From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
arnd@arndb.de
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] libcrypto/chachapoly: Use strict typing for fixed size array arguments
Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2025 21:33:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMj1kXG0RKOE4uQHfWnY1vU_FS+KUkZNNOLCrhC8dfbtf4PUjA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aRePu_IMV5G76kHK@zx2c4.com>
On Fri, 14 Nov 2025 at 21:23, Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 14, 2025 at 07:07:07PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > void xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,
> > const u8 *ad, const size_t ad_len,
> > const u8 (*nonce)[XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE],
> > const u8 (*key)[CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])
> >
> > However, this variant is checked more strictly by the compiler, and only
> > arrays of the correct size are accepted as plain arguments (using the &
> > operator), and so inadvertent mixing up of arguments or passing buffers
> > of an incorrect size will trigger an error at build time.
>
> Interesting idea! And codegen is the same, you say?
>
Well, the address values passed into the functions are the same.
Whether or not some compilers may behave differently as a result is a
different matter: I suppose some heuristics may produce different
results knowing the fixed sizes of the inputs.
> There's another variant of this that doesn't change callsites and keeps
> the single pointer, which more accurate reflects what the function does:
>
> void xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,
> const u8 *ad, const size_t ad_len,
> const u8 nonce[static XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE],
> const u8 key[static CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])
>
Whoah!
> An obscure use of the `static` keyword, but this is what it's used for -
> telling the compiler what size you expect the object to be. Last time I
> investigated this, only clang respected it, but now it looks like gcc
> does too:
>
> zx2c4@thinkpad /tmp $ cat a.c
>
> void blah(unsigned char herp[static 7]);
>
> static void schma(void)
> {
> unsigned char good[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 };
> unsigned char bad[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 };
> blah(good);
> blah(bad);
> }
> zx2c4@thinkpad /tmp $ gcc -c a.c
> a.c: In function ‘schma’:
> a.c:9:9: warning: ‘blah’ accessing 7 bytes in a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
> 9 | blah(bad);
> | ^~~~~~~~~
> a.c:9:9: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘unsigned char[7]’
> a.c:2:6: note: in a call to function ‘blah’
> 2 | void blah(unsigned char herp[static 7]);
> | ^~~~
> zx2c4@thinkpad /tmp $ clang -c a.c
> a.c:9:2: warning: array argument is too small; contains 6 elements, callee requires at least 7
> [-Warray-bounds]
> 9 | blah(bad);
> | ^ ~~~
> a.c:2:25: note: callee declares array parameter as static here
> 2 | void blah(unsigned char herp[static 7]);
> | ^ ~~~~~~~~~~
> 1 warning generated.
>
>
> This doesn't account for buffers that are oversize -- the less dangerous
> case -- but maybe that's fine, to keep "normal" semantics of function
> calls and still get some checking? And adding `static` a bunch of places
> is easy.
Yeah if that is as portable as you say it is, it is a much better
solution, given that the minimum size is the most important:
inadvertently swapping two arguments will still result in a
diagnostic, unless the buffers are the same size, in which case there
is still a bug but not a memory safety issue. And passing a buffer
that is too large is not a memory safety issue either.
> It could apply much wider than just chapoly.
>
Yes, that was always the intent. I used this as an example because it
is low hanging fruit, given that it only has a single user.
> This all makes me wish we had NT's SAL notations though...
>
(quotation needed)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-14 20:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-14 18:07 [RFC PATCH] libcrypto/chachapoly: Use strict typing for fixed size array arguments Ard Biesheuvel
2025-11-14 20:23 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-11-14 20:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2025-11-15 2:14 ` Eric Biggers
2025-11-15 17:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-11-15 17:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-11-15 17:39 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2025-12-02 1:12 ` Alejandro Colomar
2025-12-02 1:57 ` Eric Biggers
2025-12-02 10:14 ` Alejandro Colomar
2025-12-02 13:42 ` Alejandro Colomar
2025-12-02 16:49 ` Eric Biggers
2025-12-02 21:27 ` Alejandro Colomar
2025-12-03 17:24 ` Daniel Thompson
2025-12-03 18:01 ` Alejandro Colomar
2025-12-05 13:59 ` Daniel Thompson
2025-12-13 20:04 ` Alejandro Colomar
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