From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Ross Philipson" <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
<linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>, <iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>,
<mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>, <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
<peterhuewe@gmx.de>, <jgg@ziepe.ca>, <luto@amacapital.net>,
<nivedita@alum.mit.edu>, <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
<davem@davemloft.net>, <corbet@lwn.net>, <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
<dwmw2@infradead.org>, <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
<kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com>, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
<trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support
Date: Tue, 04 Jun 2024 23:05:34 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <D1RI46IG5GSA.17H7M0DIQGRQ0@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240531010331.134441-11-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
On Fri May 31, 2024 at 4:03 AM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
> On Intel, the APs are left in a well documented state after TXT performs
> the late launch. Specifically they cannot have #INIT asserted on them so
> a standard startup via INIT/SIPI/SIPI cannot be performed. Instead the
> early SL stub code uses MONITOR and MWAIT to park the APs. The realmode/init.c
> code updates the jump address for the waiting APs with the location of the
> Secure Launch entry point in the RM piggy after it is loaded and fixed up.
> As the APs are woken up by writing the monitor, the APs jump to the Secure
> Launch entry point in the RM piggy which mimics what the real mode code would
> do then jumps to the standard RM piggy protected mode entry point.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 3 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 3 ++
> arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S | 3 ++
> arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 32 +++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> index 87e5482acd0d..339b48e2543d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
> @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ struct real_mode_header {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> u32 machine_real_restart_seg;
> #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
> + u32 sl_trampoline_start32;
> +#endif
> };
>
> /* This must match data at realmode/rm/trampoline_{32,64}.S */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
> index 0c35207320cb..adb521221d6c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
> @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
> #include <linux/stackprotector.h>
> #include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
> #include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>
> #include <asm/acpi.h>
> #include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
> @@ -868,6 +869,56 @@ int common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
> +
> +static bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
> +{
> + if ((slaunch_get_flags() & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE|SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) ==
> + (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT))
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
static inline bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
{
u32 mask = SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT;
return slaunch_get_flags() & mask == mask;
}
> +
> +/*
> + * TXT AP startup is quite different than normal. The APs cannot have #INIT
> + * asserted on them or receive SIPIs. The early Secure Launch code has parked
> + * the APs using monitor/mwait. This will wake the APs by writing the monitor
> + * and have them jump to the protected mode code in the rmpiggy where the rest
> + * of the SMP boot of the AP will proceed normally.
> + */
> +static void slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(int cpu, int apicid)
> +{
> + struct sl_ap_wake_info *ap_wake_info;
> + struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *stack_monitor = NULL;
struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *stack_monitor; /* note: no initialization */
struct sl_ap_wake_info *ap_wake_info;
> +
> + ap_wake_info = slaunch_get_ap_wake_info();
> +
> + stack_monitor = (struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *)__va(ap_wake_info->ap_wake_block +
> + ap_wake_info->ap_stacks_offset);
> +
> + for (unsigned int i = TXT_MAX_CPUS - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
> + if (stack_monitor[i].apicid == apicid) {
> + /* Write the monitor */
I'd remove this comment.
> + stack_monitor[i].monitor = 1;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(int cpu, int apicid)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* !CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH */
> +
> /*
> * NOTE - on most systems this is a PHYSICAL apic ID, but on multiquad
> * (ie clustered apic addressing mode), this is a LOGICAL apic ID.
> @@ -877,7 +928,7 @@ int common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
> static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
> {
> unsigned long start_ip = real_mode_header->trampoline_start;
> - int ret;
> + int ret = 0;
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> /* If 64-bit wakeup method exists, use the 64-bit mode trampoline IP */
> @@ -922,12 +973,15 @@ static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
>
> /*
> * Wake up a CPU in difference cases:
> + * - Intel TXT DRTM launch uses its own method to wake the APs
> * - Use a method from the APIC driver if one defined, with wakeup
> * straight to 64-bit mode preferred over wakeup to RM.
> * Otherwise,
> * - Use an INIT boot APIC message
> */
> - if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
> + if (slaunch_is_txt_launch())
> + slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(cpu, apicid);
> + else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
> ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64(apicid, start_ip);
> else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu)
> ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu(apicid, start_ip);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> index f9bc444a3064..d95776cb30d3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
> #include <linux/memblock.h>
> #include <linux/cc_platform.h>
> #include <linux/pgtable.h>
> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>
> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> #include <asm/realmode.h>
> @@ -210,6 +211,8 @@ void __init init_real_mode(void)
>
> setup_real_mode();
> set_real_mode_permissions();
> +
> + slaunch_fixup_jump_vector();
> }
>
> static int __init do_init_real_mode(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
> index 2eb62be6d256..3b5cbcbbfc90 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
> @@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ SYM_DATA_START(real_mode_header)
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> .long __KERNEL32_CS
> #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
> + .long pa_sl_trampoline_start32
> +#endif
> SYM_DATA_END(real_mode_header)
>
> /* End signature, used to verify integrity */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
> index 14d9c7daf90f..b0ce6205d7ea 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
> @@ -122,6 +122,38 @@ SYM_CODE_END(sev_es_trampoline_start)
>
> .section ".text32","ax"
> .code32
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
> + .balign 4
> +SYM_CODE_START(sl_trampoline_start32)
> + /*
> + * The early secure launch stub AP wakeup code has taken care of all
> + * the vagaries of launching out of TXT. This bit just mimics what the
> + * 16b entry code does and jumps off to the real startup_32.
> + */
> + cli
> + wbinvd
> +
> + /*
> + * The %ebx provided is not terribly useful since it is the physical
> + * address of tb_trampoline_start and not the base of the image.
> + * Use pa_real_mode_base, which is fixed up, to get a run time
> + * base register to use for offsets to location that do not have
> + * pa_ symbols.
> + */
> + movl $pa_real_mode_base, %ebx
> +
> + LOCK_AND_LOAD_REALMODE_ESP lock_pa=1
> +
> + lgdt tr_gdt(%ebx)
> + lidt tr_idt(%ebx)
> +
> + movw $__KERNEL_DS, %dx # Data segment descriptor
> +
> + /* Jump to where the 16b code would have jumped */
> + ljmpl $__KERNEL32_CS, $pa_startup_32
> +SYM_CODE_END(sl_trampoline_start32)
> +#endif
> +
> .balign 4
> SYM_CODE_START(startup_32)
> movl %edx, %ss
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-04 20:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 113+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-31 1:03 [PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 01/19] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:28 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 02/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:31 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:00 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05 0:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 0:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 2:33 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05 4:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 19:03 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-06 6:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-06 16:49 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-20 0:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-20 16:55 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 05/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:52 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 2:16 ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-31 13:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
2024-08-15 17:38 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-08-15 19:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-16 10:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 11:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-08-16 11:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 18:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-19 18:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-19 18:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-20 15:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-22 18:29 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-08-29 3:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-08-29 3:25 ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-29 17:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-05 1:01 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-13 0:34 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-14 3:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-21 18:36 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-21 22:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-02 14:53 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-02 16:04 ` James Bottomley
2024-11-15 1:17 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-18 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 18:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 19:12 ` James Bottomley
2024-11-18 20:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 20:11 ` ross.philipson
2024-11-21 20:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 22:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-22 23:37 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-12 19:56 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-12-12 22:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-12-14 2:56 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 16:18 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 18:14 ` Eric Biggers
2024-08-28 20:14 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-28 23:13 ` Eric Biggers
2024-06-04 18:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:02 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 07/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 13:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 14:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 16:13 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:31 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:24 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:33 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 20:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 21:12 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:14 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 19:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:09 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 19:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:16 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 19:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:17 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-12 19:02 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-15 18:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2024-06-04 21:47 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 11/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 12/19] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 13/19] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 18:52 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 14/19] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 19:24 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 15/19] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 22:14 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:04 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 17/19] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 19/19] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:22 ` ross.philipson
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