>> @@ -904,9 +1066,9 @@ static void sec_skcipher_callback(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req,
>> static void sec_aead_copy_iv(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> {
>> struct aead_request *aead_req = req->aead_req.aead_req;
>> - u8 *c_ivin = req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin;
>> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
>>
>> - memcpy(c_ivin, aead_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
>> + memcpy(c_req->c_ivin, aead_req->iv, ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
>> }
>>
>> static void sec_auth_bd_fill_ex(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx, int dir,
>> @@ -939,8 +1101,7 @@ static void sec_auth_bd_fill_ex(struct sec_auth_ctx *ctx, int dir,
>>
>> sec_sqe->type2.cipher_src_offset = cpu_to_le16((u16)aq->assoclen);
>>
>> - sec_sqe->type2.mac_addr =
>> - cpu_to_le64(req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].out_mac_dma);
>> + sec_sqe->type2.mac_addr = cpu_to_le64(a_req->out_mac_dma);
>> }
>>
>> static int sec_aead_bd_fill(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> @@ -964,6 +1125,7 @@ static void sec_aead_callback(struct sec_ctx *c, struct sec_req *req, int err)
>> {
>> struct aead_request *a_req = req->aead_req.aead_req;
>> struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(a_req);
>> + struct sec_aead_req *aead_req = &req->aead_req;
>> struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
>> size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
>> struct sec_qp_ctx *qp_ctx = req->qp_ctx;
>> @@ -979,7 +1141,7 @@ static void sec_aead_callback(struct sec_ctx *c, struct sec_req *req, int err)
>> struct scatterlist *sgl = a_req->dst;
>>
>> sz = sg_pcopy_from_buffer(sgl, sg_nents(sgl),
>> - qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].out_mac,
>> + aead_req->out_mac,
>> authsize, a_req->cryptlen +
>> a_req->assoclen);
>>
>> @@ -1031,6 +1193,7 @@ static int sec_request_init(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>>
>> static int sec_process(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> {
>> + struct sec_cipher_req *c_req = &req->c_req;
>> int ret;
>>
>> ret = sec_request_init(ctx, req);
>> @@ -1057,12 +1220,10 @@ static int sec_process(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *req)
>> /* As failing, restore the IV from user */
>> if (ctx->c_ctx.c_mode == SEC_CMODE_CBC && !req->c_req.encrypt) {
>> if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_SKCIPHER)
>> - memcpy(req->c_req.sk_req->iv,
>> - req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin,
>> + memcpy(req->c_req.sk_req->iv, c_req->c_ivin,
>> ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
>> else
>> - memcpy(req->aead_req.aead_req->iv,
>> - req->qp_ctx->res[req->req_id].c_ivin,
>> + memcpy(req->aead_req.aead_req->iv, c_req->c_ivin,
>> ctx->c_ctx.ivsize);
>> }
>>
>> @@ -1208,6 +1369,10 @@ static int sec_skcipher_param_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> }
>> sreq->c_req.c_len = sk_req->cryptlen;
>> +
>> + if (ctx->pbuf_supported && sk_req->cryptlen <= SEC_PBUF_SZ)
>> + ctx->use_pbuf = true;
> This is request specific so a bit nasty to put it in the context. If nothing
> else it means reviewing this properly requires careful checking that there
> isn't a race on that variable. Can we put the flag in the request somewhere?
Will fix here in V2.
Cheers,
Zaibo
.
>
>> +
>> if (c_alg == SEC_CALG_3DES) {
>> if (unlikely(sk_req->cryptlen & (DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))) {
>> dev_err(dev, "skcipher 3des input length error!\n");
>> @@ -1321,11 +1486,16 @@ static int sec_aead_param_check(struct sec_ctx *ctx, struct sec_req *sreq)
>> struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
>> size_t authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
>>
>> - if (unlikely(!req->src || !req->dst || !req->cryptlen)) {
>> + if (unlikely(!req->src || !req->dst || !req->cryptlen ||
>> + req->assoclen > SEC_MAX_AAD_LEN)) {
>> dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "aead input param error!\n");
>> return -EINVAL;
>> }
>>
>> + if (ctx->pbuf_supported && (req->cryptlen + req->assoclen) <=
>> + SEC_PBUF_SZ)
>> + ctx->use_pbuf = true;
>> +
>> /* Support AES only */
>> if (unlikely(c_alg != SEC_CALG_AES)) {
>> dev_err(SEC_CTX_DEV(ctx), "aead crypto alg error!\n");
>
> .
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-25 3:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-20 9:04 [PATCH 0/4] crypto: hisilicon - Improve SEC performance Zaibo Xu
2020-02-20 9:04 ` [PATCH 1/4] crypto: hisilicon - Use one workqueue per qm instead of per qp Zaibo Xu
2020-02-20 9:04 ` [PATCH 2/4] crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - Add workqueue for SEC driver Zaibo Xu
2020-02-20 9:04 ` [PATCH 3/4] crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - Add iommu status check Zaibo Xu
2020-02-20 9:04 ` [PATCH 4/4] crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - Add pbuffer mode for SEC driver Zaibo Xu
2020-02-20 9:50 ` John Garry
2020-02-20 10:10 ` Xu Zaibo
2020-02-20 11:07 ` John Garry
2020-02-20 12:16 ` Xu Zaibo
2020-02-20 12:20 ` John Garry
2020-02-20 12:32 ` Xu Zaibo
2020-02-24 14:01 ` Jonathan Cameron
2020-02-25 3:16 ` Xu Zaibo [this message]
2020-02-25 15:14 ` Jonathan Cameron
2020-02-26 11:18 ` Xu Zaibo
2020-02-26 14:30 ` Jonathan Cameron
2020-02-27 1:13 ` Xu Zaibo
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