From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E8428C132; Fri, 1 Mar 2024 20:41:15 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709325676; cv=none; b=mk63uGzspqhC6mDA83ZrizPJcJcNNMWBlUqZ9MAqkCFBv2q6Ri0YYWpjjje6Tp6dFRmM9IN7ws5DCY8npNsrQI94llPIcN1WjGAYyKlRiO9eEWjiJmXFSrjWicwcYIKaCAztLEI06WriwpYLDQ0f/lKK2I99G4eu0SkKJTE1OaM= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709325676; c=relaxed/simple; bh=HIQuNupU1f1nFwHvmn1AN6nyk6XK6SOEQ937XFc1vpw=; h=Mime-Version:Content-Type:Date:Message-Id:Cc:Subject:From:To: References:In-Reply-To; b=hSnX+hpTEeWLzbTDu/L8XQE76Mzgt/tBzQvIL8G7+bqBAwxPeOl8rnXxgXSddkoNTi5B9X6l5R4lduN/1ltZn5TNOKQEn8Z2ukWQLyvq/YoTRqlfbWb5h46bz9b5HgWVsE1vnwRKFQ2ORcy7t0IgFRTR/QEypKCqd+MZeN3vbJM= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=F+nWVMWU; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="F+nWVMWU" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CFE26C433C7; Fri, 1 Mar 2024 20:41:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1709325675; bh=HIQuNupU1f1nFwHvmn1AN6nyk6XK6SOEQ937XFc1vpw=; h=Date:Cc:Subject:From:To:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=F+nWVMWULrL7L81dd09yiXj3EMkHxwfJuq6l5EwUyDtKEYpl3wZzLnlv7vjTV55ll qEHMMvnoS2J3Ia7mNTtRsl7gOpBHG/j2j+9U13LReIRy/Jg9nu8c3k7sp6xkhLgFc3 Hz2LzW/oV5UaixAn9B93Z9nOQzs8U76mdEugZBpAduEPBzQghiTDXdTaCNCKDkoPUT 3UcnFfEBuEnLp4rqKRfnYVPf10JfQVanxIr4iSODrdxr3FMD0I7ujm/k68UvdQMQj1 13/vtU66WvbXasn/sAWLmM0Zkgs3rR7xMumJnl1wzH3YD3JjzJ8ZxYn3P3QVZuNYri Y5JtnWSHh2xsQ== Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Date: Fri, 01 Mar 2024 22:41:11 +0200 Message-Id: Cc: , , Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 09/12] crypto: ecdsa - Rename keylen to bufsize where necessary From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" To: "Stefan Berger" , , , , X-Mailer: aerc 0.15.2 References: <20240301022007.344948-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> <20240301022007.344948-10-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <20240301022007.344948-10-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> On Fri Mar 1, 2024 at 4:20 AM EET, Stefan Berger wrote: > In some cases the name keylen does not reflect the purpose of the variabl= e > anymore once NIST P521 is used but it is the size of the buffer. There- > for, rename keylen to bufsize where appropriate. > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger > --- > crypto/ecdsa.c | 12 ++++++------ > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c > index 4daefb40c37a..4e847b59622a 100644 > --- a/crypto/ecdsa.c > +++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c > @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ struct ecdsa_signature_ctx { > static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned cha= r tag, > const void *value, size_t vlen, unsigned int ndigits) > { > - size_t keylen =3D ndigits * sizeof(u64); > - ssize_t diff =3D vlen - keylen; > + size_t bufsize =3D ndigits * sizeof(u64); why not just "* 8"? using sizeof here makes this function only unreadable. > + ssize_t diff =3D vlen - bufsize; > const char *d =3D value; > u8 rs[ECC_MAX_BYTES]; > =20 > @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdr= len, unsigned char tag, > if (diff) > return -EINVAL; > } > - if (-diff >=3D keylen) > + if (-diff >=3D bufsize) > return -EINVAL; > =20 > if (diff) { > @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) > { > struct crypto_akcipher *tfm =3D crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req); > struct ecc_ctx *ctx =3D akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); > - size_t keylen =3D ctx->curve->g.ndigits * sizeof(u64); > + size_t bufsize =3D ctx->curve->g.ndigits * sizeof(u64); > struct ecdsa_signature_ctx sig_ctx =3D { > .curve =3D ctx->curve, > }; > @@ -165,14 +165,14 @@ static int ecdsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *re= q) > goto error; > =20 > /* if the hash is shorter then we will add leading zeros to fit to ndig= its */ > - diff =3D keylen - req->dst_len; > + diff =3D bufsize - req->dst_len; > if (diff >=3D 0) { > if (diff) > memset(rawhash, 0, diff); > memcpy(&rawhash[diff], buffer + req->src_len, req->dst_len); > } else if (diff < 0) { > /* given hash is longer, we take the left-most bytes */ > - memcpy(&rawhash, buffer + req->src_len, keylen); > + memcpy(&rawhash, buffer + req->src_len, bufsize); > } > =20 > ecc_swap_digits((u64 *)rawhash, hash, ctx->curve->g.ndigits); BR, Jarkko