From: "Toke Høiland-Jørgensen" <toke@redhat.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"open list:BPF JIT for MIPS (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
<netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
Erik Kline <ek@google.com>, Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>,
Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>,
hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v1 2/3] ipv6: move from sha1 to blake2s in address calculation
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 14:30:39 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87ilung3uo.fsf@toke.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXGz7_98B_b=SJER6-Q2g-nOT5X3cfN=nfhYoH0eHep5bw@mail.gmail.com>
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> writes:
> On Thu, 13 Jan 2022 at 12:15, Hannes Frederic Sowa
> <hannes@stressinduktion.org> wrote:
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> On 13.01.22 00:31, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> > On 1/13/22, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> wrote:
>> >> However, if we make this change, systems setting a stable_secret and
>> >> using addr_gen_mode 2 or 3 will come up with a completely different
>> >> address after a kernel upgrade. Which would be bad for any operator
>> >> expecting to be able to find their machine again after a reboot,
>> >> especially if it is accessed remotely.
>> >>
>> >> I haven't ever used this feature myself, though, or seen it in use. So I
>> >> don't know if this is purely a theoretical concern, or if the
>> >> stable_address feature is actually used in this way in practice. If it
>> >> is, I guess the switch would have to be opt-in, which kinda defeats the
>> >> purpose, no (i.e., we'd have to keep the SHA1 code around
>>
>> Yes, it is hard to tell if such a change would have real world impact
>> due to not knowing its actual usage in the field - but I would avoid
>> such a change. The reason for this standard is to have stable addresses
>> across reboots. The standard is widely used but most servers or desktops
>> might get their stable privacy addresses being generated by user space
>> network management systems (NetworkManager/networkd) nowadays. I would
>> guess it could be used in embedded installations.
>>
>> The impact of this change could be annoying though: users could suddenly
>> lose connectivity due to e.g. changes to the default gateway after an
>> upgrade.
>>
>> > I'm not even so sure that's true. That was my worry at first, but
>> > actually, looking at this more closely, DAD means that the address can
>> > be changed anyway - a byte counter is hashed in - so there's no
>> > gurantee there.
>>
>> The duplicate address detection counter is a way to merely provide basic
>> network connectivity in case of duplicate addresses on the network
>> (maybe some kind misconfiguration or L2 attack). Such detected addresses
>> would show up in the kernel log and an administrator should investigate
>> and clean up the situation. Afterwards bringing the interface down and
>> up again should revert the interface to its initial (dad_counter == 0)
>> address.
>>
>> > There's also the other aspect that open coding sha1_transform like
>> > this and prepending it with the secret (rather than a better
>> > construction) isn't so great... Take a look at the latest version of
>> > this in my branch to see a really nice simplification and security
>> > improvement:
>> >
>> > https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/log/?h=remove-sha1
>>
>> All in all, I consider the hash produced here as being part of uAPI
>> unfortunately and thus cannot be changed. It is unfortunate that it
>> can't easily be improved (I assume a separate mode for this is not
>> reasonable). The patches definitely look like a nice cleanup.
>>
>> Would this be the only user of sha_transform left?
>>
>
> The question is not whether but when we can/will change this.
>
> SHA-1 is broken and should be removed at *some* point, so unless the
> feature itself is going to be obsolete, its implementation will need
> to switch to a PRF that fulfils the requirements in RFC7217 once SHA-1
> ceases to do so.
>
> And I should also point out that the current implementation does not
> even use SHA-1 correctly, as it omits the finalization step. This may
> or may not matter in practice, but it deviates from crypto best
> practices, as well as from RFC7217
Right, but that implies we need to work on a transition mechanism. For
newly deployed systems changing the hash is obviously fine, it's the
"reboot and you have a new address" problem.
We could introduce new values to the addr_gen_mode? I.e. values of 4 and
5 would be equivalent to 2 and 3 (respectively), but with the new
hashing algorithm? And then document that 2 and 3 are considered
deprecated to be removed at some point in the future...
-Toke
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-13 13:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-12 13:12 [PATCH RFC v1 0/3] remove remaining users of SHA-1 Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-12 13:12 ` [PATCH RFC v1 1/3] bpf: move from sha1 to blake2s in tag calculation Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-12 22:56 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2022-01-13 1:33 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-01-13 12:27 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-13 22:45 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-01-14 8:33 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-01-14 14:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-14 15:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-01-14 15:20 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-14 15:36 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-01-14 15:59 ` David Laight
2022-01-14 16:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-01-14 16:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-14 23:04 ` Jeffrey Walton
2022-01-12 13:12 ` [PATCH RFC v1 2/3] ipv6: move from sha1 to blake2s in address calculation Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-12 15:49 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-12 23:05 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2022-01-12 23:31 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-13 11:15 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2022-01-13 12:06 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-01-13 12:22 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-13 12:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-01-13 13:30 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen [this message]
2022-01-13 13:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-01-13 13:45 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-13 13:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-01-13 13:54 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-13 16:18 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2022-01-14 16:07 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-14 16:57 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2022-01-14 17:41 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2022-01-14 17:58 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-12 13:12 ` [PATCH RFC v1 3/3] crypto: sha1_generic - import lib/sha1.c locally Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-12 18:50 ` [PATCH RFC v1 0/3] remove remaining users of SHA-1 David Sterba
2022-01-12 18:57 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-13 3:24 ` Sandy Harris
2022-01-13 8:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-01-13 17:28 ` Theodore Ts'o
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