From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 17:23:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHmME9rTpe4FM2+VSxZB48JDPCNTpSWzHx2DW1om7DW_1PvttQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHmME9q0N3KgWU4XMDmzNjd0EF_HWROBquwXMYXxfssx_VoghA@mail.gmail.com>
Hey again Eric,
One thing led to another and I wound up just rewriting all the crypto
in big_keys.c. I'll include this for v4:
https://git.zx2c4.com/linux-dev/commit/?h=jd/rng-blocker&id=886ff283b9808aecb14aa8e397da8496a9635aed
Not only was the use of crypto/rng inappropriate, but the decision to
go with aes-ecb is shocking. Seeing that this author had no other
commits in the tree, and that all subsequent commits that mentioned
his name were cleaning up his mess, I just went ahead and removed both
the crypto/rng misusage and changed from aes-ecb to aes-gcm.
Anyway, I'll wait for some more reviews on v3, and then this can be
reviewed for v4.
Regards,
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-06 15:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-06 0:50 [PATCH v3 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:50 ` [PATCH v3 01/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:50 ` [PATCH v3 02/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 5:11 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-06 12:21 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:50 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 17:42 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 18:16 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:50 ` [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 3:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 3:56 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 4:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-06 12:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 15:23 ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2017-06-06 17:26 ` Eric Biggers
2017-06-06 17:30 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:03 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:28 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:57 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-06 18:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 22:19 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2017-06-06 23:14 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07 5:00 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-07 14:42 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2017-06-07 21:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-07 17:00 ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-07 17:26 ` Mark Rutland
2017-06-08 3:59 ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-07 17:37 ` Mark Rutland
2017-06-08 12:02 ` Kevin Easton
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 06/13] iscsi: " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 10:08 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use David Howells
2017-06-06 12:23 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
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