* Re: [PATCH v2 7/7] hwrng: core: Remove linux/sched.h from includes
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-12-27 9:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Corentin Labbe; +Cc: mpm, arnd, gregkh, linux-crypto, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20161213145115.30082-7-clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 03:51:15PM +0100, Corentin Labbe wrote:
> linux/sched.h is useless for hw_random/core.c.
> This patch remove it.
I see a schedule_timeout_interruptible call in core.c.
Cheers,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] crypto: arm64/aes: reimplement bit-sliced ARM/NEON implementation for arm64
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-12-27 9:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel; +Cc: linux-crypto, linux-arm-kernel, nico, will.deacon
In-Reply-To: <1481564758-7275-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 05:45:58PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> + .chunksize = 8 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
Same comment as to the previous patches regarding chunksize.
Cheers,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] crypto: arm64/chacha20 - implement NEON version based on SSE3 code
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-12-27 9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel; +Cc: linux-crypto, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1481294033-23508-3-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On Fri, Dec 09, 2016 at 02:33:52PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> + .chunksize = 4 * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE,
This should use a new attribute specific to the walk interface.
Cheers,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs - process 8 blocks in parallel if we can
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-12-27 8:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel; +Cc: linux-crypto, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1481291246-20216-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On Fri, Dec 09, 2016 at 01:47:26PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> The bit-sliced NEON implementation of AES only performs optimally if
> it can process 8 blocks of input in parallel. This is due to the nature
> of bit slicing, where the n-th bit of each byte of AES state of each input
> block is collected into NEON register 'n', for registers q0 - q7.
>
> This implies that the amount of work for the transform is fixed,
> regardless of whether we are handling just one block or 8 in parallel.
>
> So let's try a bit harder to iterate over the input in suitably sized
> chunks, by increasing the chunksize to 8 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, and tweaking
> the loops to only process multiples of the chunk size, unless we are
> handling the last chunk in the input stream.
>
> Note that the skcipher walk API guarantees that a step in the walk never
> returns less that 'chunksize' bytes if there are at least that many bytes
> of input still available. However, it does *not* guarantee that those steps
> produce an exact multiple of the chunk size.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
I like this patch. However, I had different plans for the chunksize
attribute. It's primarily meant to be a hint to the upper layer
in case it does partial updates. It's meant to provide the minimum
number of bytes a partial update can carry without screwing up
subsequent updates.
It just happens to be the same value that we were using during
an skcipher walk.
So I think for your case we should add a new attribute, perhaps
walk_chunksize or walksize, which doesn't need to be exported to
the outside at all and can then be used by the walk interface.
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] virtio-crypto: support crypto engine framework
From: Gonglei @ 2016-12-27 6:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, virtualization, linux-crypto
Cc: Herbert Xu, Michael S . Tsirkin, Baolin Wang, longpeng2, wu.wubin
crypto engine was introduced since 'commit 735d37b5424b ("crypto: engine
- Introduce the block request crypto engine framework")' which uses work
queue to realize the asynchronous processing for ablk_cipher and ahash.
For virtio-crypto device, I register an engine for each
data virtqueue so that we can use the capability of
multiple data queues in future.
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
---
drivers/crypto/virtio/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c | 52 ++++++++++++-------
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_common.h | 16 ++++++
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/virtio/Kconfig
index d80f733..5db0749 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/Kconfig
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_VIRTIO
select CRYPTO_AEAD
select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
+ select CRYPTO_ENGINE
default m
help
This driver provides support for virtio crypto device. If you
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
index c2374df..970d0ca 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
@@ -288,8 +288,7 @@ static int virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm,
static int
__virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_do_req(struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req,
struct ablkcipher_request *req,
- struct data_queue *data_vq,
- __u8 op)
+ struct data_queue *data_vq)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(req);
unsigned int ivsize = crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
@@ -329,7 +328,7 @@ static int virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm,
vc_req->req_data = req_data;
vc_req->type = VIRTIO_CRYPTO_SYM_OP_CIPHER;
/* Head of operation */
- if (op) {
+ if (vc_req->encrypt) {
req_data->header.session_id =
cpu_to_le64(ctx->enc_sess_info.session_id);
req_data->header.opcode =
@@ -424,19 +423,15 @@ static int virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req)
struct virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(atfm);
struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req = ablkcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct virtio_crypto *vcrypto = ctx->vcrypto;
- int ret;
/* Use the first data virtqueue as default */
struct data_queue *data_vq = &vcrypto->data_vq[0];
vc_req->ablkcipher_ctx = ctx;
vc_req->ablkcipher_req = req;
- ret = __virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_do_req(vc_req, req, data_vq, 1);
- if (ret < 0) {
- pr_err("virtio_crypto: Encryption failed!\n");
- return ret;
- }
+ vc_req->encrypt = true;
+ vc_req->dataq = data_vq;
- return -EINPROGRESS;
+ return crypto_transfer_cipher_request_to_engine(data_vq->engine, req);
}
static int virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req)
@@ -445,20 +440,16 @@ static int virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req)
struct virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(atfm);
struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req = ablkcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct virtio_crypto *vcrypto = ctx->vcrypto;
- int ret;
/* Use the first data virtqueue as default */
struct data_queue *data_vq = &vcrypto->data_vq[0];
vc_req->ablkcipher_ctx = ctx;
vc_req->ablkcipher_req = req;
- ret = __virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_do_req(vc_req, req, data_vq, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- pr_err("virtio_crypto: Decryption failed!\n");
- return ret;
- }
+ vc_req->encrypt = false;
+ vc_req->dataq = data_vq;
- return -EINPROGRESS;
+ return crypto_transfer_cipher_request_to_engine(data_vq->engine, req);
}
static int virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
@@ -484,6 +475,33 @@ static void virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
ctx->vcrypto = NULL;
}
+int virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_crypt_req(
+ struct crypto_engine *engine,
+ struct ablkcipher_request *req)
+{
+ struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req = ablkcipher_request_ctx(req);
+ struct data_queue *data_vq = vc_req->dataq;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_do_req(vc_req, req, data_vq);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ virtqueue_kick(data_vq->vq);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_finalize_req(
+ struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req,
+ struct ablkcipher_request *req,
+ int err)
+{
+ crypto_finalize_cipher_request(vc_req->dataq->engine, req, err);
+
+ virtcrypto_clear_request(vc_req);
+}
+
static struct crypto_alg virtio_crypto_algs[] = { {
.cra_name = "cbc(aes)",
.cra_driver_name = "virtio_crypto_aes_cbc",
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_common.h b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_common.h
index 3d6566b..da6d8c0 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_common.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_common.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/engine.h>
/* Internal representation of a data virtqueue */
@@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ struct data_queue {
/* Name of the tx queue: dataq.$index */
char name[32];
+
+ struct crypto_engine *engine;
};
struct virtio_crypto {
@@ -97,6 +100,9 @@ struct virtio_crypto_request {
struct virtio_crypto_op_data_req *req_data;
struct scatterlist **sgs;
uint8_t *iv;
+ /* Encryption? */
+ bool encrypt;
+ struct data_queue *dataq;
};
int virtcrypto_devmgr_add_dev(struct virtio_crypto *vcrypto_dev);
@@ -110,6 +116,16 @@ struct virtio_crypto_request {
struct virtio_crypto *virtcrypto_get_dev_node(int node);
int virtcrypto_dev_start(struct virtio_crypto *vcrypto);
void virtcrypto_dev_stop(struct virtio_crypto *vcrypto);
+int virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_crypt_req(
+ struct crypto_engine *engine,
+ struct ablkcipher_request *req);
+void virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_finalize_req(
+ struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req,
+ struct ablkcipher_request *req,
+ int err);
+
+void
+virtcrypto_clear_request(struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req);
static inline int virtio_crypto_get_current_node(void)
{
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
index fe70ec8..b5b1533 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#include "virtio_crypto_common.h"
-static void
+void
virtcrypto_clear_request(struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req)
{
if (vc_req) {
@@ -66,12 +66,12 @@ static void virtcrypto_dataq_callback(struct virtqueue *vq)
break;
}
ablk_req = vc_req->ablkcipher_req;
- virtcrypto_clear_request(vc_req);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(
&vcrypto->data_vq[qid].lock, flags);
/* Finish the encrypt or decrypt process */
- ablk_req->base.complete(&ablk_req->base, error);
+ virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_finalize_req(vc_req,
+ ablk_req, error);
spin_lock_irqsave(
&vcrypto->data_vq[qid].lock, flags);
}
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static int virtcrypto_find_vqs(struct virtio_crypto *vi)
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int i, total_vqs;
const char **names;
+ struct device *dev = &vi->vdev->dev;
/*
* We expect 1 data virtqueue, followed by
@@ -128,6 +129,15 @@ static int virtcrypto_find_vqs(struct virtio_crypto *vi)
for (i = 0; i < vi->max_data_queues; i++) {
spin_lock_init(&vi->data_vq[i].lock);
vi->data_vq[i].vq = vqs[i];
+ /* Initialize crypto engine */
+ vi->data_vq[i].engine = crypto_engine_alloc_init(dev, 1);
+ if (!vi->data_vq[i].engine) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_engine;
+ }
+
+ vi->data_vq[i].engine->cipher_one_request =
+ virtio_crypto_ablkcipher_crypt_req;
}
kfree(names);
@@ -136,6 +146,7 @@ static int virtcrypto_find_vqs(struct virtio_crypto *vi)
return 0;
+err_engine:
err_find:
kfree(names);
err_names:
@@ -269,6 +280,38 @@ static int virtcrypto_update_status(struct virtio_crypto *vcrypto)
return 0;
}
+static int virtcrypto_start_crypto_engines(struct virtio_crypto *vcrypto)
+{
+ int32_t i;
+ int ret;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < vcrypto->max_data_queues; i++) {
+ if (vcrypto->data_vq[i].engine) {
+ ret = crypto_engine_start(vcrypto->data_vq[i].engine);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ while (--i >= 0)
+ if (vcrypto->data_vq[i].engine)
+ crypto_engine_exit(vcrypto->data_vq[i].engine);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void virtcrypto_clear_crypto_engines(struct virtio_crypto *vcrypto)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < vcrypto->max_data_queues; i++)
+ if (vcrypto->data_vq[i].engine)
+ crypto_engine_exit(vcrypto->data_vq[i].engine);
+}
+
static void virtcrypto_del_vqs(struct virtio_crypto *vcrypto)
{
struct virtio_device *vdev = vcrypto->vdev;
@@ -355,14 +398,21 @@ static int virtcrypto_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev)
dev_err(&vdev->dev, "Failed to initialize vqs.\n");
goto free_dev;
}
+
+ err = virtcrypto_start_crypto_engines(vcrypto);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_vqs;
+
virtio_device_ready(vdev);
err = virtcrypto_update_status(vcrypto);
if (err)
- goto free_vqs;
+ goto free_engines;
return 0;
+free_engines:
+ virtcrypto_clear_crypto_engines(vcrypto);
free_vqs:
vcrypto->vdev->config->reset(vdev);
virtcrypto_del_vqs(vcrypto);
@@ -398,6 +448,7 @@ static void virtcrypto_remove(struct virtio_device *vdev)
virtcrypto_dev_stop(vcrypto);
vdev->config->reset(vdev);
virtcrypto_free_unused_reqs(vcrypto);
+ virtcrypto_clear_crypto_engines(vcrypto);
virtcrypto_del_vqs(vcrypto);
virtcrypto_devmgr_rm_dev(vcrypto);
kfree(vcrypto);
@@ -420,6 +471,7 @@ static int virtcrypto_freeze(struct virtio_device *vdev)
if (virtcrypto_dev_started(vcrypto))
virtcrypto_dev_stop(vcrypto);
+ virtcrypto_clear_crypto_engines(vcrypto);
virtcrypto_del_vqs(vcrypto);
return 0;
}
@@ -433,14 +485,26 @@ static int virtcrypto_restore(struct virtio_device *vdev)
if (err)
return err;
+ err = virtcrypto_start_crypto_engines(vcrypto);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_vqs;
+
virtio_device_ready(vdev);
+
err = virtcrypto_dev_start(vcrypto);
if (err) {
dev_err(&vdev->dev, "Failed to start virtio crypto device.\n");
- return -EFAULT;
+ goto free_engines;
}
return 0;
+
+free_engines:
+ virtcrypto_clear_crypto_engines(vcrypto);
+free_vqs:
+ vcrypto->vdev->config->reset(vdev);
+ virtcrypto_del_vqs(vcrypto);
+ return err;
}
#endif
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 3/6] bpf: Use SHA256 instead of SHA1 for bpf digests
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-27 2:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Andy Lutomirski, Netdev, LKML,
Linux Crypto Mailing List, Jason A. Donenfeld,
Hannes Frederic Sowa, Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert,
David S. Miller, Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <20161227013644.GA96815@ast-mbp.thefacebook.com>
On Mon, Dec 26, 2016 at 5:36 PM, Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 24, 2016 at 08:59:53PM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>> On 12/24/2016 03:22 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >BPF digests are intended to be used to avoid reloading programs that
>> >are already loaded. For use cases (CRIU?) where untrusted programs
>> >are involved, intentional hash collisions could cause the wrong BPF
>> >program to execute. Additionally, if BPF digests are ever used
>> >in-kernel to skip verification, a hash collision could give privilege
>> >escalation directly.
>>
>> Just for the record, digests will never ever be used to skip the
>> verification step, so I don't know why this idea even comes up
>> here (?) or is part of the changelog? As this will never be done
>> anyway, rather drop that part so we can avoid confusion on this?
>
> +1 to what Daniel said above.
>
> For the others let me explain what this patch set is actually
> trying to accomplish.
The patch:
a) cleans up the code and
b) uses a cryptographic hash that is actually believed to satisfy the
definition of a cryptographic hash.
There's no excuse for not doing b.
> and I have an obvious NACK for bpf related patches 3,4,5,6.
Did you *read* the ones that were pure cleanups?
>
> sha1 is 20 bytes which is already a bit long to print and copy paste by humans.
> whereas 4 byte jhash is a bit too short, since collisions are not that rare
> and may lead to incorrect assumptions from the users that develop the programs.
> I would prefer something in 6-10 byte range that prevents collisions most of
> the time and short to print as hex, but I don't know of anything like this
> in the existing kernel and inventing bpf specific hash is not great.
> Another requirement for debugging (and prog_digest) that user space
> should be able to produce the same hash without asking kernel, so
> sha1 fits that as well, since it's well known and easy to put into library.
Then truncate them in user space.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 3/6] bpf: Use SHA256 instead of SHA1 for bpf digests
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2016-12-27 1:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Eric Dumazet,
Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller, Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <585ED3B9.6020407@iogearbox.net>
On Sat, Dec 24, 2016 at 08:59:53PM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 12/24/2016 03:22 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >BPF digests are intended to be used to avoid reloading programs that
> >are already loaded. For use cases (CRIU?) where untrusted programs
> >are involved, intentional hash collisions could cause the wrong BPF
> >program to execute. Additionally, if BPF digests are ever used
> >in-kernel to skip verification, a hash collision could give privilege
> >escalation directly.
>
> Just for the record, digests will never ever be used to skip the
> verification step, so I don't know why this idea even comes up
> here (?) or is part of the changelog? As this will never be done
> anyway, rather drop that part so we can avoid confusion on this?
+1 to what Daniel said above.
For the others let me explain what this patch set is actually
trying to accomplish.
Andy had an idea that sha256 of the program can somehow be used
to bypass kernel verifier during program loading. Furthemore
he thinks that such 'bypass' would be useful for criu of bpf programs,
hence see vigorously attacking existing prog_digest (sha1) because
it's not as secure as sha256 and hence cannot be used for such 'bypass'.
The problem with criu of bpf programs is same as criu of kernel modules.
For the main tracing and networking use cases, we cannot stop the kernel,
so criu is out of question already.
Even if we could stop all the events that trigger bpf program execution,
the sha256 or memcmp() of the full program is not enough to guarantee
that two programs are the same.
Ex. bpf_map_lookup() may be safe for one program and not for another
depending on how map was created. Two programs of different types
are not comparable either. Etc, etc.
Therefore the idea of using sha256 for such purpose is bogus,
and I have an obvious NACK for bpf related patches 3,4,5,6.
For the questions raised in other threads:
I'm not ok with making BPF depend on CRYPTO, since it's the same as
requiring CRYPTO to select BPF for no good reason.
And 0/6 commit log:
> Since there are plenty of uses for the new-in-4.10 BPF digest feature
> that would be problematic if malicious users could produce collisions,
> the BPF digest should be collision-resistant.
This statement is also bogus. The only reason we added prog_digest is
to improve debuggability and introspection of bpf programs.
As I said in the previous thread "collisions are ok" and we could have
used jhash here to avoid patches like this ever appearing
and wasting everyones time.
sha1 is 20 bytes which is already a bit long to print and copy paste by humans.
whereas 4 byte jhash is a bit too short, since collisions are not that rare
and may lead to incorrect assumptions from the users that develop the programs.
I would prefer something in 6-10 byte range that prevents collisions most of
the time and short to print as hex, but I don't know of anything like this
in the existing kernel and inventing bpf specific hash is not great.
Another requirement for debugging (and prog_digest) that user space
should be able to produce the same hash without asking kernel, so
sha1 fits that as well, since it's well known and easy to put into library.
sha256 doesn't fit either of these requirements. 32-bytes are too long to print
and when we use it as a substitue for the prog name for jited ksym, looking
at long function names will screw up all tools like perf, which we don't
want. sha256 is equally not easy for user space app like iproute2,
so not an acceptable choice from that pov either.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [sparc64] cryptomgr_test OOPS kernel 4.9.0+
From: David Miller @ 2016-12-26 22:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matorola; +Cc: linux-crypto, sparclinux, herbert, giovanni.cabiddu
In-Reply-To: <CADxRZqwxU+XjTe+jwfrDdsp7Vs47YsJHww3=bsENhrUsYgHvkg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Anatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Dec 2016 20:56:08 +0300
> Disabling kernel config option
> CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
> i.e. enable run-time self tests, makes kernel unbootable:
>
> tested with git kernels v4.9-8648-g5cc60aeedf31 and v4.9-12259-g7c0f6ba682b9
I think the testing code for the new synchronous compression module is
putting kernel image pointers into scatterlists, which in turn we
attempt to transform to and from page structs.
That doesn't work.
It's coming from the test input buffers:
static int test_acomp(struct crypto_acomp *tfm, struct comp_testvec *ctemplate,
struct comp_testvec *dtemplate, int ctcount, int dtcount)
{
...
sg_init_one(&src, ctemplate[i].input, ilen);
These have to be copied into kmalloc() buffers or similar, just like
the skchiper tests do.
The crash on sparc64 shows that we try to dereference a page struct at
a bogus vmemmap address for a page that doesn't exist.
I hacked up the following and this makes the crashes go away:
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index f616ad7..117bb33 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -1449,22 +1449,31 @@ static int test_acomp(struct crypto_acomp *tfm, struct comp_testvec *ctemplate,
const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_acomp_tfm(tfm));
unsigned int i;
char *output;
+ char *input;
int ret;
struct scatterlist src, dst;
struct acomp_req *req;
struct tcrypt_result result;
+ pr_info("test_acomp: COMP_BUF_SIZE %d\n", (int) COMP_BUF_SIZE);
+
output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!output)
return -ENOMEM;
+ input = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!input) {
+ kfree(output);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ctcount; i++) {
unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
int ilen = ctemplate[i].inlen;
memset(output, 0, dlen);
+ memcpy(input, ctemplate[i].input, ilen);
init_completion(&result.completion);
- sg_init_one(&src, ctemplate[i].input, ilen);
+ sg_init_one(&src, input, ilen);
sg_init_one(&dst, output, dlen);
req = acomp_request_alloc(tfm);
@@ -1512,8 +1521,9 @@ static int test_acomp(struct crypto_acomp *tfm, struct comp_testvec *ctemplate,
int ilen = dtemplate[i].inlen;
memset(output, 0, dlen);
+ memcpy(input, dtemplate[i].input, ilen);
init_completion(&result.completion);
- sg_init_one(&src, dtemplate[i].input, ilen);
+ sg_init_one(&src, input, ilen);
sg_init_one(&dst, output, dlen);
req = acomp_request_alloc(tfm);
@@ -1559,6 +1569,7 @@ static int test_acomp(struct crypto_acomp *tfm, struct comp_testvec *ctemplate,
ret = 0;
out:
+ kfree(input);
kfree(output);
return ret;
}
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [sparc64] cryptomgr_test OOPS kernel 4.9.0+
From: David Miller @ 2016-12-26 20:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: matorola; +Cc: linux-crypto, sparclinux
In-Reply-To: <CADxRZqwxU+XjTe+jwfrDdsp7Vs47YsJHww3=bsENhrUsYgHvkg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Anatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Dec 2016 20:56:08 +0300
> Disabling kernel config option
> CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
> i.e. enable run-time self tests, makes kernel unbootable:
>
> tested with git kernels v4.9-8648-g5cc60aeedf31 and v4.9-12259-g7c0f6ba682b9
I'm getting this with the current GIT tree too, will try to see
what's going wrong.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 1/6] crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-26 18:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: Herbert Xu, Andy Lutomirski, Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML,
Linux Crypto Mailing List, Jason A. Donenfeld,
Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov, Eric Dumazet,
Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu-NMNCEs61f4k7JSf9iSJ1A_Gy1r=kZRGqtbDsEDz7--Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Dec 26, 2016 at 9:51 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> On 26 December 2016 at 07:57, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>> On Sat, Dec 24, 2016 at 09:57:53AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>
>>> I actually do use incremental hashing later on. BPF currently
>>> vmallocs() a big temporary buffer just so it can fill it and hash it.
>>> I change it to hash as it goes.
>>
>> How much data is this supposed to hash on average? If it's a large
>> amount then perhaps using the existing crypto API would be a better
>> option than adding this.
>>
>
> This is a good point actually: you didn't explain *why* BPF shouldn't
> depend on the crypto API.
According to Daniel, the networking folks want to let embedded systems
include BPF without requiring the crypto core.
At some point, I'd also like to use modern hash functions for module
verification. If doing so would require the crypto core to be
available when modules are loaded, then the crypto core couldn't be
modular. (Although it occurs to me that my patches get that wrong --
if this change happens, I need to split the code so that the library
functions can be built in even if CRYPTO=m.)
Daniel, would you be okay with BPF selecting CRYPTO and CRYPTO_HASH?
Also, as a bikeshed thought: I could call the functions
sha256_init_direct(), etc. Then there wouldn't be namespace
collisions and the fact that they bypass accelerated drivers would be
more obvious.
--Andy
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 1/6] crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2016-12-26 17:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Andy Lutomirski, Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML,
Linux Crypto Mailing List, Jason A. Donenfeld,
Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov, Eric Dumazet,
Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20161226075757.GA8916@gondor.apana.org.au>
On 26 December 2016 at 07:57, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 24, 2016 at 09:57:53AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>> I actually do use incremental hashing later on. BPF currently
>> vmallocs() a big temporary buffer just so it can fill it and hash it.
>> I change it to hash as it goes.
>
> How much data is this supposed to hash on average? If it's a large
> amount then perhaps using the existing crypto API would be a better
> option than adding this.
>
This is a good point actually: you didn't explain *why* BPF shouldn't
depend on the crypto API.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 0/6] Switch BPF's digest to SHA256
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-12-26 8:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: daniel, netdev, linux-kernel, linux-crypto, Jason, hannes,
alexei.starovoitov, edumazet, ebiggers3, tom, davem, luto
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> Since there are plenty of uses for the new-in-4.10 BPF digest feature
> that would be problematic if malicious users could produce collisions,
> the BPF digest should be collision-resistant. SHA-1 is no longer
> considered collision-resistant, so switch it to SHA-256.
>
> The actual switchover is trivial. Most of this series consists of
> cleanups to the SHA256 code to make it usable as a standalone library
> (since BPF should not depend on crypto).
>
> The cleaned up library is much more user-friendly than the SHA-1 code,
> so this also significantly tidies up the BPF digest code.
>
> This is intended for 4.10. If this series misses 4.10 and nothing
> takes its place, then we'll have an unpleasant ABI stability
> situation.
Can you please explain why BPF needs to be able to use SHA directly
rather than through the crypto API?
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 1/6] crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-12-26 7:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Andy Lutomirski, Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML,
Linux Crypto Mailing List, Jason A. Donenfeld,
Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov, Eric Dumazet,
Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVbT_1=cdU1+a-+KbhoFqeT3XvbHjY0s_U7C5JVgiPx_Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Sat, Dec 24, 2016 at 09:57:53AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> I actually do use incremental hashing later on. BPF currently
> vmallocs() a big temporary buffer just so it can fill it and hash it.
> I change it to hash as it goes.
How much data is this supposed to hash on average? If it's a large
amount then perhaps using the existing crypto API would be a better
option than adding this.
Cheers,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* [sparc64] cryptomgr_test OOPS kernel 4.9.0+
From: Anatoly Pugachev @ 2016-12-25 17:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto; +Cc: Sparc kernel list
Hello!
Disabling kernel config option
CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
i.e. enable run-time self tests, makes kernel unbootable:
tested with git kernels v4.9-8648-g5cc60aeedf31 and v4.9-12259-g7c0f6ba682b9
SILO Version 1.4.14
boot:
Allocated 64 Megs of memory at 0x40000000 for kernel
Uncompressing image...
Loaded kernel version 4.9.0
Loading initial ramdisk (14000758 bytes at 0x74000000 phys, 0x40C00000 virt)...
/
[ 0.000000] PROMLIB: Sun IEEE Boot Prom 'OBP 4.38.5 2016/06/22 19:36'
[ 0.000000] PROMLIB: Root node compatible: sun4v
[ 0.000000] Linux version 4.9.0+ (mator@ttip) (gcc version 6.2.1
20161215 (Debian 6.2.1-7) ) #38 SMP Sun Dec 25 13:35:48 MSK 2016
[ 0.000000] debug: skip boot console de-registration.
[ 0.000000] bootconsole [earlyprom0] enabled
[ 0.000000] ARCH: SUN4V
[ 0.000000] Ethernet address: 00:14:4f:fa:06:f2
[ 0.000000] MM: PAGE_OFFSET is 0xfff8000000000000 (max_phys_bits == 47)
[ 0.000000] MM: VMALLOC [0x0000000100000000 --> 0x0006000000000000]
[ 0.000000] MM: VMEMMAP [0x0006000000000000 --> 0x000c000000000000]
[ 0.000000] Kernel: Using 5 locked TLB entries for main kernel image.
[ 0.000000] Remapping the kernel...
[ 0.000000] done.
[ 0.000000] kmemleak: Kernel memory leak detector disabled
[ 0.000000] OF stdout device is: /virtual-devices@100/console@1
[ 0.000000] PROM: Built device tree with 85327 bytes of memory.
[ 0.000000] MDESC: Size is 35552 bytes.
[ 0.000000] PLATFORM: banner-name [SPARC T5-2]
[ 0.000000] PLATFORM: name [ORCL,SPARC-T5-2]
[ 0.000000] PLATFORM: hostid [84fa06f2]
[ 0.000000] PLATFORM: serial# [0035260e]
[ 0.000000] PLATFORM: stick-frequency [3b9aca00]
[ 0.000000] PLATFORM: mac-address [144ffa06f2]
[ 0.000000] PLATFORM: watchdog-resolution [1000 ms]
[ 0.000000] PLATFORM: watchdog-max-timeout [31536000000 ms]
[ 0.000000] PLATFORM: max-cpus [1024]
[ 0.000000] Top of RAM: 0x82f93a000, Total RAM: 0x7ff350000
[ 0.000000] Memory hole size: 773MB
[ 0.000000] Allocated 24576 bytes for kernel page tables.
[ 0.000000] Zone ranges:
[ 0.000000] Normal [mem 0x0000000030400000-0x000000082f939fff]
[ 0.000000] Movable zone start for each node
[ 0.000000] Early memory node ranges
[ 0.000000] node 0: [mem 0x0000000030400000-0x000000006fe7ffff]
[ 0.000000] node 0: [mem 0x000000006ff00000-0x000000006ff25fff]
[ 0.000000] node 0: [mem 0x0000000070000000-0x000000082f87ffff]
[ 0.000000] node 0: [mem 0x000000082f900000-0x000000082f921fff]
[ 0.000000] node 0: [mem 0x000000082f932000-0x000000082f939fff]
[ 0.000000] Initmem setup node 0 [mem 0x0000000030400000-0x000000082f939fff]
[ 0.000000] Booting Linux...
[ 0.000000] CPU CAPS: [flush,stbar,swap,muldiv,v9,blkinit,n2,mul32]
[ 0.000000] CPU CAPS: [div32,v8plus,popc,vis,vis2,ASIBlkInit,fmaf,vis3]
[ 0.000000] CPU CAPS: [hpc,ima,pause,cbcond,aes,des,kasumi,camellia]
[ 0.000000] CPU CAPS: [md5,sha1,sha256,sha512,mpmul,montmul,montsqr,crc32c]
[ 0.000000] percpu: Embedded 11 pages/cpu @fff800082d000000 s46024
r8192 d35896 u131072
[ 0.000000] SUN4V: Mondo queue sizes [cpu(131072) dev(16384) r(8192) nr(256)]
[ 0.000000] Built 1 zonelists in Zone order, mobility grouping on.
Total pages: 4155828
[ 0.000000] Kernel command line: root=/dev/vdiska2 ro
zswap.enabled=1 keep_bootcon noresume
[ 0.000000] log_buf_len individual max cpu contribution: 4096 bytes
[ 0.000000] log_buf_len total cpu_extra contributions: 1044480 bytes
[ 0.000000] log_buf_len min size: 131072 bytes
[ 0.000000] log_buf_len: 2097152 bytes
[ 0.000000] early log buf free: 126208(96%)
[ 0.000000] PID hash table entries: 4096 (order: 2, 32768 bytes)
[ 0.000000] Dentry cache hash table entries: 4194304 (order: 12,
33554432 bytes)
[ 0.000000] Inode-cache hash table entries: 2097152 (order: 11,
16777216 bytes)
[ 0.000000] Sorting __ex_table...
[ 0.000000] Memory: 33114224K/33541440K available (6603K kernel
code, 894K rwdata, 1824K rodata, 608K init, 9985K bss, 427216K
reserved, 0K cma-reserved)
[ 0.000000] Running RCU self tests
[ 0.000000] Hierarchical RCU implementation.
[ 0.000000] RCU lockdep checking is enabled.
[ 0.000000] Build-time adjustment of leaf fanout to 64.
[ 0.000000] NR_IRQS:2048 nr_irqs:2048 1
[ 0.000000] SUN4V: Using IRQ API major 3, cookie only virqs enabled
[11059882.082988] clocksource: stick: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff
max_cycles: 0x1cd42e4dffb, max_idle_ns: 881590591483 ns
[11059882.083097] clocksource: mult[800000] shift[23]
[11059882.083148] clockevent: mult[80000000] shift[31]
[11059882.085633] Console: colour dummy device 80x25
[11059882.085696] console [tty0] enabled
[11059882.085740] Lock dependency validator: Copyright (c) 2006 Red
Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar
[11059882.085819] ... MAX_LOCKDEP_SUBCLASSES: 8
[11059882.085866] ... MAX_LOCK_DEPTH: 48
[11059882.085912] ... MAX_LOCKDEP_KEYS: 8191
[11059882.085962] ... CLASSHASH_SIZE: 4096
[11059882.086011] ... MAX_LOCKDEP_ENTRIES: 16384
[11059882.086061] ... MAX_LOCKDEP_CHAINS: 32768
[11059882.086110] ... CHAINHASH_SIZE: 16384
[11059882.086160] memory used by lock dependency info: 5855 kB
[11059882.086221] per task-struct memory footprint: 1920 bytes
[11059882.086971] kmemleak: Early log buffer exceeded (26295), please
increase DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_EARLY_LOG_SIZE
[11059884.094525] Calibrating delay using timer specific routine..
2006.23 BogoMIPS (lpj=4012467)
[11059884.094652] pid_max: default: 262144 minimum: 2048
[11059884.095661] Security Framework initialized
[11059884.095713] Yama: becoming mindful.
[11059884.095776] AppArmor: AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter
[11059884.096179] Mount-cache hash table entries: 65536 (order: 6, 524288 bytes)
[11059884.096261] Mountpoint-cache hash table entries: 65536 (order:
6, 524288 bytes)
[11059884.098289] ftrace: allocating 19365 entries in 38 pages
[11059884.119485] smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ...
[11059884.173617] smp: Brought up 1 node, 32 CPUs
[11059884.179296] devtmpfs: initialized
[11059884.185352] Performance events:
[11059884.185387] Testing NMI watchdog ...
[11059884.265513] OK.
[11059884.265632] Supported PMU type is 'niagara5'
[11059884.299456] ldc.c:v1.1 (July 22, 2008)
[11059884.301371] clocksource: jiffies: mask: 0xffffffff max_cycles:
0xffffffff, max_idle_ns: 7645041785100000 ns
[11059884.306042] NET: Registered protocol family 16
[11059884.316862] VIO: Adding device channel-devices
[11059884.317163] VIO: Adding device vnet-port-0-0
[11059884.317437] VIO: Adding device vnet-port-0-1
[11059884.317694] VIO: Adding device vnet-port-0-2
[11059884.317961] VIO: Adding device vnet-port-0-3
[11059884.318852] VIO: Adding device vnet-port-0-4
[11059884.319757] VIO: Adding device vdc-port-0-0
[11059884.320640] VIO: Adding device vdc-port-1-0
[11059884.321523] VIO: Adding device vdc-port-2-0
[11059884.322420] VIO: Adding device vdc-port-3-0
[11059884.323303] VIO: Adding device vlds-port-0-0
[11059884.324207] VIO: Adding device ds-0
[11059884.393536] HugeTLB registered 8 MB page size, pre-allocated 0 pages
[11059884.403418] vgaarb: loaded
[11059884.407260] SUN4V: Reboot data supported (maj=1,min=0).
[11059884.407477] ds.c:v1.0 (Jul 11, 2007)
[11059884.407815] ds-0: ds_conn_reset() from send_events
[11059884.407968] ds-0: Registered md-update service.
[11059884.408021] ds-0: Registered domain-shutdown service.
[11059884.408090] ds-0: Registered domain-panic service.
[11059884.408155] ds-0: Registered dr-cpu service.
[11059884.408211] ds-0: Registered pri service.
[11059884.408266] ds-0: Registered var-config service.
[11059884.408413] clocksource: Switched to clocksource stick
[11059884.509681] VFS: Disk quotas dquot_6.6.0
[11059884.511529] VFS: Dquot-cache hash table entries: 1024 (order 0,
8192 bytes)
[11059884.531075] NET: Registered protocol family 2
[11059884.538440] TCP established hash table entries: 262144 (order:
8, 2097152 bytes)
[11059884.539519] TCP bind hash table entries: 65536 (order: 9, 4194304 bytes)
[11059884.550419] TCP: Hash tables configured (established 262144 bind 65536)
[11059884.550753] UDP hash table entries: 16384 (order: 8, 2621440 bytes)
[11059884.557183] UDP-Lite hash table entries: 16384 (order: 8, 2621440 bytes)
[11059884.568838] NET: Registered protocol family 1
[11059884.569346] Unpacking initramfs...
[11059884.902162] Freeing initrd memory: 13672K
[11059884.944211] futex hash table entries: 65536 (order: 10, 8388608 bytes)
[11059884.955799] audit: initializing netlink subsys (disabled)
[11059884.956191] audit: type=2000 audit(0.936:1): initialized
[11059884.958931] workingset: timestamp_bits=46 max_order=22 bucket_order=0
[11059884.960142] zbud: loaded
[11059884.979364] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual
address 000612000001c000
[11059884.979448] tsk->{mm,active_mm}->context = 0000000000000000
[11059884.979502] tsk->{mm,active_mm}->pgd = fff8000070002000
[11059884.979555] \|/ ____ \|/
[11059884.979555] "@'/ .. \`@"
[11059884.979555] /_| \__/ |_\
[11059884.979555] \__U_/
[11059884.979695] cryptomgr_test(229): Oops [#1]
[11059884.979743] CPU: 27 PID: 229 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 4.9.0+ #38
[11059884.979808] task: fff800080c42c040 task.stack: fff8000808c74000
[11059884.979866] TSTATE: 0000009980001602 TPC: 0000000000745208 TNPC:
000000000074520c Y: 000000d1 Not tainted
[11059884.979966] TPC: <scatterwalk_copychunks+0xa8/0x1e0>
[11059884.980015] g0: 0000000000000000 g1: 000612000001cc20 g2:
00000000000000b8 g3: 0000000000000002
[11059884.980096] g4: fff800080c42c040 g5: fff800082c5ac000 g6:
fff8000808c74000 g7: 0000000000001b00
[11059884.980177] o0: fff8000808c77b08 o1: 00000001003a4000 o2:
0000000000000046 o3: 00000000024002c0
[11059884.980258] o4: fff8000030404920 o5: 0000000000cdec00 sp:
fff8000808c76f11 ret_pc: 0000000000000000
[11059884.980341] RPC: < (null)>
[11059884.980405] l0: 0000000000001fff l1: 0000000000000000 l2:
0000000000baddf0 l3: 00000000000011e8
[11059884.980492] l4: 00000fff00000000 l5: 0006000000000000 l6:
0000000000d0afc0 l7: 0000000000dc13c8
[11059884.980573] i0: 00000001003a4000 i1: fff8000808c77870 i2:
0000000000000046 i3: 0000000000000000
[11059884.980651] i4: 0000000000000046 i5: 0000000000000046 i6:
fff8000808c76fc1 i7: 000000000074537c
[11059884.980734] I7: <scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x3c/0xc0>
[11059884.980784] Call Trace:
[11059884.980814] [000000000074537c] scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x3c/0xc0
[11059884.980879] [000000000074ba94] scomp_acomp_comp_decomp+0xb4/0x260
[11059884.980940] [000000000074bc70] scomp_acomp_compress+0x10/0x20
[11059884.981000] [0000000000751080] test_acomp+0x160/0x4c0
[11059884.981052] [0000000000751474] alg_test_comp+0x94/0x100
[11059884.981104] [000000000074f6fc] alg_test+0x15c/0x300
[11059884.981157] [000000000074c748] cryptomgr_test+0x48/0x60
[11059884.982214] [00000000004927cc] kthread+0xec/0x140
[11059884.982265] [0000000000406084] ret_from_fork+0x1c/0x2c
[11059884.982317] [0000000000000000] (null)
[11059884.982364] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[11059884.982416] Caller[000000000074537c]: scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x3c/0xc0
[11059884.982479] Caller[000000000074ba94]: scomp_acomp_comp_decomp+0xb4/0x260
[11059884.982544] Caller[000000000074bc70]: scomp_acomp_compress+0x10/0x20
[11059884.982606] Caller[0000000000751080]: test_acomp+0x160/0x4c0
[11059884.982661] Caller[0000000000751474]: alg_test_comp+0x94/0x100
[11059884.982717] Caller[000000000074f6fc]: alg_test+0x15c/0x300
[11059884.982773] Caller[000000000074c748]: cryptomgr_test+0x48/0x60
[11059884.982829] Caller[00000000004927cc]: kthread+0xec/0x140
[11059884.982881] Caller[0000000000406084]: ret_from_fork+0x1c/0x2c
[11059884.982937] Caller[0000000000000000]: (null)
[11059884.982987] Instruction DUMP:
[11059884.982989] c4066008
[11059884.983021] 92100018
[11059884.983050] 9410001c
[11059884.983079] <d0586040>
[11059884.983106] 82088010
[11059884.983135] 90020001
[11059884.983162] 937ec408
[11059884.983190] 40019e7a
[11059884.983219] 917ec418
[11059884.983247]
[11059884.983298] note: cryptomgr_test[229] exited with preempt_count 2
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 2/2] crypto: skcipher AF_ALG - overhaul memory management
From: Stephan Müller @ 2016-12-25 17:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <1486189.x0AQ4O6r2j@positron.chronox.de>
The updated memory management is described in the top part of the code.
As one benefit of the changed memory management, the AIO and synchronous
operation is now implemented in one common function. The AF_ALG
operation uses the async kernel crypto API interface for each cipher
operation. Thus, the only difference between the AIO and sync operation
types visible from user space is:
1. the callback function to be invoked when the asynchronous operation
is completed
2. whether to wait for the completion of the kernel crypto API operation
or not
In addition, the code structure is adjusted to match the structure of
algif_aead for easier code assessment.
The user space interface changed slightly as follows: the old AIO
operation returned zero upon success and < 0 in case of an error to user
space. As all other AF_ALG interfaces (including the sync skcipher
interface) returned the number of processed bytes upon success and < 0
in case of an error, the new skcipher interface (regardless of AIO or
sync) returns the number of processed bytes in case of success.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 438 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 174 insertions(+), 264 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
index a9e79d8..437e60a 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -10,6 +10,24 @@
* Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
* any later version.
*
+ * The following concept of the memory management is used:
+ *
+ * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is
+ * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling
+ * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be
+ * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must
+ * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL.
+ *
+ * During the processing of the recvmsg operation, the cipher request is
+ * allocated and prepared. To support multiple recvmsg operations operating
+ * on one TX SGL, an offset pointer into the TX SGL is maintained. The TX SGL
+ * that is used for the crypto request is scatterwalk_ffwd by the offset
+ * pointer to obtain the start address the crypto operation shall use for
+ * the input data.
+ *
+ * After the completion of the crypto operation, the RX SGL and the cipher
+ * request is released. The TX SGL is released once all parts of it are
+ * processed.
*/
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
@@ -31,6 +49,22 @@ struct skcipher_sg_list {
struct scatterlist sg[0];
};
+struct skcipher_async_rsgl {
+ struct af_alg_sgl sgl;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct skcipher_async_req {
+ struct kiocb *iocb;
+ struct sock *sk;
+
+ struct skcipher_async_rsgl first_sgl;
+ struct list_head list;
+
+ unsigned int areqlen;
+ struct skcipher_request req;
+};
+
struct skcipher_tfm {
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
bool has_key;
@@ -44,65 +78,22 @@ struct skcipher_ctx {
struct af_alg_completion completion;
- atomic_t inflight;
+ unsigned int inflight;
size_t used;
+ size_t processed;
- unsigned int len;
bool more;
bool merge;
bool enc;
- struct skcipher_request req;
-};
-
-struct skcipher_async_rsgl {
- struct af_alg_sgl sgl;
- struct list_head list;
+ unsigned int len;
};
-struct skcipher_async_req {
- struct kiocb *iocb;
- struct skcipher_async_rsgl first_sgl;
- struct list_head list;
- struct scatterlist *tsg;
- atomic_t *inflight;
- struct skcipher_request req;
-};
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(skcipher_aio_finish_wait);
#define MAX_SGL_ENTS ((4096 - sizeof(struct skcipher_sg_list)) / \
sizeof(struct scatterlist) - 1)
-static void skcipher_free_async_sgls(struct skcipher_async_req *sreq)
-{
- struct skcipher_async_rsgl *rsgl, *tmp;
- struct scatterlist *sgl;
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- int i, n;
-
- list_for_each_entry_safe(rsgl, tmp, &sreq->list, list) {
- af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
- if (rsgl != &sreq->first_sgl)
- kfree(rsgl);
- }
- sgl = sreq->tsg;
- n = sg_nents(sgl);
- for_each_sg(sgl, sg, n, i)
- put_page(sg_page(sg));
-
- kfree(sreq->tsg);
-}
-
-static void skcipher_async_cb(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
-{
- struct skcipher_async_req *sreq = req->data;
- struct kiocb *iocb = sreq->iocb;
-
- atomic_dec(sreq->inflight);
- skcipher_free_async_sgls(sreq);
- kzfree(sreq);
- iocb->ki_complete(iocb, err, err);
-}
-
static inline int skcipher_sndbuf(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
@@ -117,7 +108,7 @@ static inline bool skcipher_writable(struct sock *sk)
return PAGE_SIZE <= skcipher_sndbuf(sk);
}
-static int skcipher_alloc_sgl(struct sock *sk)
+static int skcipher_alloc_tsgl(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
@@ -147,7 +138,7 @@ static int skcipher_alloc_sgl(struct sock *sk)
return 0;
}
-static void skcipher_pull_sgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, int put)
+static void skcipher_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
@@ -171,30 +162,35 @@ static void skcipher_pull_sgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, int put)
used -= plen;
ctx->used -= plen;
+ ctx->processed -= plen;
if (sg[i].length)
return;
- if (put)
- put_page(sg_page(sg + i));
+
+ put_page(sg_page(sg + i));
sg_assign_page(sg + i, NULL);
}
list_del(&sgl->list);
- sock_kfree_s(sk, sgl,
- sizeof(*sgl) + sizeof(sgl->sg[0]) *
- (MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1));
+ sock_kfree_s(sk, sgl, sizeof(*sgl) + sizeof(sgl->sg[0]) *
+ (MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1));
}
if (!ctx->used)
ctx->merge = 0;
}
-static void skcipher_free_sgl(struct sock *sk)
+static void skcipher_free_rsgl(struct skcipher_async_req *areq)
{
- struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
- struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
+ struct sock *sk = areq->sk;
+ struct skcipher_async_rsgl *rsgl, *tmp;
- skcipher_pull_sgl(sk, ctx->used, 1);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(rsgl, tmp, &areq->list, list) {
+ af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
+ if (rsgl != &areq->first_sgl)
+ sock_kfree_s(sk, rsgl, sizeof(*rsgl));
+ list_del(&rsgl->list);
+ }
}
static int skcipher_wait_for_wmem(struct sock *sk, unsigned flags)
@@ -378,7 +374,7 @@ static int skcipher_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
len = min_t(unsigned long, len, skcipher_sndbuf(sk));
- err = skcipher_alloc_sgl(sk);
+ err = skcipher_alloc_tsgl(sk);
if (err)
goto unlock;
@@ -453,7 +449,7 @@ static ssize_t skcipher_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,
goto unlock;
}
- err = skcipher_alloc_sgl(sk);
+ err = skcipher_alloc_tsgl(sk);
if (err)
goto unlock;
@@ -479,25 +475,33 @@ static ssize_t skcipher_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,
return err ?: size;
}
-static int skcipher_all_sg_nents(struct skcipher_ctx *ctx)
+static void skcipher_async_cb(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
{
- struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- int nents = 0;
+ struct skcipher_async_req *areq = req->data;
+ struct sock *sk = areq->sk;
+ struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
+ struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
+ struct kiocb *iocb = areq->iocb;
- list_for_each_entry(sgl, &ctx->tsgl, list) {
- sg = sgl->sg;
+ lock_sock(sk);
- while (!sg->length)
- sg++;
+ BUG_ON(!ctx->inflight);
- nents += sg_nents(sg);
- }
- return nents;
+ skcipher_free_rsgl(areq);
+ sock_kfree_s(sk, areq, areq->areqlen);
+ skcipher_pull_tsgl(sk, areq->req.cryptlen);
+ __sock_put(sk);
+ ctx->inflight--;
+
+ iocb->ki_complete(iocb, err, err);
+
+ release_sock(sk);
+
+ wake_up_interruptible(&skcipher_aio_finish_wait);
}
-static int skcipher_recvmsg_async(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- int flags)
+static int skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ size_t ignored, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
@@ -506,215 +510,131 @@ static int skcipher_recvmsg_async(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
struct skcipher_tfm *skc = pask->private;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = skc->skcipher;
- struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- struct skcipher_async_req *sreq;
- struct skcipher_request *req;
+ unsigned bs = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ unsigned int areqlen = sizeof(struct skcipher_async_req) +
+ crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm);
+ struct skcipher_sg_list *tsgl;
+ struct skcipher_async_req *areq;
struct skcipher_async_rsgl *last_rsgl = NULL;
- unsigned int txbufs = 0, len = 0, tx_nents;
- unsigned int reqsize = crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm);
- unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ struct scatterlist tsgl_head[2], *tsgl_head_p;
int err = -ENOMEM;
- bool mark = false;
- char *iv;
-
- sreq = kzalloc(sizeof(*sreq) + reqsize + ivsize, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!sreq))
- goto out;
-
- req = &sreq->req;
- iv = (char *)(req + 1) + reqsize;
- sreq->iocb = msg->msg_iocb;
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sreq->list);
- sreq->inflight = &ctx->inflight;
+ size_t len = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
- tx_nents = skcipher_all_sg_nents(ctx);
- sreq->tsg = kcalloc(tx_nents, sizeof(*sg), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!sreq->tsg))
+
+ /* Allocate cipher request for current operation. */
+ areq = sock_kmalloc(sk, areqlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!areq))
goto unlock;
- sg_init_table(sreq->tsg, tx_nents);
- memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, ivsize);
- skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
- skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
- skcipher_async_cb, sreq);
+ areq->areqlen = areqlen;
+ areq->sk = sk;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&areq->list);
- while (iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
+ /* convert iovecs of output buffers into RX SGL */
+ while (len < ctx->used && iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
struct skcipher_async_rsgl *rsgl;
- int used;
+ size_t seglen;
if (!ctx->used) {
err = skcipher_wait_for_data(sk, flags);
if (err)
goto free;
}
- sgl = list_first_entry(&ctx->tsgl,
- struct skcipher_sg_list, list);
- sg = sgl->sg;
- while (!sg->length)
- sg++;
-
- used = min_t(unsigned long, ctx->used,
- iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter));
- used = min_t(unsigned long, used, sg->length);
-
- if (txbufs == tx_nents) {
- struct scatterlist *tmp;
- int x;
- /* Ran out of tx slots in async request
- * need to expand */
- tmp = kcalloc(tx_nents * 2, sizeof(*tmp),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tmp) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto free;
- }
+ seglen = min_t(size_t, ctx->used,
+ iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter));
- sg_init_table(tmp, tx_nents * 2);
- for (x = 0; x < tx_nents; x++)
- sg_set_page(&tmp[x], sg_page(&sreq->tsg[x]),
- sreq->tsg[x].length,
- sreq->tsg[x].offset);
- kfree(sreq->tsg);
- sreq->tsg = tmp;
- tx_nents *= 2;
- mark = true;
- }
- /* Need to take over the tx sgl from ctx
- * to the asynch req - these sgls will be freed later */
- sg_set_page(sreq->tsg + txbufs++, sg_page(sg), sg->length,
- sg->offset);
-
- if (list_empty(&sreq->list)) {
- rsgl = &sreq->first_sgl;
- list_add_tail(&rsgl->list, &sreq->list);
+ if (list_empty(&areq->list)) {
+ rsgl = &areq->first_sgl;
} else {
- rsgl = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsgl), GFP_KERNEL);
+ rsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*rsgl), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rsgl) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free;
}
- list_add_tail(&rsgl->list, &sreq->list);
}
- used = af_alg_make_sg(&rsgl->sgl, &msg->msg_iter, used);
- err = used;
- if (used < 0)
+ rsgl->sgl.npages = 0;
+ list_add_tail(&rsgl->list, &areq->list);
+
+ /* make one iovec available as scatterlist */
+ err = af_alg_make_sg(&rsgl->sgl, &msg->msg_iter, seglen);
+ if (err < 0)
goto free;
+
+ /* chain the new scatterlist with previous one */
if (last_rsgl)
af_alg_link_sg(&last_rsgl->sgl, &rsgl->sgl);
last_rsgl = rsgl;
- len += used;
- skcipher_pull_sgl(sk, used, 0);
- iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, used);
+ len += err;
+ iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, err);
}
- if (mark)
- sg_mark_end(sreq->tsg + txbufs - 1);
+ /* Process only as much RX buffers for which we have TX data */
+ if (len > ctx->used)
+ len = ctx->used;
+
+ /*
+ * If more buffers are to be expected to be processed, process only
+ * full block size buffers.
+ */
+ if (ctx->more || len < ctx->used)
+ len -= len % bs;
+
+ tsgl = list_first_entry(&ctx->tsgl, struct skcipher_sg_list, list);
+ /* Get the head of the SGL we want to process */
+ tsgl_head_p = scatterwalk_ffwd(tsgl_head, tsgl->sg, ctx->processed);
+ BUG_ON(!tsgl_head_p);
+
+ /* Initialize the crypto operation */
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(&areq->req, tfm);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(&areq->req, tsgl_head_p,
+ areq->first_sgl.sgl.sg, len, ctx->iv);
+
+ if (msg->msg_iocb && !is_sync_kiocb(msg->msg_iocb)) {
+ /* AIO operation */
+ areq->iocb = msg->msg_iocb;
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(&areq->req,
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ skcipher_async_cb, areq);
+ err = ctx->enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&areq->req) :
+ crypto_skcipher_decrypt(&areq->req);
+ } else {
+ /* Synchronous operation */
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(&areq->req,
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ af_alg_complete,
+ &ctx->completion);
+ err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(ctx->enc ?
+ crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&areq->req) :
+ crypto_skcipher_decrypt(&areq->req),
+ &ctx->completion);
+ }
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sreq->tsg, sreq->first_sgl.sgl.sg,
- len, iv);
- err = ctx->enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req) :
- crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+ /* AIO operation in progress */
if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
- atomic_inc(&ctx->inflight);
+ sock_hold(sk);
err = -EIOCBQUEUED;
- sreq = NULL;
+ ctx->inflight++;
+ /* Remember the TX bytes that were processed. */
+ ctx->processed += len;
goto unlock;
- }
-free:
- skcipher_free_async_sgls(sreq);
-unlock:
- skcipher_wmem_wakeup(sk);
- release_sock(sk);
- kzfree(sreq);
-out:
- return err;
-}
-
-static int skcipher_recvmsg_sync(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- int flags)
-{
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
- struct sock *psk = ask->parent;
- struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk);
- struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- struct skcipher_tfm *skc = pask->private;
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = skc->skcipher;
- unsigned bs = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
- struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- int err = -EAGAIN;
- int used;
- long copied = 0;
-
- lock_sock(sk);
- while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
- if (!ctx->used) {
- err = skcipher_wait_for_data(sk, flags);
- if (err)
- goto unlock;
- }
-
- used = min_t(unsigned long, ctx->used, msg_data_left(msg));
-
- used = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->rsgl, &msg->msg_iter, used);
- err = used;
- if (err < 0)
- goto unlock;
-
- if (ctx->more || used < ctx->used)
- used -= used % bs;
-
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (!used)
- goto free;
-
- sgl = list_first_entry(&ctx->tsgl,
- struct skcipher_sg_list, list);
- sg = sgl->sg;
-
- while (!sg->length)
- sg++;
-
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, sg, ctx->rsgl.sg, used,
- ctx->iv);
-
- err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(
- ctx->enc ?
- crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&ctx->req) :
- crypto_skcipher_decrypt(&ctx->req),
- &ctx->completion);
+ } else if (!err)
+ /* Remember the TX bytes that were processed. */
+ ctx->processed += len;
free:
- af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->rsgl);
-
- if (err)
- goto unlock;
-
- copied += used;
- skcipher_pull_sgl(sk, used, 1);
- iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, used);
- }
-
- err = 0;
+ skcipher_free_rsgl(areq);
+ if (areq)
+ sock_kfree_s(sk, areq, areqlen);
+ skcipher_pull_tsgl(sk, len);
unlock:
skcipher_wmem_wakeup(sk);
release_sock(sk);
-
- return copied ?: err;
-}
-
-static int skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- size_t ignored, int flags)
-{
- return (msg->msg_iocb && !is_sync_kiocb(msg->msg_iocb)) ?
- skcipher_recvmsg_async(sock, msg, flags) :
- skcipher_recvmsg_sync(sock, msg, flags);
+ return err ? err : len;
}
static unsigned int skcipher_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
@@ -894,26 +814,20 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
return err;
}
-static void skcipher_wait(struct sock *sk)
-{
- struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
- struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- int ctr = 0;
-
- while (atomic_read(&ctx->inflight) && ctr++ < 100)
- msleep(100);
-}
-
static void skcipher_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(&ctx->req);
+ struct sock *psk = ask->parent;
+ struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk);
+ struct skcipher_tfm *skc = pask->private;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = skc->skcipher;
- if (atomic_read(&ctx->inflight))
- skcipher_wait(sk);
+ /* Suspend caller if AIO operations are in flight. */
+ wait_event_interruptible(skcipher_aio_finish_wait,
+ (ctx->inflight == 0));
- skcipher_free_sgl(sk);
+ skcipher_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used);
sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len);
af_alg_release_parent(sk);
@@ -925,7 +839,7 @@ static int skcipher_accept_parent_nokey(void *private, struct sock *sk)
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_tfm *tfm = private;
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = tfm->skcipher;
- unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(skcipher);
+ unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx);
ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
@@ -943,19 +857,15 @@ static int skcipher_accept_parent_nokey(void *private, struct sock *sk)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->tsgl);
ctx->len = len;
ctx->used = 0;
+ ctx->processed = 0;
+ ctx->inflight = 0;
ctx->more = 0;
ctx->merge = 0;
ctx->enc = 0;
- atomic_set(&ctx->inflight, 0);
af_alg_init_completion(&ctx->completion);
ask->private = ctx;
- skcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, skcipher);
- skcipher_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
- CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
-
sk->sk_destruct = skcipher_sock_destruct;
return 0;
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 1/2] crypto: aead AF_ALG - overhaul memory management
From: Stephan Müller @ 2016-12-25 17:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <1486189.x0AQ4O6r2j@positron.chronox.de>
The updated memory management is described in the top part of the code.
As one benefit of the changed memory management, the AIO and synchronous
operation is now implemented in one common function. The AF_ALG
operation uses the async kernel crypto API interface for each cipher
operation. Thus, the only difference between the AIO and sync operation
types visible from user space is:
1. the callback function to be invoked when the asynchronous operation
is completed
2. whether to wait for the completion of the kernel crypto API operation
or not
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
crypto/algif_aead.c | 439 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
1 file changed, 195 insertions(+), 244 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c
index f849311..3ca68fb 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -11,6 +11,25 @@
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
* Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
* any later version.
+ *
+ * The following concept of the memory management is used:
+ *
+ * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is
+ * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling
+ * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be
+ * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must
+ * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL.
+ *
+ * During the processing of the recvmsg operation, the cipher request is
+ * allocated and prepared. To support multiple recvmsg operations operating
+ * on one TX SGL, an offset pointer into the TX SGL is maintained. The TX SGL
+ * that is used for the crypto request is scatterwalk_ffwd by the offset
+ * pointer to obtain the start address the crypto operation shall use for
+ * the input data.
+ *
+ * After the completion of the crypto operation, the RX SGL and the cipher
+ * request is released. The TX SGL is released once all parts of it are
+ * processed.
*/
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
@@ -24,7 +43,7 @@
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
-struct aead_sg_list {
+struct aead_async_tsgl {
unsigned int cur;
struct scatterlist sg[ALG_MAX_PAGES];
};
@@ -35,34 +54,38 @@ struct aead_async_rsgl {
};
struct aead_async_req {
- struct scatterlist *tsgl;
- struct aead_async_rsgl first_rsgl;
- struct list_head list;
struct kiocb *iocb;
- unsigned int tsgls;
- char iv[];
+ struct sock *sk;
+
+ struct aead_async_rsgl first_rsgl; /* First RX SG */
+ struct list_head list; /* Track RX SGs */
+
+ unsigned int areqlen; /* Length of this data struct */
+ struct aead_request aead_req; /* req ctx trails this struct */
};
struct aead_ctx {
- struct aead_sg_list tsgl;
- struct aead_async_rsgl first_rsgl;
- struct list_head list;
+ struct aead_async_tsgl tsgl;
void *iv;
+ size_t aead_assoclen;
- struct af_alg_completion completion;
+ struct af_alg_completion completion; /* sync work queue */
- unsigned long used;
+ unsigned int inflight; /* outstanding AIO ops */
+ size_t used; /* TX bytes sent to kernel */
+ size_t processed; /* number of bytes processed */
- unsigned int len;
bool more;
bool merge;
bool enc;
- size_t aead_assoclen;
- struct aead_request aead_req;
+ unsigned int len; /* length data structure */
+ struct crypto_aead *aead_tfm;
};
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(aead_aio_finish_wait);
+
static inline int aead_sndbuf(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
@@ -79,34 +102,43 @@ static inline bool aead_writable(struct sock *sk)
static inline bool aead_sufficient_data(struct aead_ctx *ctx)
{
- unsigned as = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req));
+ unsigned as = crypto_aead_authsize(ctx->aead_tfm);
/*
* The minimum amount of memory needed for an AEAD cipher is
* the AAD and in case of decryption the tag.
+ *
+ * Also, sufficient data must be available after disregarding the
+ * already processed data.
*/
- return ctx->used >= ctx->aead_assoclen + (ctx->enc ? 0 : as);
+ return ctx->used >= ctx->aead_assoclen + (ctx->enc ? 0 : as) +
+ ctx->processed;
}
static void aead_reset_ctx(struct aead_ctx *ctx)
{
- struct aead_sg_list *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
+ struct aead_async_tsgl *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
sg_init_table(sgl->sg, ALG_MAX_PAGES);
sgl->cur = 0;
ctx->used = 0;
+ ctx->processed = 0;
ctx->more = 0;
ctx->merge = 0;
}
-static void aead_put_sgl(struct sock *sk)
+static void aead_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, bool force)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- struct aead_sg_list *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
+ struct aead_async_tsgl *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
struct scatterlist *sg = sgl->sg;
unsigned int i;
+ /* leave provided data in tact if we did not finish AIO work */
+ if (!force && ctx->used > ctx->processed)
+ return;
+
for (i = 0; i < sgl->cur; i++) {
if (!sg_page(sg + i))
continue;
@@ -117,6 +149,19 @@ static void aead_put_sgl(struct sock *sk)
aead_reset_ctx(ctx);
}
+static void aead_free_rsgl(struct aead_async_req *areq)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = areq->sk;
+ struct aead_async_rsgl *rsgl, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(rsgl, tmp, &areq->list, list) {
+ af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
+ if (rsgl != &areq->first_rsgl)
+ sock_kfree_s(sk, rsgl, sizeof(*rsgl));
+ list_del(&rsgl->list);
+ }
+}
+
static void aead_wmem_wakeup(struct sock *sk)
{
struct socket_wq *wq;
@@ -189,9 +234,8 @@ static int aead_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- unsigned ivsize =
- crypto_aead_ivsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req));
- struct aead_sg_list *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
+ unsigned ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_tfm);
+ struct aead_async_tsgl *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
struct af_alg_control con = {};
long copied = 0;
bool enc = 0;
@@ -258,7 +302,7 @@ static int aead_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
if (!aead_writable(sk)) {
/* user space sent too much data */
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
+ aead_pull_tsgl(sk, 1);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto unlock;
}
@@ -269,7 +313,7 @@ static int aead_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
size_t plen = 0;
if (sgl->cur >= ALG_MAX_PAGES) {
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
+ aead_pull_tsgl(sk, 1);
err = -E2BIG;
goto unlock;
}
@@ -305,7 +349,7 @@ static int aead_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE;
if (!ctx->more && !aead_sufficient_data(ctx)) {
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
+ aead_pull_tsgl(sk, 1);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
}
@@ -322,7 +366,7 @@ static ssize_t aead_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- struct aead_sg_list *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
+ struct aead_async_tsgl *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST)
@@ -340,7 +384,7 @@ static ssize_t aead_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,
if (!aead_writable(sk)) {
/* user space sent too much data */
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
+ aead_pull_tsgl(sk, 1);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto unlock;
}
@@ -357,7 +401,7 @@ static ssize_t aead_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,
done:
ctx->more = flags & MSG_MORE;
if (!ctx->more && !aead_sufficient_data(ctx)) {
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
+ aead_pull_tsgl(sk, 1);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
}
@@ -368,190 +412,48 @@ static ssize_t aead_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,
return err ?: size;
}
-#define GET_ASYM_REQ(req, tfm) (struct aead_async_req *) \
- ((char *)req + sizeof(struct aead_request) + \
- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm))
-
- #define GET_REQ_SIZE(tfm) sizeof(struct aead_async_req) + \
- crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm) + crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) + \
- sizeof(struct aead_request)
-
static void aead_async_cb(struct crypto_async_request *_req, int err)
{
- struct sock *sk = _req->data;
+ struct aead_async_req *areq = _req->data;
+ struct sock *sk = areq->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req);
- struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(_req);
- struct aead_async_req *areq = GET_ASYM_REQ(req, tfm);
- struct scatterlist *sg = areq->tsgl;
- struct aead_async_rsgl *rsgl;
struct kiocb *iocb = areq->iocb;
- unsigned int i, reqlen = GET_REQ_SIZE(tfm);
- list_for_each_entry(rsgl, &areq->list, list) {
- af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
- if (rsgl != &areq->first_rsgl)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, rsgl, sizeof(*rsgl));
- }
+ lock_sock(sk);
- for (i = 0; i < areq->tsgls; i++)
- put_page(sg_page(sg + i));
+ BUG_ON(!ctx->inflight);
- sock_kfree_s(sk, areq->tsgl, sizeof(*areq->tsgl) * areq->tsgls);
- sock_kfree_s(sk, req, reqlen);
+ aead_free_rsgl(areq);
+ sock_kfree_s(sk, areq, areq->areqlen);
+ aead_pull_tsgl(sk, 0);
__sock_put(sk);
+ ctx->inflight--;
iocb->ki_complete(iocb, err, err);
-}
-
-static int aead_recvmsg_async(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- int flags)
-{
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
- struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req);
- struct aead_async_req *areq;
- struct aead_request *req = NULL;
- struct aead_sg_list *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
- struct aead_async_rsgl *last_rsgl = NULL, *rsgl;
- unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
- unsigned int i, reqlen = GET_REQ_SIZE(tfm);
- int err = -ENOMEM;
- unsigned long used;
- size_t outlen = 0;
- size_t usedpages = 0;
- lock_sock(sk);
- if (ctx->more) {
- err = aead_wait_for_data(sk, flags);
- if (err)
- goto unlock;
- }
-
- if (!aead_sufficient_data(ctx))
- goto unlock;
-
- used = ctx->used;
- if (ctx->enc)
- outlen = used + as;
- else
- outlen = used - as;
-
- req = sock_kmalloc(sk, reqlen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!req))
- goto unlock;
-
- areq = GET_ASYM_REQ(req, tfm);
- memset(&areq->first_rsgl, '\0', sizeof(areq->first_rsgl));
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&areq->list);
- areq->iocb = msg->msg_iocb;
- memcpy(areq->iv, ctx->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm));
- aead_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
- aead_request_set_ad(req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
- aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- aead_async_cb, sk);
- used -= ctx->aead_assoclen;
-
- /* take over all tx sgls from ctx */
- areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk,
- sizeof(*areq->tsgl) * max_t(u32, sgl->cur, 1),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!areq->tsgl))
- goto free;
-
- sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, max_t(u32, sgl->cur, 1));
- for (i = 0; i < sgl->cur; i++)
- sg_set_page(&areq->tsgl[i], sg_page(&sgl->sg[i]),
- sgl->sg[i].length, sgl->sg[i].offset);
-
- areq->tsgls = sgl->cur;
-
- /* create rx sgls */
- while (outlen > usedpages && iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
- size_t seglen = min_t(size_t, iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter),
- (outlen - usedpages));
-
- if (list_empty(&areq->list)) {
- rsgl = &areq->first_rsgl;
-
- } else {
- rsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*rsgl), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!rsgl)) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto free;
- }
- }
- rsgl->sgl.npages = 0;
- list_add_tail(&rsgl->list, &areq->list);
-
- /* make one iovec available as scatterlist */
- err = af_alg_make_sg(&rsgl->sgl, &msg->msg_iter, seglen);
- if (err < 0)
- goto free;
-
- usedpages += err;
-
- /* chain the new scatterlist with previous one */
- if (last_rsgl)
- af_alg_link_sg(&last_rsgl->sgl, &rsgl->sgl);
-
- last_rsgl = rsgl;
-
- iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, err);
- }
-
- /* ensure output buffer is sufficiently large */
- if (usedpages < outlen) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto unlock;
- }
-
- aead_request_set_crypt(req, areq->tsgl, areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used,
- areq->iv);
- err = ctx->enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
- if (err) {
- if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
- sock_hold(sk);
- err = -EIOCBQUEUED;
- aead_reset_ctx(ctx);
- goto unlock;
- } else if (err == -EBADMSG) {
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
- }
- goto free;
- }
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
-
-free:
- list_for_each_entry(rsgl, &areq->list, list) {
- af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
- if (rsgl != &areq->first_rsgl)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, rsgl, sizeof(*rsgl));
- }
- if (areq->tsgl)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, areq->tsgl, sizeof(*areq->tsgl) * areq->tsgls);
- if (req)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, req, reqlen);
-unlock:
- aead_wmem_wakeup(sk);
release_sock(sk);
- return err ? err : outlen;
+
+ wake_up_interruptible(&aead_aio_finish_wait);
}
-static int aead_recvmsg_sync(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
+static int aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored,
+ int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- unsigned as = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req));
- struct aead_sg_list *sgl = &ctx->tsgl;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = ctx->aead_tfm;
+ unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+ unsigned int areqlen =
+ sizeof(struct aead_async_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
+ struct aead_async_tsgl *tsgl = &ctx->tsgl;
+ struct aead_async_req *areq;
struct aead_async_rsgl *last_rsgl = NULL;
- struct aead_async_rsgl *rsgl, *tmp;
+ struct scatterlist tsgl_head[2], *tsgl_head_p;
int err = -EINVAL;
- unsigned long used = 0;
- size_t outlen = 0;
- size_t usedpages = 0;
+ size_t used = 0; /* [in] TX bufs to be en/decrypted */
+ size_t outlen = 0; /* [out] RX bufs produced by kernel */
+ size_t usedpages = 0; /* [in] RX bufs to be used from user */
lock_sock(sk);
@@ -566,8 +468,11 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_sync(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
goto unlock;
}
- /* data length provided by caller via sendmsg/sendpage */
- used = ctx->used;
+ /*
+ * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg/sendpage that has not
+ * yet been processed.
+ */
+ used = ctx->used - ctx->processed;
/*
* Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is
@@ -600,86 +505,131 @@ static int aead_recvmsg_sync(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
*/
used -= ctx->aead_assoclen;
- /* convert iovecs of output buffers into scatterlists */
+ /* Allocate cipher request for current operation. */
+ areq = sock_kmalloc(sk, areqlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!areq)) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ areq->areqlen = areqlen;
+ areq->sk = sk;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&areq->list);
+
+ /* convert iovecs of output buffers into RX SGL */
while (outlen > usedpages && iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
+ struct aead_async_rsgl *rsgl;
size_t seglen = min_t(size_t, iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter),
(outlen - usedpages));
- if (list_empty(&ctx->list)) {
- rsgl = &ctx->first_rsgl;
+ if (list_empty(&areq->list)) {
+ rsgl = &areq->first_rsgl;
} else {
rsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*rsgl), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!rsgl)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
- goto unlock;
+ goto free;
}
}
+
rsgl->sgl.npages = 0;
- list_add_tail(&rsgl->list, &ctx->list);
+ list_add_tail(&rsgl->list, &areq->list);
/* make one iovec available as scatterlist */
err = af_alg_make_sg(&rsgl->sgl, &msg->msg_iter, seglen);
if (err < 0)
- goto unlock;
- usedpages += err;
+ goto free;
+
/* chain the new scatterlist with previous one */
if (last_rsgl)
af_alg_link_sg(&last_rsgl->sgl, &rsgl->sgl);
last_rsgl = rsgl;
-
+ usedpages += err;
iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, err);
}
- /* ensure output buffer is sufficiently large */
+ /*
+ * Ensure output buffer is sufficiently large. If the caller provides
+ * less buffer space, only use the relative required input size. This
+ * allows AIO operation where the caller sent all data to be processed
+ * and the AIO operation performs the operation on the different chunks
+ * of the input data.
+ */
if (usedpages < outlen) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto unlock;
- }
+ size_t less = outlen - usedpages;
- sg_mark_end(sgl->sg + sgl->cur - 1);
- aead_request_set_crypt(&ctx->aead_req, sgl->sg, ctx->first_rsgl.sgl.sg,
- used, ctx->iv);
- aead_request_set_ad(&ctx->aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
+ if (used < less) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free;
+ }
+ used -= less;
+ outlen -= less;
+ }
- err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(ctx->enc ?
- crypto_aead_encrypt(&ctx->aead_req) :
- crypto_aead_decrypt(&ctx->aead_req),
+ sg_mark_end(tsgl->sg + tsgl->cur - 1);
+
+ /* Get the head of the SGL we want to process */
+ tsgl_head_p = scatterwalk_ffwd(tsgl_head, tsgl->sg, ctx->processed);
+ BUG_ON(!tsgl_head_p);
+
+ /* Initialize the crypto operation */
+ aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->aead_req, tsgl_head_p,
+ areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, ctx->iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(&areq->aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);
+ aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->aead_req, tfm);
+
+ if (msg->msg_iocb && !is_sync_kiocb(msg->msg_iocb)) {
+ /* AIO operation */
+ areq->iocb = msg->msg_iocb;
+ aead_request_set_callback(&areq->aead_req,
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ aead_async_cb, areq);
+ err = ctx->enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(&areq->aead_req) :
+ crypto_aead_decrypt(&areq->aead_req);
+ } else {
+ /* Synchronous operation */
+ aead_request_set_callback(&areq->aead_req,
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
+ err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(ctx->enc ?
+ crypto_aead_encrypt(&areq->aead_req) :
+ crypto_aead_decrypt(&areq->aead_req),
&ctx->completion);
+ }
if (err) {
- /* EBADMSG implies a valid cipher operation took place */
- if (err == -EBADMSG)
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
+ /* AIO operation in progress */
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
+ sock_hold(sk);
+ err = -EIOCBQUEUED;
- goto unlock;
+ /* Remember the TX bytes that were processed. */
+ ctx->processed += ctx->enc ? (outlen - as) :
+ (outlen + as);
+ ctx->inflight++;
+
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ /* EBADMSG implies a valid cipher operation took place */
+ else if (err != -EBADMSG)
+ goto free;
}
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
- err = 0;
+ /* Remember the TX bytes that were processed. */
+ ctx->processed += ctx->enc ? (outlen - as) : (outlen + as);
+
+free:
+ aead_free_rsgl(areq);
+ if (areq)
+ sock_kfree_s(sk, areq, areqlen);
+ aead_pull_tsgl(sk, 0);
unlock:
- list_for_each_entry_safe(rsgl, tmp, &ctx->list, list) {
- af_alg_free_sg(&rsgl->sgl);
- if (rsgl != &ctx->first_rsgl)
- sock_kfree_s(sk, rsgl, sizeof(*rsgl));
- list_del(&rsgl->list);
- }
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->list);
aead_wmem_wakeup(sk);
release_sock(sk);
-
return err ? err : outlen;
}
-static int aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored,
- int flags)
-{
- return (msg->msg_iocb && !is_sync_kiocb(msg->msg_iocb)) ?
- aead_recvmsg_async(sock, msg, flags) :
- aead_recvmsg_sync(sock, msg, flags);
-}
-
static unsigned int aead_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
@@ -746,11 +696,14 @@ static void aead_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct aead_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
- unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(
- crypto_aead_reqtfm(&ctx->aead_req));
+ unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_tfm);
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt) != 0);
- aead_put_sgl(sk);
+
+ /* Suspend caller if AIO operations are in flight. */
+ wait_event_interruptible(aead_aio_finish_wait, (ctx->inflight == 0));
+
+ aead_pull_tsgl(sk, 1);
sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, ivlen);
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len);
af_alg_release_parent(sk);
@@ -760,7 +713,7 @@ static int aead_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
struct aead_ctx *ctx;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
- unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_aead_reqsize(private);
+ unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx);
unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(private);
ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -777,20 +730,18 @@ static int aead_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
ctx->len = len;
ctx->used = 0;
+ ctx->processed = 0;
ctx->more = 0;
ctx->merge = 0;
ctx->enc = 0;
+ ctx->inflight = 0;
ctx->tsgl.cur = 0;
ctx->aead_assoclen = 0;
af_alg_init_completion(&ctx->completion);
sg_init_table(ctx->tsgl.sg, ALG_MAX_PAGES);
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->list);
ask->private = ctx;
-
- aead_request_set_tfm(&ctx->aead_req, private);
- aead_request_set_callback(&ctx->aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
+ ctx->aead_tfm = private;
sk->sk_destruct = aead_sock_destruct;
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 0/2] crypto: AF_ALG memory management fix
From: Stephan Müller @ 2016-12-25 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto
Hi Herbert,
please find attached memory management updates to
- simplify the code: the old AIO memory management is very
complex and seemingly very fragile -- the update now
eliminates all reported bugs in the skcipher and AEAD
interfaces which allowed the kernel to be crashed by
an unprivileged user
- streamline the code: there is one code path for AIO and sync
operation; the code between algif_skcipher and algif_aead
is very similar (if that patch set is accepted, I volunteer
to reduce code duplication by moving service operations
into af_alg.c and to further unify the TX SGL handling)
- unify the AIO and sync operation which only differ in the
kernel crypto API callback and whether to wait for the
crypto operation or not
- fix all reported bugs regarding the handling of multiple
IOCBs.
The following testing was performed:
- stress testing to verify that no memleaks exist
- testing using Tadeusz Struck AIO test tool (see
https://github.com/tstruk/afalg_async_test) -- the AEAD test
is not applicable any more due to the changed user space
interface; the skcipher test works once the user space
interface change is honored in the test code
- using the libkcapi test suite, all tests including the
originally failing ones (AIO with multiple IOCBs) work now --
the current libkcapi code artificially limits the AEAD
operation to one IOCB. After altering the libkcapi code
to allow multiple IOCBs, the testing works flawless.
Stephan Mueller (2):
crypto: aead AF_ALG - overhaul memory management
crypto: skcipher AF_ALG - overhaul memory management
crypto/algif_aead.c | 439 ++++++++++++++++++++
+---------------------------
crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 438 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
2 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 508 deletions(-)
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 3/6] bpf: Use SHA256 instead of SHA1 for bpf digests
From: Daniel Borkmann @ 2016-12-24 19:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <bbfd69226fd74391045bafc695bba9a46cacca85.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
On 12/24/2016 03:22 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> BPF digests are intended to be used to avoid reloading programs that
> are already loaded. For use cases (CRIU?) where untrusted programs
> are involved, intentional hash collisions could cause the wrong BPF
> program to execute. Additionally, if BPF digests are ever used
> in-kernel to skip verification, a hash collision could give privilege
> escalation directly.
Just for the record, digests will never ever be used to skip the
verification step, so I don't know why this idea even comes up
here (?) or is part of the changelog? As this will never be done
anyway, rather drop that part so we can avoid confusion on this?
Wrt untrusted programs, I don't see much of a use on this facility
in general for them. Something like a tail call map would quite
likely only be private to the application. And again, I really doubt
we'll have something like user namespace support in the foreseeable
future. Anyway, that said, I don't really have a big issue if you
want to switch to sha256, though.
> SHA1 is no longer considered adequately collision-resistant (see, for
> example, all the major browsers dropping support for SHA1
> certificates). Use SHA256 instead.
>
> I moved the digest field to keep all of the bpf program metadata in
> the same cache line.
>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 1/6] crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ard Biesheuvel
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML,
Linux Crypto Mailing List, Jason A. Donenfeld,
Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov, Eric Dumazet,
Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller, Herbert Xu
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu-UCqwchgbhg8VN4s=Yxk=PkjXG46NZo=8P4wAQtJ2TXw@mail.gmail.com>
On Sat, Dec 24, 2016 at 2:33 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> On 24 December 2016 at 02:22, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>> There are some pieecs of kernel code that want to compute SHA256
>> directly without going through the crypto core. Adjust the exported
>> API to decouple it from the crypto core.
>>
>
> There are a bunch of things happening at the same time in this patch,
> i.e., unnecessary renames of functions with static linkage, return
> type changes to the base prototypes (int (*)(...) to void (*)(...))
> and the change for the base functions to take a struct sha256_state
> ctx rather than a shash_desc. I suppose you are mainly after the
> latter, so could we please drop the other changes?
>
> For the name clashes, could we simply use the crypto_ prefix for the
> globally visible functions rather than using names that are already in
> use? (and having to go around clean up the conflicts)
> As for the return type changes, the base functions intentionally
> return int to allow tail calls from the functions exposed by the
> crypto API (whose prototypes cannot be changed). Unlikely to matter in
> the grand scheme of things (especially now that the base layer
> consists of static inline functions primarily), but it is equally
> pointless to go around and change them to return void IMO.
>
> So what remains is the struct shash_desc to struct sha256_state
> change, which makes sense given that you are after a sha256_digest()
> function that does not require the crypto API. But it seems your use
> case does not rely on incremental hashing, and so there is no reason
> for the state to be exposed outside of the implementation, and we
> could simply expose a crypto_sha256_digest() routine from the
> sha256_generic.c implementation instead.
I actually do use incremental hashing later on. BPF currently
vmallocs() a big temporary buffer just so it can fill it and hash it.
I change it to hash as it goes.
I painted the bike shed the other way because I thought that crypto_
names should indicate that they're the versions compatible with the
crypto API, but I take your point about churn. Part of the reason I
didn't want to use crypto_sha256_update is because that function is
currently like this:
int crypto_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
and I wanted to avoid churn. The sha256_update() functions scattered
all over were static, so I didn't worry about them.
I'm going to give this another try as a split-up series that tries to
avoid making any changes beyond simple function renames to the
drivers.
>
> Also, I strongly feel that crypto and other security related patches
> should be tested before being posted, even if they are only RFC,
> especially when they are posted by high profile kernel devs like
> yourself. (Your code incorrectly calls crypto_sha2_final() in a couple
> of places, resulting in the finalization being performed twice, once
> with the accelerated block transform and again with the generic
> transform)
>
I tested it, albeit poorly. I wanted feedback on the API (thanks!)
and I figured I could more carefully check the implementation once the
API survives a bit of review. Since it looks like I have to rework
this, I'd need to re-test anyway.
>> I suspect this will very slightly speed up the SHA256 shash operations
>> as well by reducing the amount of indirection involved.
>>
>
> I think you have a valid point when it comes to the complexity of the
> crypto API in general. But the struct sha256_state is embedded in the
> shash_desc rather than referred to via a pointer, so the level of
> indirection does not appear to change. And given how 99.9% of the
> SHA256 execution time is spent in the block transform routine anyway,
> I expect the performance delta to be in the noise tbh.
s/very slightly/negligibly? There's an extra speedup from avoiding a
variable-length stack allocation, but that probably doesn't matter
much either.
>
> Finally, another thing to keep in mind is that the base layers of
> SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are intentionally structured in the same
> way. If there is a need for a digest() entry point, I'd prefer to add
> them for all flavours.
I want to get sha256 right first. Once it's in good shape, making the
same changes to the other variants should be easy.
>
> Whether this still belongs under crypto or under lib/sha256.c as a
> library function (allowing archs to override it) is open for debate.
> If hashing BPF programs becomes a hot spot, we probably have bigger
> problems.
>
> Regards,
> Ard.
>
> P.S. I do take your point regarding the arch_sha256_block_transform()
> proposed in your follow up email, but there are some details (SIMD,
> availability of the instructions etc) that would make it only suitable
> for the generic implementation anyway, and the base layer was already
> a huge improvement compared to the open coded implementations of the
> SHA boilerplate.
Agreed, and my model may not be quite right. It might have to be
something like:
if (arch_begin_sha256(len)) {
... do it with arch helpers...
arch_end_sha256();
} else {
... do it generically ...
}
>> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
>> + return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
>
> This is wrong: your crypto_sha2_final also calls sha256_base_do_finalize()
Ugh, right. I clearly need to organize this change better to avoid
this kind of mistake.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 1/6] crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2016-12-24 10:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Herbert Xu
In-Reply-To: <942b91f25a63b22ec4946378a1fffe78d655cf18.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
Hi Andy,
On 24 December 2016 at 02:22, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> There are some pieecs of kernel code that want to compute SHA256
> directly without going through the crypto core. Adjust the exported
> API to decouple it from the crypto core.
>
There are a bunch of things happening at the same time in this patch,
i.e., unnecessary renames of functions with static linkage, return
type changes to the base prototypes (int (*)(...) to void (*)(...))
and the change for the base functions to take a struct sha256_state
ctx rather than a shash_desc. I suppose you are mainly after the
latter, so could we please drop the other changes?
For the name clashes, could we simply use the crypto_ prefix for the
globally visible functions rather than using names that are already in
use? (and having to go around clean up the conflicts)
As for the return type changes, the base functions intentionally
return int to allow tail calls from the functions exposed by the
crypto API (whose prototypes cannot be changed). Unlikely to matter in
the grand scheme of things (especially now that the base layer
consists of static inline functions primarily), but it is equally
pointless to go around and change them to return void IMO.
So what remains is the struct shash_desc to struct sha256_state
change, which makes sense given that you are after a sha256_digest()
function that does not require the crypto API. But it seems your use
case does not rely on incremental hashing, and so there is no reason
for the state to be exposed outside of the implementation, and we
could simply expose a crypto_sha256_digest() routine from the
sha256_generic.c implementation instead.
Also, I strongly feel that crypto and other security related patches
should be tested before being posted, even if they are only RFC,
especially when they are posted by high profile kernel devs like
yourself. (Your code incorrectly calls crypto_sha2_final() in a couple
of places, resulting in the finalization being performed twice, once
with the accelerated block transform and again with the generic
transform)
> I suspect this will very slightly speed up the SHA256 shash operations
> as well by reducing the amount of indirection involved.
>
I think you have a valid point when it comes to the complexity of the
crypto API in general. But the struct sha256_state is embedded in the
shash_desc rather than referred to via a pointer, so the level of
indirection does not appear to change. And given how 99.9% of the
SHA256 execution time is spent in the block transform routine anyway,
I expect the performance delta to be in the noise tbh.
Finally, another thing to keep in mind is that the base layers of
SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are intentionally structured in the same
way. If there is a need for a digest() entry point, I'd prefer to add
them for all flavours.
E.g, something like
"""
@@ -126,3 +128,23 @@ static inline int sha256_base_finish(struct
shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
*sctx = (struct sha256_state){};
return 0;
}
+
+static inline int sha256_base_finish(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ unsigned int digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+ struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ return __sha256_base_finish(sctx, out, digest_size);
+}
+
+static inline int sha256_base_digest(const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out,
+ sha256_block_fn *block_fn)
+{
+ struct sha256_state sctx;
+
+ __sha256_base_init(&sctx);
+ sha256_base_do_update(&sctx, data, len, block_fn);
+ sha256_base_do_finalize(&sctx, block_fn);
+
+ return __sha256_base_finish(&sctx, out, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+}
"""
(where __sha256_base_init() and __sha256_base_finish() are the
existing functions modified to take a struct sha256_state rather than
a shash_desc) should be sufficient to allow a generic
crypto_sha256_digest() to be composed that does not rely on the crypto
API.
Whether this still belongs under crypto or under lib/sha256.c as a
library function (allowing archs to override it) is open for debate.
If hashing BPF programs becomes a hot spot, we probably have bigger
problems.
Regards,
Ard.
P.S. I do take your point regarding the arch_sha256_block_transform()
proposed in your follow up email, but there are some details (SIMD,
availability of the instructions etc) that would make it only suitable
for the generic implementation anyway, and the base layer was already
a huge improvement compared to the open coded implementations of the
SHA boilerplate.
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c | 10 ++++---
> arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c | 23 ++++++++++-----
> arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c | 34 +++++++++++----------
> arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c | 13 ++++----
> arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++------------
> arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c | 25 ++--------------
> arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h | 22 --------------
> crypto/sha256_generic.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> include/crypto/sha.h | 29 ++++++++++++++----
> include/crypto/sha256_base.h | 40 ++++++++-----------------
> 12 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)
> delete mode 100644 arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
> index 0755b2d657f3..8832c2f85591 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
> @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static int sha2_ce_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> return crypto_sha256_arm_update(desc, data, len);
>
> kernel_neon_begin();
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
> kernel_neon_end();
>
> @@ -48,17 +48,19 @@ static int sha2_ce_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> static int sha2_ce_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> {
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> if (!may_use_simd())
> return crypto_sha256_arm_finup(desc, data, len, out);
>
> kernel_neon_begin();
> if (len)
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc, (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx, (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
> kernel_neon_end();
>
> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
> + return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
> }
>
> static int sha2_ce_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c
> index a84e869ef900..405a29a9a9d3 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c
> @@ -36,27 +36,34 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_block_data_order(u32 *digest, const void *data,
> int crypto_sha256_arm_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len)
> {
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> /* make sure casting to sha256_block_fn() is safe */
> BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sha256_state, state) != 0);
>
> - return sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha256_arm_update);
>
> -static int sha256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> +static int sha256_arm_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> {
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
> + return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
This is wrong: your crypto_sha2_final also calls sha256_base_do_finalize()
> }
>
> int crypto_sha256_arm_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> {
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
> - return sha256_final(desc, out);
> + return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha256_arm_finup);
>
> @@ -64,7 +71,7 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
> .digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
> .init = sha256_base_init,
> .update = crypto_sha256_arm_update,
> - .final = sha256_final,
> + .final = sha256_arm_final,
> .finup = crypto_sha256_arm_finup,
> .descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
> .base = {
> @@ -79,7 +86,7 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
> .digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
> .init = sha224_base_init,
> .update = crypto_sha256_arm_update,
> - .final = sha256_final,
> + .final = sha256_arm_final,
> .finup = crypto_sha256_arm_finup,
> .descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
> .base = {
> diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c
> index 39ccd658817e..40c85d1d4c1e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c
> @@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
> asmlinkage void sha256_block_data_order_neon(u32 *digest, const void *data,
> unsigned int num_blks);
>
> -static int sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> - unsigned int len)
> +static int sha256_neon_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> + unsigned int len)
> {
> struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
>
> @@ -39,41 +39,43 @@ static int sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> return crypto_sha256_arm_update(desc, data, len);
>
> kernel_neon_begin();
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order_neon);
> kernel_neon_end();
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> - unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> +static int sha256_neon_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> + unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> {
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> if (!may_use_simd())
> return crypto_sha256_arm_finup(desc, data, len, out);
>
> kernel_neon_begin();
> if (len)
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order_neon);
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order_neon);
> kernel_neon_end();
>
> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
> + return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
> }
>
> -static int sha256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> +static int sha256_neon_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> {
> - return sha256_finup(desc, NULL, 0, out);
> + return sha256_neon_finup(desc, NULL, 0, out);
> }
>
> struct shash_alg sha256_neon_algs[] = { {
> .digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
> .init = sha256_base_init,
> - .update = sha256_update,
> - .final = sha256_final,
> - .finup = sha256_finup,
> + .update = sha256_neon_update,
> + .final = sha256_neon_final,
> + .finup = sha256_neon_finup,
> .descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
> .base = {
> .cra_name = "sha256",
> @@ -86,9 +88,9 @@ struct shash_alg sha256_neon_algs[] = { {
> }, {
> .digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
> .init = sha224_base_init,
> - .update = sha256_update,
> - .final = sha256_final,
> - .finup = sha256_finup,
> + .update = sha256_neon_update,
> + .final = sha256_neon_final,
> + .finup = sha256_neon_finup,
> .descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
> .base = {
> .cra_name = "sha224",
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
> index 7cd587564a41..e38dd301abce 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c
> @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static int sha256_ce_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
>
> sctx->finalize = 0;
> kernel_neon_begin_partial(28);
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(&sctx->sst, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
> kernel_neon_end();
>
> @@ -64,13 +64,13 @@ static int sha256_ce_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> sctx->finalize = finalize;
>
> kernel_neon_begin_partial(28);
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(&sctx->sst, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
> if (!finalize)
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(&sctx->sst,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
> kernel_neon_end();
> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
> + return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
> }
>
> static int sha256_ce_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> @@ -79,9 +79,10 @@ static int sha256_ce_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
>
> sctx->finalize = 0;
> kernel_neon_begin_partial(28);
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc, (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(&sctx->sst,
> + (sha256_block_fn *)sha2_ce_transform);
> kernel_neon_end();
> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
> + return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
> }
>
> static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c
> index a2226f841960..132a1ef89a71 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c
> @@ -33,36 +33,39 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_block_data_order(u32 *digest, const void *data,
> asmlinkage void sha256_block_neon(u32 *digest, const void *data,
> unsigned int num_blks);
>
> -static int sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> - unsigned int len)
> +static int sha256_update_arm64(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> + unsigned int len)
> {
> - return sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> - (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
> + sha256_base_do_update(shash_desc_ctx(desc), data, len,
> + (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
> + return 0;
> }
>
> -static int sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> - unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> +static int sha256_finup_arm64(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> + unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> {
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> if (len)
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
>
> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
> + return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
> }
>
> -static int sha256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> +static int sha256_final_arm64(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> {
> - return sha256_finup(desc, NULL, 0, out);
> + return sha256_finup_arm64(desc, NULL, 0, out);
> }
>
> static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
> .digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
> .init = sha256_base_init,
> - .update = sha256_update,
> - .final = sha256_final,
> - .finup = sha256_finup,
> + .update = sha256_update_arm64,
> + .final = sha256_final_arm64,
> + .finup = sha256_finup_arm64,
> .descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
> .base.cra_name = "sha256",
> .base.cra_driver_name = "sha256-arm64",
> @@ -73,9 +76,9 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
> }, {
> .digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
> .init = sha224_base_init,
> - .update = sha256_update,
> - .final = sha256_final,
> - .finup = sha256_finup,
> + .update = sha256_update_arm64,
> + .final = sha256_final_arm64,
> + .finup = sha256_finup_arm64,
> .descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
> .base.cra_name = "sha224",
> .base.cra_driver_name = "sha224-arm64",
> @@ -88,18 +91,22 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { {
> static int sha256_update_neon(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len)
> {
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> /*
> * Stacking and unstacking a substantial slice of the NEON register
> * file may significantly affect performance for small updates when
> * executing in interrupt context, so fall back to the scalar code
> * in that case.
> */
> - if (!may_use_simd())
> - return sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + if (!may_use_simd()) {
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
> + return 0;
> + }
>
> kernel_neon_begin();
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_neon);
> kernel_neon_end();
>
> @@ -109,22 +116,24 @@ static int sha256_update_neon(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> static int sha256_finup_neon(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> {
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> if (!may_use_simd()) {
> if (len)
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_data_order);
> } else {
> kernel_neon_begin();
> if (len)
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_neon);
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc,
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_block_neon);
> kernel_neon_end();
> }
> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
> + return crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
> }
>
> static int sha256_final_neon(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c
> index 9e79baf03a4b..e722fbaf0558 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c
> @@ -44,52 +44,60 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_transform_ssse3(u32 *digest, const char *data,
> u64 rounds);
> typedef void (sha256_transform_fn)(u32 *digest, const char *data, u64 rounds);
>
> -static int sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> - unsigned int len, sha256_transform_fn *sha256_xform)
> +static int sha256_fpu_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> + unsigned int len,
> + sha256_transform_fn *sha256_xform)
> {
> struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
>
> if (!irq_fpu_usable() ||
> - (sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) + len < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE)
> - return crypto_sha256_update(desc, data, len);
> + (sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) + len < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) {
> + sha256_update(sctx, data, len);
> + return 0;
> + }
>
> /* make sure casting to sha256_block_fn() is safe */
> BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sha256_state, state) != 0);
>
> kernel_fpu_begin();
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_xform);
> kernel_fpu_end();
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> +static int sha256_fpu_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len, u8 *out, sha256_transform_fn *sha256_xform)
> {
> - if (!irq_fpu_usable())
> - return crypto_sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out);
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> + if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
> + sha256_finup(sctx, data, len, out);
> + return 0;
> + }
>
> kernel_fpu_begin();
> if (len)
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len,
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len,
> (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_xform);
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc, (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_xform);
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx, (sha256_block_fn *)sha256_xform);
> kernel_fpu_end();
>
> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
> + crypto_sha2_final(desc, out);
> + return 0;
> }
>
> static int sha256_ssse3_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len)
> {
> - return sha256_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_ssse3);
> + return sha256_fpu_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_ssse3);
> }
>
> static int sha256_ssse3_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> {
> - return sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_ssse3);
> + return sha256_fpu_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_ssse3);
> }
>
> /* Add padding and return the message digest. */
> @@ -152,13 +160,13 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_transform_avx(u32 *digest, const char *data,
> static int sha256_avx_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len)
> {
> - return sha256_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_avx);
> + return sha256_fpu_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_avx);
> }
>
> static int sha256_avx_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> {
> - return sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_avx);
> + return sha256_fpu_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_avx);
> }
>
> static int sha256_avx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> @@ -236,13 +244,13 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_transform_rorx(u32 *digest, const char *data,
> static int sha256_avx2_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len)
> {
> - return sha256_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_rorx);
> + return sha256_fpu_update(desc, data, len, sha256_transform_rorx);
> }
>
> static int sha256_avx2_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> {
> - return sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_rorx);
> + return sha256_fpu_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_transform_rorx);
> }
>
> static int sha256_avx2_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> @@ -318,13 +326,13 @@ asmlinkage void sha256_ni_transform(u32 *digest, const char *data,
> static int sha256_ni_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len)
> {
> - return sha256_update(desc, data, len, sha256_ni_transform);
> + return sha256_fpu_update(desc, data, len, sha256_ni_transform);
> }
>
> static int sha256_ni_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> {
> - return sha256_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_ni_transform);
> + return sha256_fpu_finup(desc, data, len, out, sha256_ni_transform);
> }
>
> static int sha256_ni_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c b/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c
> index 25e068ba3382..ed6e80b844cf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c
> @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
> * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
> */
>
> -#include "sha256.h"
> +#include <crypto/sha.h>
> #include "../boot/string.h"
>
> struct sha_region {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c
> index 548ca675a14a..724925d5da61 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c
> @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/bitops.h>
> #include <asm/byteorder.h>
> -#include "sha256.h"
> +#include <crypto/sha.h>
> #include "../boot/string.h"
>
> static inline u32 Ch(u32 x, u32 y, u32 z)
> @@ -208,22 +208,7 @@ static void sha256_transform(u32 *state, const u8 *input)
> memset(W, 0, 64 * sizeof(u32));
> }
>
> -int sha256_init(struct sha256_state *sctx)
> -{
> - sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
> - sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
> - sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
> - sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
> - sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
> - sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
> - sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
> - sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
> - sctx->count = 0;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -int sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
> +void sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
> {
> unsigned int partial, done;
> const u8 *src;
> @@ -249,11 +234,9 @@ int sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
> partial = 0;
> }
> memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, src, len - done);
> -
> - return 0;
> }
>
> -int sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
> +void sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
> {
> __be32 *dst = (__be32 *)out;
> __be64 bits;
> @@ -278,6 +261,4 @@ int sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
>
> /* Zeroize sensitive information. */
> memset(sctx, 0, sizeof(*sctx));
> -
> - return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h b/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
> deleted file mode 100644
> index bd15a4127735..000000000000
> --- a/arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
> -/*
> - * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
> - *
> - * Author: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
> - *
> - * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
> - * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
> - */
> -
> -#ifndef SHA256_H
> -#define SHA256_H
> -
> -
> -#include <linux/types.h>
> -#include <crypto/sha.h>
> -
> -extern int sha256_init(struct sha256_state *sctx);
> -extern int sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *input,
> - unsigned int length);
> -extern int sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *hash);
> -
> -#endif /* SHA256_H */
> diff --git a/crypto/sha256_generic.c b/crypto/sha256_generic.c
> index 8f9c47e1a96e..f2747893402c 100644
> --- a/crypto/sha256_generic.c
> +++ b/crypto/sha256_generic.c
> @@ -231,6 +231,13 @@ static void sha256_transform(u32 *state, const u8 *input)
> memzero_explicit(W, 64 * sizeof(u32));
> }
>
> +int sha256_base_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
> +{
> + sha256_init(shash_desc_ctx(desc));
> + return 0;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha256_base_init);
> +
> static void sha256_generic_block_fn(struct sha256_state *sst, u8 const *src,
> int blocks)
> {
> @@ -240,32 +247,49 @@ static void sha256_generic_block_fn(struct sha256_state *sst, u8 const *src,
> }
> }
>
> -int crypto_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> +void sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len)
> {
> - return sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len, sha256_generic_block_fn);
> + sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len, sha256_generic_block_fn);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha256_update);
> +
> +void sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
> +{
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx, sha256_generic_block_fn);
> + sha256_base_finish(sctx, out);
> }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha256_update);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha256_final);
>
> -static int sha256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> +static int crypto_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> + unsigned int len)
> {
> - sha256_base_do_finalize(desc, sha256_generic_block_fn);
> - return sha256_base_finish(desc, out);
> + sha256_update(shash_desc_ctx(desc), data, len);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int crypto_sha2_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> +{
> + struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> +
> + sha256_base_do_finalize(sctx, sha256_generic_block_fn);
> + sha2_base_finish(sctx, crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm), out);
> + return 0;
> }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha2_final);
>
> -int crypto_sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> - unsigned int len, u8 *hash)
> +static int crypto_sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> + unsigned int len, u8 *hash)
> {
> - sha256_base_do_update(desc, data, len, sha256_generic_block_fn);
> - return sha256_final(desc, hash);
> + sha256_finup(shash_desc_ctx(desc), data, len, hash);
> + return 0;
> }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_sha256_finup);
>
> static struct shash_alg sha256_algs[2] = { {
> .digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
> .init = sha256_base_init,
> .update = crypto_sha256_update,
> - .final = sha256_final,
> + .final = crypto_sha2_final,
> .finup = crypto_sha256_finup,
> .descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
> .base = {
> @@ -279,7 +303,7 @@ static struct shash_alg sha256_algs[2] = { {
> .digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
> .init = sha224_base_init,
> .update = crypto_sha256_update,
> - .final = sha256_final,
> + .final = crypto_sha2_final,
> .finup = crypto_sha256_finup,
> .descsize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
> .base = {
> diff --git a/include/crypto/sha.h b/include/crypto/sha.h
> index c94d3eb1cefd..2b6978471605 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/sha.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/sha.h
> @@ -96,11 +96,30 @@ extern int crypto_sha1_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> extern int crypto_sha1_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len, u8 *hash);
>
> -extern int crypto_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> - unsigned int len);
> -
> -extern int crypto_sha256_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> - unsigned int len, u8 *hash);
> +static inline void sha256_init(struct sha256_state *sctx)
> +{
> + sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
> + sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
> + sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
> + sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
> + sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
> + sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
> + sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
> + sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
> + sctx->count = 0;
> +}
> +
> +extern void sha256_update(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data,
> + unsigned int len);
> +
> +extern void sha256_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out);
> +
> +static inline void sha256_finup(struct sha256_state *sctx, const u8 *data,
> + unsigned int len, u8 *hash)
> +{
> + sha256_update(sctx, data, len);
> + sha256_final(sctx, hash);
> +}
>
> extern int crypto_sha512_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len);
> diff --git a/include/crypto/sha256_base.h b/include/crypto/sha256_base.h
> index d1f2195bb7de..f65d9a516b36 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/sha256_base.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/sha256_base.h
> @@ -35,29 +35,13 @@ static inline int sha224_base_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int sha256_base_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
> -{
> - struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> -
> - sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
> - sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
> - sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
> - sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
> - sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
> - sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
> - sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
> - sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
> - sctx->count = 0;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> +extern int sha256_base_init(struct shash_desc *desc);
>
> -static inline int sha256_base_do_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
> +static inline void sha256_base_do_update(struct sha256_state *sctx,
> const u8 *data,
> unsigned int len,
> sha256_block_fn *block_fn)
> {
> - struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
>
> sctx->count += len;
> @@ -86,15 +70,12 @@ static inline int sha256_base_do_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
> }
> if (len)
> memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, len);
> -
> - return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int sha256_base_do_finalize(struct shash_desc *desc,
> +static inline void sha256_base_do_finalize(struct sha256_state *sctx,
> sha256_block_fn *block_fn)
> {
> const int bit_offset = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(__be64);
> - struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> __be64 *bits = (__be64 *)(sctx->buf + bit_offset);
> unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
>
> @@ -109,14 +90,11 @@ static inline int sha256_base_do_finalize(struct shash_desc *desc,
> memset(sctx->buf + partial, 0x0, bit_offset - partial);
> *bits = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count << 3);
> block_fn(sctx, sctx->buf, 1);
> -
> - return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int sha256_base_finish(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> +static inline void sha2_base_finish(struct sha256_state *sctx,
> + unsigned int digest_size, u8 *out)
> {
> - unsigned int digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
> - struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> __be32 *digest = (__be32 *)out;
> int i;
>
> @@ -124,5 +102,11 @@ static inline int sha256_base_finish(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> put_unaligned_be32(sctx->state[i], digest++);
>
> *sctx = (struct sha256_state){};
> - return 0;
> }
> +
> +static inline void sha256_base_finish(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *out)
> +{
> + sha2_base_finish(sctx, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, out);
> +}
> +
> +extern int crypto_sha2_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out);
> --
> 2.9.3
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4.10 1/6] crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu
In-Reply-To: <942b91f25a63b22ec4946378a1fffe78d655cf18.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 6:22 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> There are some pieecs of kernel code that want to compute SHA256
> directly without going through the crypto core. Adjust the exported
> API to decouple it from the crypto core.
>
> I suspect this will very slightly speed up the SHA256 shash operations
> as well by reducing the amount of indirection involved.
>
I should also mention: there's a nice potential cleanup that's
possible on top of this. Currently, most of the accelerated SHA256
implementations just swap out the block function. Another approach to
enabling this would be to restructure sha256_update along the lines
of:
sha256_block_fn_t fn = arch_sha256_block_fn(len);
sha256_base_do_update(sctx, data, len, arch_sha256_block_fn(len));
The idea being that arch code can decide whether to use an accelerated
block function based on context (x86, for example, can't always use
xmm regs) and length (on x86, using the accelerated versions for short
digests is very slow due to the state save/restore that happens) and
then the core code can just use it.
This would allow a lot of the boilerplate that this patch was forced
to modify to be deleted outright.
--Andy
^ permalink raw reply
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 3/6] bpf: Use SHA256 instead of SHA1 for bpf digests
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski, Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
BPF digests are intended to be used to avoid reloading programs that
are already loaded. For use cases (CRIU?) where untrusted programs
are involved, intentional hash collisions could cause the wrong BPF
program to execute. Additionally, if BPF digests are ever used
in-kernel to skip verification, a hash collision could give privilege
escalation directly.
SHA1 is no longer considered adequately collision-resistant (see, for
example, all the major browsers dropping support for SHA1
certificates). Use SHA256 instead.
I moved the digest field to keep all of the bpf program metadata in
the same cache line.
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/filter.h | 11 +++--------
init/Kconfig | 1 +
kernel/bpf/core.c | 41 +++++++----------------------------------
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 702314253797..23df2574e30c 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
-#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <net/sch_generic.h>
@@ -408,11 +409,11 @@ struct bpf_prog {
kmemcheck_bitfield_end(meta);
enum bpf_prog_type type; /* Type of BPF program */
u32 len; /* Number of filter blocks */
- u32 digest[SHA_DIGEST_WORDS]; /* Program digest */
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux; /* Auxiliary fields */
struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; /* Original BPF program */
unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const void *ctx,
const struct bpf_insn *insn);
+ u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* Program digest */
/* Instructions for interpreter */
union {
struct sock_filter insns[0];
@@ -519,12 +520,6 @@ static inline u32 bpf_prog_insn_size(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
return prog->len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn);
}
-static inline u32 bpf_prog_digest_scratch_size(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
-{
- return round_up(bpf_prog_insn_size(prog) +
- sizeof(__be64) + 1, SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES);
-}
-
static inline unsigned int bpf_prog_size(unsigned int proglen)
{
return max(sizeof(struct bpf_prog),
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 223b734abccd..5a4e2d99cc38 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1634,6 +1634,7 @@ config BPF_SYSCALL
bool "Enable bpf() system call"
select ANON_INODES
select BPF
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256_LIB
default n
help
Enable the bpf() system call that allows to manipulate eBPF
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 1eb4f1303756..911993863799 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -148,22 +148,18 @@ void __bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
int bpf_prog_calc_digest(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
- const u32 bits_offset = SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES - sizeof(__be64);
- u32 raw_size = bpf_prog_digest_scratch_size(fp);
- u32 ws[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
- u32 i, bsize, psize, blocks;
+ struct sha256_state sha;
+ u32 i, psize;
struct bpf_insn *dst;
bool was_ld_map;
- u8 *raw, *todo;
- __be32 *result;
- __be64 *bits;
+ u8 *raw;
- raw = vmalloc(raw_size);
+ psize = bpf_prog_insn_size(fp);
+ raw = vmalloc(psize);
if (!raw)
return -ENOMEM;
- sha_init(fp->digest);
- memset(ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+ sha256_init(&sha);
/* We need to take out the map fd for the digest calculation
* since they are unstable from user space side.
@@ -188,30 +184,7 @@ int bpf_prog_calc_digest(struct bpf_prog *fp)
}
}
- psize = bpf_prog_insn_size(fp);
- memset(&raw[psize], 0, raw_size - psize);
- raw[psize++] = 0x80;
-
- bsize = round_up(psize, SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES);
- blocks = bsize / SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES;
- todo = raw;
- if (bsize - psize >= sizeof(__be64)) {
- bits = (__be64 *)(todo + bsize - sizeof(__be64));
- } else {
- bits = (__be64 *)(todo + bsize + bits_offset);
- blocks++;
- }
- *bits = cpu_to_be64((psize - 1) << 3);
-
- while (blocks--) {
- sha_transform(fp->digest, todo, ws);
- todo += SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES;
- }
-
- result = (__force __be32 *)fp->digest;
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_WORDS; i++)
- result[i] = cpu_to_be32(fp->digest[i]);
-
+ sha256_finup(&sha, raw, psize, fp->digest);
vfree(raw);
return 0;
}
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 0/6] Switch BPF's digest to SHA256
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski
Since there are plenty of uses for the new-in-4.10 BPF digest feature
that would be problematic if malicious users could produce collisions,
the BPF digest should be collision-resistant. SHA-1 is no longer
considered collision-resistant, so switch it to SHA-256.
The actual switchover is trivial. Most of this series consists of
cleanups to the SHA256 code to make it usable as a standalone library
(since BPF should not depend on crypto).
The cleaned up library is much more user-friendly than the SHA-1 code,
so this also significantly tidies up the BPF digest code.
This is intended for 4.10. If this series misses 4.10 and nothing
takes its place, then we'll have an unpleasant ABI stability
situation.
Andy Lutomirski (6):
crypto/sha256: Refactor the API so it can be used without shash
crypto/sha256: Make the sha256 library functions selectable
bpf: Use SHA256 instead of SHA1 for bpf digests
bpf: Avoid copying the entire BPF program when hashing it
bpf: Rename fdinfo's prog_digest to prog_sha256
net: Rename TCA*BPF_DIGEST to ..._SHA256
arch/arm/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c | 10 +++---
arch/arm/crypto/sha256_glue.c | 23 +++++++++-----
arch/arm/crypto/sha256_neon_glue.c | 34 ++++++++++----------
arch/arm64/crypto/sha2-ce-glue.c | 13 ++++----
arch/arm64/crypto/sha256-glue.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ssse3_glue.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++-----------
arch/x86/purgatory/purgatory.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.c | 25 ++-------------
arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h | 22 -------------
crypto/Kconfig | 8 +++++
crypto/Makefile | 2 +-
crypto/sha256_generic.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
include/crypto/sha.h | 33 ++++++++++++++++---
include/crypto/sha256_base.h | 40 +++++++----------------
include/linux/filter.h | 11 ++-----
include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h | 2 +-
include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h | 2 +-
init/Kconfig | 1 +
kernel/bpf/core.c | 63 +++++++++----------------------------
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
net/sched/act_bpf.c | 2 +-
net/sched/cls_bpf.c | 2 +-
22 files changed, 225 insertions(+), 231 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 arch/x86/purgatory/sha256.h
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 6/6] net: Rename TCA*BPF_DIGEST to ..._SHA256
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski, Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
This makes it easier to add another digest algorithm down the road if
needed. It also serves to force any programs that might have been
written against a kernel that had the old field name to notice the
change and make any necessary changes.
This shouldn't violate any stable API policies, as no released kernel
has ever had TCA*BPF_DIGEST.
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h | 2 +-
include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h | 2 +-
net/sched/act_bpf.c | 2 +-
net/sched/cls_bpf.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h b/include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h
index cb4bcdc58543..ac6b300c1550 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/pkt_cls.h
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ enum {
TCA_BPF_NAME,
TCA_BPF_FLAGS,
TCA_BPF_FLAGS_GEN,
- TCA_BPF_DIGEST,
+ TCA_BPF_SHA256,
__TCA_BPF_MAX,
};
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h
index a6b88a6f7f71..eae18a7430eb 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_bpf.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ enum {
TCA_ACT_BPF_FD,
TCA_ACT_BPF_NAME,
TCA_ACT_BPF_PAD,
- TCA_ACT_BPF_DIGEST,
+ TCA_ACT_BPF_SHA256,
__TCA_ACT_BPF_MAX,
};
#define TCA_ACT_BPF_MAX (__TCA_ACT_BPF_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/net/sched/act_bpf.c b/net/sched/act_bpf.c
index 1c60317f0121..3868a66d0b24 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_bpf.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_bpf.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int tcf_bpf_dump_ebpf_info(const struct tcf_bpf *prog,
nla_put_string(skb, TCA_ACT_BPF_NAME, prog->bpf_name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
- nla = nla_reserve(skb, TCA_ACT_BPF_DIGEST,
+ nla = nla_reserve(skb, TCA_ACT_BPF_SHA256,
sizeof(prog->filter->digest));
if (nla == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
diff --git a/net/sched/cls_bpf.c b/net/sched/cls_bpf.c
index adc776048d1a..6fc110321621 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_bpf.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_bpf.c
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static int cls_bpf_dump_ebpf_info(const struct cls_bpf_prog *prog,
nla_put_string(skb, TCA_BPF_NAME, prog->bpf_name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
- nla = nla_reserve(skb, TCA_BPF_DIGEST, sizeof(prog->filter->digest));
+ nla = nla_reserve(skb, TCA_BPF_SHA256, sizeof(prog->filter->digest));
if (nla == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC PATCH 4.10 5/6] bpf: Rename fdinfo's prog_digest to prog_sha256
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2016-12-24 2:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel Borkmann, Netdev, LKML, Linux Crypto Mailing List
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Alexei Starovoitov,
Eric Dumazet, Eric Biggers, Tom Herbert, David S. Miller,
Andy Lutomirski, Alexei Starovoitov
In-Reply-To: <cover.1482545792.git.luto@kernel.org>
This makes it easier to add another digest algorithm down the road
if needed. It also serves to force any programs that might have
been written against a kernel that had 'prog_digest' to be updated.
This shouldn't violate any stable API policies, as no released
kernel has ever had 'prog_digest'.
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index e89acea22ecf..956370b80296 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
seq_printf(m,
"prog_type:\t%u\n"
"prog_jited:\t%u\n"
- "prog_digest:\t%s\n"
+ "prog_sha256:\t%s\n"
"memlock:\t%llu\n",
prog->type,
prog->jited,
--
2.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related
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